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ABSTRACT
This study seeks to improve our understanding of the drivers of civil conflict
through a synthesis of the grievance and feasibility approaches. It begins with two
premises. The first is that the proponents of the feasibility explanation of conflict onset—
who suggest that civil conflict will occur where it can happen—did not use theoretically
justified measures of grievance in making their determination that motives have little
bearing as drivers of conflict. The second premise is that the grievance literature that
improved upon those measures did not fully consider feasibility in their models, leaving
questions remaining regarding whether and to what degree more sound measures of
grievance improve our current understanding of when and where conflict occurs. The
research presented here seeks to address those limitations by adding updated grievance
measures to the feasibility model to determine whether the feasibility hypothesis ought to
be reconsidered.
In this study several of the new measures of grievance remain significantly related
with onset when they are added to the feasibility model, suggesting that grievance levels
do influence civil conflict likelihood. However, the inclusion of the improved grievance
measures does not statistically improve the ability of the feasibility model to classify
onset and non-conflict periods correctly. Therefore, while grievances may be related with
conflict onset, the onus is still on those in the “grievance camp” to illustrate the manner
in which knowing grievance levels improves our ability to predict civil conflict onset.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s, more than 20 percent of the world’s countries experienced
some degree of internal armed conflict (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). These conflicts
resulted in millions of human casualties and cost billions of dollars that instead could
have been put toward education, infrastructure, or health care (Oxfam, 2007). Given the
enormous human and economic costs of violent civil conflict, there is much interest
among both academics and policy-makers in determining and addressing its causes.
However, after decades of research and the publication of dozens of models intended to
distill the determinants of civil conflict (see, e.g., Marshall, 2008), there is still much
debate surrounding its principal drivers.
One of the primary debates regarding the causes of intrastate violence is that of
“grievance versus greed.” This debate entered the academic mainstream after Collier and
Hoeffler (2004) pitted the two theories against one another as competing explanations of
civil conflict onset. The “grievance-based” explanation, they argued, tends to be preferred
by political scientists and sociologists who suggest that conflict is rooted in issues of
identity, oppression, or inequality. From these proposed classes of grievance, Collier and
Hoeffler developed a series of “grievance models” and found that only one grievance
variable—political repression—appeared to be statistically significant, and that the
models’ pseudo R-squareds were a relatively low 0.11 to 0.17.
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Collier and Hoeffler (2004) then compared these grievance models with what they
termed “greed” models of conflict. The intent of the “greed” models was to capture a
more economic explanation of onset that suggests there will always be incentives for
taking control of or seceding from the state, whether those incentives are increased access
to political power or financial gain. Because motives are ubiquitous, then, the primary
predictor of where civil war will occur ought to be where the opportunity for rebellion
exists. Therefore, the “greed” models focus on measures of the availability of potential
rebels, their opportunity costs for engaging in rebellion, the ability to finance the
rebellion, and the capacity of the state. In these models, far more variables remained
significant when compared with the grievance models,1 the political repression variable
lost its significance, and the pseudo R-squareds ranged from 0.22 to 0.25. These findings
prompted the authors to conclude that opportunities for rebellion are more salient than are
grievances in explaining where and when civil conflict occurs.
In the years immediately following Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) research, one
criticism of their conclusion was that several of the indicators intended to measure
opportunities may have captured grievances as well. For example, Collier and Hoeffler
interpreted male secondary schooling enrolment rates as indicative of the opportunity
cost for potential rebels, when it may indicate a grievance-inducing lack of public
services or lack of access to services that do exist. Likewise, GDP per capita and growth
in GDP per capita were also interpreted by Collier and Hoeffler in terms of opportunity
cost, when they both could indicate grievance propensity as well.
In response to this criticism, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) published a
follow-up study which focused on the “feasibility” of armed civil conflict using less
1

Male secondary schooling enrolment rates, population, GDP/capita, GDP growth, diaspora, primary
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ambiguous indicators. They included the proportion of young men relative to the total
population rather than secondary schooling enrolment rates, and added a variable
delineating former French African colonies, who had French security guarantees between
independence and 1989. In this more recent work, again no measures of inequality were
significant in the models, and political repression was not significant. The new measures
of feasibility, though, remained significant in their model. Based on these findings,
Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner concluded with their feasibility hypothesis that, “[W]here
rebellion is feasible it will occur: motivation is indeterminate” (2009, p. 24). The
feasibility hypothesis and its derivatives remain the preferred explanations of civil
conflict onset among economists today (Young, 2016).
In spite of Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner’s steadfastness on the limited role of
grievance in intrastate conflict onset, the “greed” versus grievance debate continues.
More recently, rather than criticizing the ambiguity of the greed measures, scholars
interested in grievances have suggested that the grievance measures proposed in the
opportunity and feasibility literature “lack strong theoretical justification” (Buhaug,
Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014). A more detailed case for this argument will be presented
in chapter 2, but a summary is provided here.
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) proposed three primary categories of grievance:
inequality, identity-based tension or hatred, and political repression or exclusion. To
capture inequality, Collier and Hoeffler used the Gini index and a land Gini that measures
differences in land holdings among individuals. There are two major limitations to using
these types of measures as indicators of conflict-driving grievances. First, civil conflict is
a collective rather than individual action. Therefore, inequalities that exist along identity-
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based lines are much more likely to drive conflict than are those that simply exist among
individuals (Stewart, 2008). Second, Gini indices measure actual differences, but there is
little reason to suggest that differences alone are enough to cause grievance. Instead,
inequalities are thought to lead to frustration and the possibility of aggression when the
discrepancies are perceived to be unjust (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). For
example, there are large differences in median incomes among different religious groups
in the United States (Kosmin & Keysar, 2006). However, these differences may be
explained away using varying beliefs regarding the importance of education, the cultural
value placed on jobs with varying returns, or the meaning of material wealth (Leonhardt,
2011). Because the differences are not perceived to be grounded in an injustice such as
religiously-based discrimination, one rarely hears of a call to action due to religouslybased income inequality in the U.S.
In measuring the second category of grievance, identity-based tension, Collier and
Hoeffler drew on several indicators of ethnic, religious, and social diversity, as well as
the distribution of different demographic groups within the state. They argue that in order
for such tensions to exist, varying identity-based groups must be put in contact with one
another. However, while diversity may be necessary in order for issues of identity to lead
to conflict, there is little reason to believe that the existence of multiple identity groups
within a space is sufficient to lead to grievance. Instead, similar to the collective action
argument described above, a perceived injustice among those groups would be necessary.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Collier and Hoeffler’s measures of identity-based
tension were not often related with conflict onset, even if such tensions are conflictinducing.
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The third category of grievance Collier and Hoeffler (2004) outlined was political
repression or exclusion. Here, they drew on an ordinal measure of regime type that coded
full democracies at one end, full autocracies at the other, and partial democracies and
autocracies in the middle. The major limitation of this measure is that it may conflate
regime type and capacity. That is, both partial democracies and partial autocracies may
be considered “partials” because they lack the capacity to fully implement a desired
regime type (be that autocratic or democratic) (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch,
2001). Therefore, the relationship between Collier and Hoeffler’s measure of regime type
and onset may be inverted U-shaped, as the states with a greater capacity to suppress
conflict exist at the poles. The relationship between repression and conflict may appear to
be inconsistent and contradictory not because grievances are unrelated with onset, but
because the variable used to capture repression is also measuring state capacity.
Given the limitations in the measures described above, there has been much
interest over the last decade in determining and implementing more theoretically sound
measures of grievance in quantitative conflict studies (e.g., Buhaug, Cederman, &
Gleditsch, 2014; Buhaug, Gleditsch, Holtermann, Østby, & Tollesen, 2011; Esteban &
Ray, 2011; Fearon, 2011; Goldstone et al., 2010; Hegre, Karlsen, Nygard, Strand, &
Urdal, 2013; Østby, 2007; Østby, 2008; Østby, 2009; Vreeland, 2008). This response
from the “grievance camp” has found that asset-, income-, and education-based
inequalities among groups are correlated with conflict onset, and that state spending to
decrease grievances also decreases conflict likelihood.
The major limitation of this new wave of grievance literature is that, while it is in
many ways written as a response to the feasibility argument, its authors tend to treat

5

grievances independently from the feasibility explanation of conflict. That is, while
feasibility includes the dimensions of recruitment, finance, and state capacity, often the
only control variables for feasibility included in the new grievance research are GDP per
capita and the state’s population. Therefore, while the research illustrates a correlation
between grievances and onset, the degree to which a grievance account of conflict adds to
the current feasibility explanation remains unclear.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The major questions guiding this study are: Do improved measures of grievance
add to our ability to explain where and when civil conflict occurs? More specifically,
does the development and incorporation of more theoretically justifiable measures of
grievance merit altering the feasibility hypothesis, and in what ways? Answering these
questions relies on the formulation of several competing hypotheses regarding the
expected effect of updated grievance measures on the feasibility model. If the Collier,
Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) are correct and “motivation is indeterminate” (p. 24), then
the updated grievance measures ought not to remain significant when added to the
feasibility model, or their effect sizes ought to be much smaller than those of the
feasibility variables. Further, the updated grievance measures ought not to improve the
ability of the model to classify onset and non-conflict periods correctly. However, if the
feasibility hypothesis is incomplete and grievances do affect conflict likelihood, then the
grievance variables will remain significant when added to the feasibility model, their
effect sizes will be comparable with those capturing feasibility, and the model’s
predictive power ought to improve.
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Two sub-questions are also considered to determine the relative role of grievances
and feasibility in determining when and where intrastate conflict occurs. They are: How
do the updated grievance indicators compare as a whole with the feasibility model? And,
do the new grievance measures remain salient when feasibility is taken into account? In
an effort to answer the former question, the feasibility model as a whole is compared with
an updated “grievance” model in a method derived from Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004)
“greed” versus “grievance” research. To address the latter, a series of stepwise
regressions are run to determine whether the grievance measures remain in the feasibility
model after the least salient measures are removed.
The Importance of the Greed versus Grievance Debate
The primary intent of this research is to add to the theoretical debate surrounding
the roles of opportunity and grievance in driving civil conflict. By considering grievances
alongside the feasibility argument we can determine whether and to what degree these
new measures of grievance add to our current feasibility-based understanding and
explanation of onset. The findings do have policy implications as well, however.
If the Collier camp is correct, and the rectification of grievances is not related
with decreases in conflict likelihood, then given limited resources the appropriate
approach to increasing stability would be to prioritize state capacity over grievance
propensity reduction. This economically-focused approach is precisely that which the
Bretton Woods Institutions took with their Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) the
1970s, 80s, and 90s.
The exact terms of the SAPs varied from loan to loan, but they typically involved
some combination of currency devaluation, decreased government spending and
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regulation, the elimination of subsidies, and the liberalization of trade (Riddell, 1992).
The intent of the conditions was to increase government revenue in order to increase the
likelihood that the loan would be repaid. The effects of this emphasis on economic
development at the expense of the civil sector, though, are less clear.
At best, the SAPs ignored existing inequalities and grievances within borrowing
states. At worst, existing grievances were exacerbated. For example, in 1986 Sierra
Leone requested IMF assistance. One condition of the loan was that the state had to unpeg its currency from the IMF’s Special Drawing Right (SDR), and allow its exchange
rate to float (Hoogvelt, 1987). Within the year, the value of the leone fell against other
international currencies by 80 percent (Hoogvelt, 1987). The price of basic goods like
soap, kerosene, and firewood increased three- and four-fold (Riddell, 1992). As Hoogvelt
phrased it, “It was, the people said, as if ‘tiefs’ had come in the night, ‘all de money
gone’” (1987, p. 80).
Not only did the devaluation lead to a decrease in citizens’ capabilities, but the
policies also likely increased existing inequalities. The privately owned diamond mines,
run by the ruling families and their supporters, continued to operate with few taxes or
restrictions and they maintained their profits. As government spending decreased, though,
many civil service jobs including those in the education sector were cut. Therefore, as
incomes in the private sector dominated by a few families remained the same or rose,
individuals in the public sector lost their jobs. Simultaneously, the reduction in teachers
resulted in the education system crumbling and bands of thousands of young men and
women attempting to enter an already flooded marketplace (Gberie, 2005).
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Judging by the IMF’s metric, the 1986 loan and adjustments were a success.
Sierra Leone received and repaid the full amount of the loan. The country also
experienced positive growth in GDP in 1989, 1990, and 1991. However, by 1991, the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) had recruited enough of the state’s disaffected youth
to attempt to overthrow the Sierra Leonean government. The resulting civil war lasted
more than decade. While accounts vary, between 50,000 and 300,000 people were killed,
and more than 2 million people were displaced in the ensuing violence (Gberie, 2005).
While the SAPs preceded Collier’s “greed” versus grievance work, both the SAPs
and Collier’s policy recommendations follow a similar logic regarding the roles of the
state, state capacity, and grievances in both development and stability. That is, both
approaches assume that state capacity is the priority, and therefore that policy
prescriptions intended for economic development or increased stability do not need to
take grievance levels into account. Instead, the focus is on increased economic output,
revenue, or resources without regard for civil services or equitability. However, as the
case of Sierra Leone illustrates, the feasibility explanation of conflict may be incomplete.
If grievances are related with violent conflict onset even when feasibility is controlled
for, then the emphasis on capacity without regard for grievance propensity can have
devastating consequences for both development and stability.
Structure of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 provides the backdrop for this study. It begins with a more detailed
examination of the path that led to the current feasibility hypothesis and its critics. The
concepts of greed, grievance, motive, opportunity, and feasibility are then defined, due to
their sometimes overlapping and intersecting meanings in the conflict literature. A
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discussion of the opportunity and feasibility literature follows. In that discussion, the
indicators of grievance employed in the opportunity and feasibility literature are more
thoroughly discussed, and their limitations are again delimited. At that time, the conflict
theory literature is also briefly introduced. The core of the feasibility model is then laid
out, which later serves as the reference against which the updated grievance models are
evaluated. The chapter then shifts to a thorough discussion of the theories of absolute
deprivation and relative deprivation that are thought to drive conflict. Throughout the
section, the relative merits of various proposed measures are debated, and the justification
for the measures used in this research is provided. As each measure is determined, its
associated hypotheses are put forward.
Chapter 3 lists the precise measurements, data sources, and statistical techniques
employed in this research. The logic underlying the research approach is presented, along
with the methods used for updating Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner’s (2009) dataset. The
data used for all of the motive indicators are presented, along with methods of
imputation, where applicable. The calculations for any aggregated measures are also put
forward. In some cases, the challenges or limitations to the data are introduced, but they
are not discussed fully until chapter 5. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the
logic underlying the logit regression technique, and the method that is employed in
comparing the relative strengths of the models.
Chapter 4 presents the data and findings. In the first section of the chapter, the
univariate data are provided, including a comparison of the data employed by Collier,
Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) and that used in this research. The bivariate relationships
between the updated grievance measures and conflict onset are then presented. Next, the
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feasibility model as a whole is compared with a combined grievance model. This overall
comparison is followed by a series of tests in which each of the updated independent
grievance measures and some combinations of grievance measures are added to the
feasibility model to determine the degree to which they improve the model’s
classificatory power. The stepwise regressions meant to determine whether the grievance
measures remain salient when included in the overall feasibility model are also presented.
Chapter 4 concludes with an exploration of the interactions between some of the terms.
The precise roles of GDP per capita and absolute deprivation on onset are considered,
along with the relationships among different types of basic human needs.
Chapter 5 outlines the conclusions that can be drawn, the limitations of the current
research, and the suggestions for further research. The discussion includes the
implications of this research both in terms of the theoretical debate between the role of
feasibility and that of grievances, and the policy implications. The work concludes with
an examination of the limitations of the methods and measures employed, and with
suggestions for a path forward in furthering our abilities to explain and understand the
causes of violent civil conflict.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Research on civil war onset has evolved through several stages since the 1960s.
The early work by sociologists and political scientists focused on motives as the primary
drivers of conflict. Davies (1962), for example, argued that revolutions are most likely
when long periods of economic or social improvements precede a drastic decline over a
short period. A similar theory was proposed by Ted Gurr (1970), who suggested that such
relative deprivation—deprivation compared with some referent—may occur due to the
differences between expectations and capabilities over time as Davies contended, or due
to differences between capabilities and expectations relative to an outside referent group.
These works largely emphasized the psychological component of conflict that suggests
that if there is a gap between what people have and what they think they deserve,
frustration results, leading to aggression. Further, if the opportunity exists under such
frustrating conditions, they will rebel.
Both Davies and Gurr drew on empirical data to support their theories, but the
generalizability of both was also questionable. Davies’s work was primarily qualitative,
citing Dorr’s Rebellion, the 1917 Russian Revolution, and the 1952 Egyptian Revolution
as evidence in support of his theory. Gurr’s (1970) research combined qualitative and
quantitative data, drawing heavily on 1,100 “strife events” that occurred between 19611965. The limited time period, and ambiguity surrounding what qualified as “strife”
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makes the usefulness of this theory in explaining civil war onset in more recent cases
uncertain.
Later tests using cross-national time series data of the link between proposed
indicators of grievances and civil conflict onset yielded inconsistent and sometimes
contradictory results (Young, 2016). For example, Lichbach’s (1989) meta-analysis of
research on income inequality and conflict onset cites studies in which the relationship
between the two is found to be positive, negative, U-shaped, inverted U-shaped, and nonexistent. Partially in response to these ambiguous findings, economists in particular
began to take interest in whether there were factors other than grievance that better
explained when and where conflict occurs (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Collier,
Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2004),
for example, explored competing theories of motive (which they termed “grievance”),
and opportunities that are conducive to rebellion (which they termed “greed”) in
explaining onset. They found that their “greed” models held substantially more
explanatory power than did the “grievance” models, and concluded that economic factors
that increased the opportunity for rebellion are more salient than are grievance-levels
motives in explaining where civil wars occur.
Collier and Hoeffler’s research with Rohner (2009) took this argument one step
further. They argued in this more recent work that “motivation is indeterminate” (p. 24)
in predicting when and where conflict will occur, and put forward what they term their
feasibility hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that “where rebellion is feasible it will
occur” (p. 24) without regard for grievance levels. This theory is also consistent with
Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) argument that state capacity is the strongest indicator of
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where civil conflict will occur. That is, if the state does not have the ability to counter
insurgency, then rebellion becomes more feasible, and, therefore, more likely.
Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) conclude by stating
An implication of the feasibility hypothesis is that if the incidence of civil war is
to be reduced, which seems appropriate given its appalling consequences, it will
need to be made more difficult. This is orthogonal to the rectification of justified
grievances, the case for which is implied directly by the concept of ‘justified
grievance’ without any need to invoke perilous consequences from the failure to
do so. (p. 24)
In other words, their research suggests that those committed to the reduction of violent
manifestations of civil conflict ought to direct their efforts toward decreasing its ease,
without needing to take into consideration the reduction of grievances. The authors do
imply that the rectification of grievances is valuable in its own right, but that it is
tangential to the goal of violent conflict mitigation.
More recent research suggests that the conclusions drawn in the opportunity and
feasibility literature and the policy recommendations that follow from it deserve to be
reconsidered. Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014), for example, argue that the
“contradictory findings [relating grievances to onset] of the civil war literature to a large
extent stem from the use of empirical measures of inequality and grievances that lack
strong theoretical justification” (p. 418). Using a new set of indicators that were designed
to capture grievance propensity from inequalities that occur along identity-based lines
rather than simply differences among individuals, they found that both a group’s decline
in political status and economic inequalities among groups were associated with conflict
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onset. However, the explanatory power of the Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch model
was not substantial (highest pseudo-R2 = 0.11). In addition, the only variables used to
control for feasibility and opportunity were GDP per capita and population. These limited
control measures are problematic for a couple of reasons. First, both GDP per capita and
population may capture grievance in addition to opportunity. That is, citizens in countries
with lower GDP per capita likely find it more difficult to meet their basic needs, and
areas with larger populations have a greater likelihood of including some aggrieved
group. Second, using GDP per capita and population as the sole measures of opportunity
ignores opportunities for rebel finance,2 the recruitable-base of the population,3 and
geographic4 and historical5 features that may affect the feasibility of rebellion. If the
argument is to be made that knowing grievance levels increases one’s ability to predict
where civil conflict will occur, then the effect of grievances ought to be measured while
taking the additional factors influencing feasibility into account. As will be further
discussed below, the use of a few limited variables to control for feasibility is common in
the grievance literature.
The research presented here is driven by the two major premises outlined above.
The first is that the operationalization of grievances in the opportunity and feasibility
literature does not adequately capture the levels of potentially conflict-causing grievance
in a given country. The second is that research that finds more carefully considered and
justifiable measures of grievance to be correlated with civil conflict onset has not tended
to control well for opportunity and feasibility. The questions these premises result in,
2

Which CHR capture using primary commodities exports.
Which CHR capture through the proportion of the population who are young men.
4
Which CHR capture using a measure of mountainous terrain.
5
E.G., French security guarantees from the 1960s through the 1990s.
3
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then, are: Do improved measures of grievance add to our ability to explain where and
when civil conflict occurs? And, more specifically, does the development and
incorporation of more theoretically justifiable measures of grievance merit altering the
feasibility hypothesis, and in what ways?
The remainder of this chapter explores the two guiding premises in more detail. In
the first section, some definitions are specified that are used throughout the rest of this
research. In the second section, the opportunity and feasibility models are discussed, and
some limitations to their measures of grievance are outlined. Finally, the theories linking
grievances to civil conflict are examined, along with the literature that incorporates more
theoretically sound measures of grievance. Where necessary, new measures are also
proposed. Several competing hypotheses are presented as they emerge throughout the
section on updated grievance measures. The major proposition is that if grievance levels
do influence the likelihood of conflict, the new measures ought to both remain
significantly related with onset when feasibility is controlled for, and they ought to
significantly improve the ability of the feasibility model to classify conflict and peace
periods.
Defining Grievance, Motive, Opportunity, and Feasibility
Four terms that will be used extensively throughout this research are motive,
grievance, opportunity, and feasibility. Motives, in the general sense, are reasons or goals
for action. Here, the term motive will apply to conditions that may incentivize an actor
toward violent conflict. In rational choice terms, motives would be the “benefits” of the
cost-benefit analysis. For example, if a person’s ethnic group is discriminated against in
the political arena, he or she may believe that condition can be improved under a different
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regime. If regime change through legitimate means is not possible, then advancement of
political rights may be the motive for—or perceived benefit of—conflict.
Grievances are often thought of as motives that are social or political rather than
economic. The term grievance is commonly paired with that of greed following Collier
and Hoeffler’s (2004) comparison of “grievance-based” and “greed-based” models of
conflict onset. This pairing is somewhat unfortunate, because it occasionally leads to a
belief that Collier and Hoeffler intended for grievance and greed to be thought of as
competing types of motive (e.g., as described by Fearon & Laitin, 2003 and Guttentag,
2012), which is not the case. The reality is that Collier and Hoeffler used the term greed
to delineate economic indicators intended to capture rebels’ increased opportunities to
engage in conflict rather than motives. Their “greed” models stemmed from the
assumption that motives for conflict are pervasive, and therefore that opportunities for
conflict took primacy. They used grievance, on the other hand, to refer to motives—
primarily ethnic tensions, political repression, and inequalities—that incentivized
conflict. In order to help disambiguate greed-based motives from the opportunity models
used by Collier and Hoeffler, the latter will be identified in quotes, as “greed” models
where appropriate.
The second set of terms that are relied upon heavily are opportunity and
feasibility. In the civil war literature, these two terms refer to similar, but not precisely the
same, concepts. The terms, when thought of from a potential rebel’s rational choice
perspective, generally represent the “cost” side of the cost-benefit equation. Opportunity,
specifically, refers to the ability a rebel group has to form and to contend with the state.
Opportunity models such as Fearon and Laitin’s (2003), therefore, tend to rely heavily on
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indicators of state capacity and are sometimes referred to as “capacity models” in this
research. The assumption is that a weak state can neither track nor counter potential
rebels in the early stages of an insurgency, and it therefore provides increased
opportunities for rebellions to occur. Feasibility, on the other hand, refers not only to the
opportunity to rebel, but also to the ability to recruit and finance a rebellion. Collier,
Hoeffler, and Rohner’s (2009) feasibility hypothesis recognizes that rebellions are not
only costly in terms of human life, but they also need to be financially viable in order to
occur. Their feasibility model, therefore, considers the opportunity costs for potential
rebels and the availability of rebel finance in addition to the capacity of the state to
prevent an insurgency. Therefore, opportunity in the civil conflict literature generally can
be thought of as the state capacity component of feasibility.
While there are several researchers who put forward models relating opportunity
to civil war onset, Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) model is the most widely cited.6 Collier and
Hoeffler’s (2004) opportunity model is also widely cited, but it captures a combination of
opportunity and feasibility indicators. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
ultimately argue that primary commodities exports, which is a principal component of
their opportunity model, is best interpreted as a measure of the ability to finance a
rebellion. This financial component is related more to the feasibility of a rebellion than it
is to the capacity of the state. Regarding feasibility models, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner
(2009) are the standard-bearers. Therefore, when opportunity and feasibility models are
referenced in this paper, the reference is to these three core models (i.e., Collier &

6

The Fearon and Laitin opportunity/capacity model includes per capita income, population, the percent of
mountainous terrain, whether a state is non-contiguous, whether a state is an oil exporter, whether a state is
within two years of independence, a measure of political instability/change in polity, and several measures
of regime type.
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Hoeffler, 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). In addition,
because Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner’s (2009) work is both the most recent and the most
complete cost-side explanation of the three, their model is used as the baseline from
which the grievance indicators are evaluated in this research. Due to their being widely
referenced in this research, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) is often referred to as CH, while
Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) is referred to as CHR.
Indicators of Grievance in the Opportunity and Feasibility Models
The first premise driving this research is that the indicators of grievance in the
opportunity and feasibility models are not theoretically sound. Here, those indicators will
be examined, and the strengths and weaknesses of each will be outlined briefly. In the
next sections, the theories underlying the link between grievance and conflict onset will
be explained in more detail, and more sound measures will be discussed and proposed.
CH, which ignited the “greed”/grievance debate, included four categories of
grievance: “ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and
economic inequality” (p. 570). These four categories led them to include measures of
ethnic and religious fractionalization, ethnic polarization, ethnic dominance, democracy,
income inequality, and land inequality in their grievance model of civil war. In their later
work with Rohner (2009), they include only social fractionalization and a measure of
democracy. Each of these variables has strengths and weaknesses regarding their validity
as measures of grievance.
Ethnic and Religious Hatred
CH, CHR, and Fearon and Laitin (2003) focused on ethnic, religious, and social
“fractionalization” as proxies for the probability of socially-based tensions or hatred.
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These fractionalization scores capture the probability that two people chosen at random
within a given country identify with different ethnic or religious groups. Therefore, they
measure the degree of ethnic or religious heterogeneity within a country. As the state’s
diversity increases, so too does its fractionalization score.
The argument for the inclusion of fractionalization as an indicator of grievance is
that ethnic and religious “hatred” cannot exist in a homogenous society. It is only when
groups are brought in contact with one another that the chance of ethnic or religious
clashes exists. Likewise, the authors imply that an increased probability of two groups
encountering one another ought to increase the chance that inter-group hostility will
occur.
The major strengths of this measure are in its objectivity and the availability of
the data. There is limited cross-national data on ethnic and religious groups’ perceptions
of one another, and so a proxy for ethnic tension is needed. While fractionalization does
not give any indication of the degree of tension between groups, it may capture some
degree of the probability that such tension exists.
The statistical results relating fractionalization to conflict onset are mixed. In CH
and CHR, fractionalization appears to increase, decrease, and have no effect on the
likelihood of conflict onset. The authors cite these contradictory findings as evidence that
ethnic tension is not related with onset likelihood. However, it is possible that these
findings are due to the limitations of using fractionalization as an indicator of grievance.
First, Allport’s (1954) contact theory suggests that the more groups interact, under
conditions of equal status, common goals, and supportive social norms, the more the level
of tension ought to decrease. This theory finds support in studies of the effects of being
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involved in team versus individual sports on racial prejudice (Brown, Brown, Jackson,
Sellers, & Manuel, 2003) effects of interpersonal contact on acceptance of homosexuals
(Herek, 1987), and more recently on the perception of the threat of Muslims among those
who live in regions more highly populated by members of that faith (Savelkoul,
Scheepers, Tolsma, & Hagendoorn, 2011). Contact theory further suggests that knowing
the number of groups in a given region without being able to measure the degree of
interaction, the relative statuses of the groups, or the social mores would not tell us much
regarding the likelihood or degree of tension present. Therefore, it is unlikely that
measures of fractionalization actually capture a probability of negative inter-group
feelings.
Second, there are few theoretical reasons to suspect that diversity alone ought to
be related to tension or hostility. Rather, as will be explored further below and as Allport
implies, diversity ought to be coupled with a perceived inequality of some kind in order
to increase tension (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). In fact, some empirical
studies found high heterogeneity to have a protective effect similar to that of high
homogeneity due to the necessity for political coalitions and the greater probability of
cross-cutting religious or economic cleavages (Horowitz, 1985).
In an effort to further test the relationship between heterogeneity and conflict, and
to possibly address some of the inconsistencies, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) modified
their data to take into account not only the degree of heterogeneity but also the sizes of
the groups in each state. In order to capture situations in which one group composes a
majority or near-majority of citizens, they developed an “ethnic dominance” variable.
They argued that “ethnic dominance” occurs when the largest group constitutes 45-90
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percent of the population, and they measured it using a dummy variable. That is, a
country-period was coded 1 if any group makes up between 45 and 90 percent of the
population, and a 0 for all other country-periods. One limitation of this measure is that it
is not possible to account for the size of the other group or groups. A country in which
one group makes up 55 percent of the population and nine other groups make up 5
percent each may have different conflict dynamics from one in which there is a 60-40
split. In order to capture those instances in which there are two large and distinct groups,
the authors borrowed from Esteban and Ray’s (1994) concept of polarity. Polarity, they
argue, is the degree to which a society is “split up into two well-defined and separated
camps” (Esteban & Ray, 1994, p. 821). While Esteban and Ray (1994) suggest that the
concept of polarity can be applied to any characteristic that distinguishes two groups,
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) focused on the distribution of different ethnic groups. Where
a country with 10 groups that all represent 10 percent of the population would be
considered highly fractionalized, it would not be considered highly polarized because
there are not two primary groups that are distinct from one another. Conversely, in a
country with two groups that each represent half of the population, polarity would be
high, but fractionalization would be moderate. In other words, Collier and Hoeffler’s
(2004) polarity variable is better able to capture instances in which a large minority may
face an ethnic majority.
By taking into consideration relative group sizes, the polarization and dominance
measures account for some of the concerns associated with the indicator of
fractionalization. However, the results remained mixed. In Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004)
models, ethnic fractionalization and ethnic dominance were significant (p < 0.10) in some
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models but not in others. Religious fractionalization was not significant in any models,
and ethnic polarization also was not significant. Fearon and Laitin (2003) used the same
ethnic and religious fractionalization scores and returned similar results. Ethnic
fractionalization was not significant in any of Fearon and Laitin’s models, and religious
fractionalization was only significant until regime types were controlled for. Again, the
authors concluded based on these findings that ethnic inequalities and tensions are not
drivers of conflict. However, these “improved” measures also did not address the central
issue that theoretical links between the existence of diversity in-and-of-itself and hostility
are tenuous. Instead, relative deprivation theory suggests that the differences in identity
must be coupled with perceived inequalities in order to lead to aggression (van Zomeren,
Postmes, & Spears, 2008). It is little surprise, then, that these heterogeneity and ethnic
distribution scores were not robustly related with onset.
In their more recent work, CHR combined ethnic and religious fractionalization
scores into one social fractionalization score. They found this measure was related to
conflict onset in all models except when ethnic fractionalization and having security
guarantees due to being a former French colony were controlled for. CHR and Fearon
and Laitin (2003) used these inconsistent findings relating heterogeneity with onset to
suggest that identity-based grievance levels have little bearing on the likelihood of
conflict. However, as noted above, these measures do not capture any of the core tenets
of the relative deprivation argument: They do not capture inequality that falls along
identity-based lines, they do not measure differences between the groups, and they do not
consider whether any found differences may be perceived as unjust. Recent research has
made advancements in this direction, by attempting to use more valid measures for
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inequalities that occur along identity-based lines (e.g., Buhaug, Cederman, & Gleditsch,
2014; Cederman, 2004; Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013; Cederman, Weidmann,
& Gleditsch, 2011; Østby, 2008). These improved measures of relative deprivation are
explored later in this chapter.
Political Repression and Exclusion
CH and CHR included several measures of democracy, autocracy, and political
freedoms that were meant to capture varying degrees of political repression and
exclusion. In their 2004 work comparing “greed” and grievance models, democracy
(measured using Polity III data) was significant and in the expected direction—indicating
repression does increase risk of conflict—in their grievance models. However, when the
opportunity indicators were controlled for, the variable was no longer significant. They
similarly found that neither autocracy nor the Freedom House measure of political
freedom were significant predictors of conflict onset. In their most recent work, CHR
measured democracy using the democracy indicator in the Polity IV dataset, and it was
not a significant predictor of conflict in any of their models. However, there are
limitations to the use of these Polity scores as indictors of grievance.
In the Polity IV dataset, democracy is conceptualized as “The presence of
institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences
about alternative policies and leaders…[T]he existence of institutionalized constraints on
the exercise of power by the executive…and [T]he guarantee of civil liberties to all
citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation” (Marshall & Jaggers,
Polity IV Codebook, 2007, p. 13). This conceptualization does address the concept of
political exclusion, in that citizens are excluded to the extent that they are unable to
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express political preferences. It also addresses repression to the extent that repression is
an absence of civil liberties.
In spite of these strengths, there are two major weaknesses to using Polity to
measure political freedoms. First, one of the indicators of democracy is the
competitiveness of political participation, which “refers to the extent to which alternative
preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena” (Marshall,
Gurr, & Jaggers, 2015, p. 26). To determine the competitiveness score, a value of three is
given to competitive countries, two to transitional countries, one to countries where
factionalism is present, negative one to countries where competition is suppressed, and
negative two where competition is repressed. This ordinal ranking is logical in the sense
that freedom of expression for individuals on average increases at higher levels.
However, the ranking is illogical regarding measuring potential grievances because the
highest chance for relative deprivation (to be discussed later) is in factionalized countries.
Therefore, while the expected relationship between the polity score and conflict
likelihood would be linear if it is capturing political freedom, it might well be U-shaped if
it is capturing relative deprivation. The second problem with the polity measure is that
the ability of the state to repress dissenting viewpoints may be considered indicative of
state capacity (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001). Coding repression as an
indicator of a full autocracy and suppression as an indicator of a partial autocracy, then,
may be conflating regime type and capacity. Therefore, both repression and exclusion
may be related to conflict onset, but that relationship may not be visible in models that
rely on Polity as a measure of both.
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Economic Inequality
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) measured economic inequality with one of the more
commonly used indicators of grievance in the opportunity literature: the Gini index. Gini
is found by comparing the distribution one would expect if wealth were spread evenly
across a country with the actual distribution of wealth in the country. It is measured on a
0-1 scale, with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 representing perfect inequality. The
index is an intuitive measure of individual income inequality that helps compare wealth
disparities in cross-national research. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also added a land
inequality index that was constructed in a similar manner. In all cases, the authors found
the indices not to be associated with conflict onset. In their work with Rohner (2009),
Collier and Hoeffler did not include any indicators of inequality in their final models.
They dismissed the measures saying, “we also tested the significance of a number of
other possible determinants of war risk. None of the measures of inequality were
significant…” (p. 16). The consistent non-significant relationship between the Gini index
and conflict onset has led the opportunity and feasibility theorists to conclude that
inequality is not a driver of conflict. However, there is reason to believe the index may
not be capturing grievance-causing inequalities.
The intent of these income and land inequality indices is to capture the degree of
relative deprivation—deprivation with respect to others—within a country. This form of
grievance will be discussed in more detail later. What is important to note here is that
there are two characteristics of relative deprivation that the Gini index does not measure.
First, in order to cause a grievance, the deprivation the poor feel compared with the rich
must be considered unjust (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). If people believe
they have equal opportunity with others, in spite of an unequal outcome, they may not
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feel relatively deprived. Second, it is much more likely that the relative deprivation will
motivate collective action if it occurs along identity-based cleavages rather than simply
among individuals (Stewart, 2008). While the Gini index captures overall inequality, it
cannot be used to discern whether some identity groups are relatively better or worse off
than are others. Therefore, in order to better capture the concept of relative deprivation,
measures other than the Gini index are needed. The possibilities for more theoretically
sound measures will be discussed further below.
Absolute Deprivation (GDP per capita)
The final measure that CHR employed that may be related with grievance levels
is GDP per capita. In all cases, it was one of the strongest predictors of conflict onset.
However, the causal link is ambiguous. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggested that a low
average income represents low opportunity cost for potential rebels, increasing the ease
of recruitment. Fearon and Laitin (2003), on the other hand, argued that low productivity
also means a limited tax base and low state capacity, which would increase a potential
rebellion’s likelihood of success. It is also possible that a low GDP per capita is
indicative of high absolute deprivation, or conditions under which people are unable to
meet their basic needs. In that case, GDP per capita may be better thought of as a
measure of grievance rather than opportunity. Therefore, while GDP per capita is a strong
indicator for helping researchers predict where civil conflict might occur, its relationship
with each of the competing theories makes it less useful for determining why it might
occur.
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Summary of the Critique of Measures of Grievance in the Opportunity Literature
Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Collier, Hoeffler, and
Rohner (2009) have thus far concluded that levels of opportunity and feasibility better
explain conflict onset than do grievance propensity. However, there are limitations to
each of the grievance measures used in the opportunity and feasibility literature that
suggest their conclusion ought to be revisited. As Fearon himself noted:
Theoretical arguments about “grievances” as causes of civil conflict are
even more underdeveloped than arguments about opportunities…a number
of the variables that come to mind first as possible measures of “societal
grievance”– such as lack of democracy, income inequality, and various
formulations of ethnic or religious demography – do not show a strong or
consistent relationship with a country’s propensity for civil war onset. But
it is hard to know how to interpret this. One possibility, of course, is that
these are not good measures of “average level of grievance,” and if we
keep trying, we will find something better that “works.” (2011a, p. 42)
More recent research has been devoted to developing those “better” measures of
grievance. However, as will be illustrated further below, these new measures are often
tested independently from the feasibility model. Therefore, it is unclear whether the new
measures of grievance add explanatory power to the feasibility measures as explanation
for the onset of civil conflict, and whether the feasibility hypothesis ought to be altered as
a result.
In the next section, CHR’s feasibility model is reviewed. As it is the most recent
cross-national quantitative study on civil war onset in the Collier line, it is taken here to
represent the current core of the opportunity and feasibility literature. Therefore, the CHR
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model signifies what ought to be controlled for in the grievance literature if a case is to be
made that knowing the level of grievance in a country adds to our ability to explain and
predict onset.
The “Feasibility Hypothesis”: Facilitating and Enabling Combatant Opportunities
CHR’s feasibility hypothesis—that “where rebellion is materially feasible it will
occur” without reference to motivation in general or grievances in particular (2009, p.
3)—represented a decisive break from previous studies on conflict. Rather than
considering motives that may drive frustration or aggression, it suggests that the tipping
point into civil violence depends solely on whether it can happen. The feasibility
hypothesis assumes that motives are pervasive across time and space, and it is therefore
the variability in the feasibility of rebellion that best explains where it occurs.
In testing their hypothesis, CHR proposed a few dimensions of feasibility. They
suggested that the level of state control over territory, the opportunity cost of rebellion,
sources of rebel finance, the availability of potential recruits, and geographic spaces from
which a rebellion may be formed and launched may all play a role in the feasibility of a
rebellion. They proxied these dimensions using GDP per capita, the growth of GDP per
capita, primary commodities exports, the proportion of young men, and mountainous
terrain, respectively. They also considered the potentially stabilizing effect of security
guarantees granted to former French African colonies. They found that GDP per capita,
growth in GDP per capita, and primary commodities exports all play a role in predicting
conflict onset. In addition, the proportion of young men had a large effect on conflict
likelihood, but a higher than traditionally acceptable p-value of 0.12. Mountainous terrain
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also had a positive effect but a slightly elevated p-value (0.14), and being a former
French African colony had a significant negative effect on conflict onset.
CHR admitted that their economic variables (GDP, growth, and primary
commodities exports) have ambiguous implications. Income, for example, may proxy the
effectiveness of the state or the opportunity cost for potential rebels. In either case, an
increase in income decreases the feasibility and likelihood of violent civil conflict, but the
precise mechanisms at play are not well-understood. Likewise, GDP growth could imply
job creation “which reduces the pool of labour likely to be targeted by rebels” (Collier,
Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009, p. 12), or it could be indicative of government popularity.
While the former would suggest a decrease in the feasibility of rebellion the latter may
signify a decrease in grievance. The relationship between primary commodities and
conflict also lends itself to several possible interpretations. Primary goods may be seen as
sources of financial support for rebels (increasing feasibility), as ends in themselves
(providing greed-based motivation), or as a means of distancing government from the
citizenry due to the lack of necessity for direct taxation (indicating increased likelihood
of grievance).
CHR argue, however, that their other three variables—proportion of young men,
mountainous terrain, and being a former French African colony—more readily lend
themselves to the feasibility explanation. They conclude that their data, “while not
decisive, [point] clearly towards the proposition that feasibility rather than motivation is
decisive for the risk of rebellion” (Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009, p. 23, emphasis
added.). CHR’s conclusion suggests that there is only one major factor that determines
whether a country tips into civil war: the feasibility of a rebellion. This argument
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discounts the role of either greed- or grievance-based motivation with the assumption that
motives are pervasive across space and time, and it prompts the hypothesis that where a
civil war can happen, it will happen.
The variables proposed above: GDP per capita; the growth of GDP per capita;
primary commodities exports; the proportion of young men; mountainous terrain; and
being a former French African colony, represent the current core of the opportunity and
feasibility literature. As discussed, this feasibility hypothesis was arrived at following the
rejection of a series of indicators that were intended to capture potential grievances.
However, it is argued that those measures do not adequately capture the circumstances
that are thought to motivate conflict behaviors. In the next section, those conflictmotivating circumstances are described with reference to theories of absolute deprivation
and relative deprivation. In addition, the literature that incorporates more sound measures
of each is discussed. Two major arguments are put forth. First, it is possible there are
theoretically justified measures of grievance that have not been widely incorporated into
the existing literature. Second, where more justifiable measures have been used, the
indicators of feasibility have not often been controlled for. Therefore, it is unclear
whether and to what degree the more valid measures of grievance add to the feasibility
model.
Absolute Deprivation: Inability to Meet Basic Human Needs
Within the grievance literature, there are two major arguments made about the
causes of conflict. The first is that people have some absolute level of basic needs that
must be met, and if that standard is not met, groups may be willing to enter into conflict
to attain it (Azar, 1991; Burton, 1990; Sites, 1973). The second argument is that
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perceived inequalities, or the relative differences between groups, may be more salient
than are absolute conditions (Azar, 1991; Azar, 1991). The case for absolute deprivation
driving conflict will be explored here, and relative deprivation will be discussed in the
next section.
The State’s Inability to Satisfy Basic Human Needs
One group of theorists who suggest absolute conditions are paramount is the
proponents of a “Basic Human Needs” explanation of conflict (e.g., Burton, 1979;
Burton, 1990; Sites, 1973). For example, Paul Sites (1973) argued that there are eight
essential needs that, if left unsatisfied, could result in deviant or violent behavior. These
include the needs for: consistency in response, security, recognition, stimulation, justice,
meaning, rationality, and control. Burton (1979) added a ninth that he termed “role
defense.” He argued that people attempt to acquire and preserve roles that allow them to
maintain their security, recognition, stimulation, etc., and that preservation of those roles
in order to meet needs is as critical as meeting the initial needs themselves. In addition,
belongingness, cultural security, freedom, and participation have all also been proffered
as human essentials (see, e.g., Maslow, 1954, Northrup, 1989, Rothman, 1997).
While there is some disagreement regarding the exact specification of needs, each
of the theorists suggests that their lack of fulfillment can result in deviant behavior. Sites,
(1973) for example, argued that satisfaction of human needs is a precursor for social
order and that people will violently pursue the gratification of their needs. This argument
implies that if the ultimate responsibility of a state is the maintenance of order, then it
ought to include needs gratification among its priorities. If the state does not provide an
environment in which needs may be satisfied, or it actively suppresses some groups’
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abilities to meet their needs, then violence should be the expected result. As Edward Azar
phrased it, “Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed
collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a
protracted social conflict” (1991, p. 9).
The theory that inability to meet basic human needs leads to conflict is not
without its critics. It is predicated upon several assumptions regarding “human nature,”
not the least of which being that such a thing exists. As mentioned above, there is also
disagreement regarding what the needs are, and whether they can and should be somehow
“ranked” or if all needs are equally important. Further, violent civil conflict is ultimately
a collective action, and human needs theory as it is offers few explanations for how
individuals with grievances form into groups and mobilize. In the end, though, Needs
Theory’s standing depends on its usefulness in explaining conflict onset and in managing
post-conflict situations.
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of empirical research on the application of Human
Needs Theory to civil conflict onset. This state of affairs has three major causes. First,
one of the more widely agreed upon human needs is security, which is influenced by the
dependent variable in conflict onset research. Most indicators of a state’s inability to meet
the need for security would also be indicators that violence is already occurring,
rendering the finding that the two occur together meaningless. Second, there is an
inherent difficulty in operationalizing several of the needs. How should one measure, for
example, whether it is possible to achieve “meaning” or the degree of “rationality” within
a state? Finally, if a researcher were to attempt to ascertain whether needs played a role in
violent conflict, the perspective of the combatant would be an important point of
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triangulation. Unfortunately, in that case the researcher would be reliant on a respondent
that may have incentive to conceal the truth. As Collier (2000) pointed out, it is likely
easier to rally external support for a cause that is grievance- rather than greed-based. The
rebels’ narrative may be of a grievance even when the root cause is actually greed.
What is needed, then, are objective measures of people’s abilities to meet their
needs. Burton (1979) and Sites (1973) would contend that all needs are equally
important, and a measure that does not encapsulate all cannot therefore be content valid.
However, Maslow (1967) argued that until physiological needs are met, people cannot
worry about higher order psychological or self-fulfillment needs. Maslow’s hierarchy
suggests that there may be merit to treating base-needs and higher order needs separately.
Meeting Survival Needs. While there are few attempts in the literature at
quantitative measures of higher order needs, there are several that are intended to capture
survival needs. For example, the physical quality of life index (PQLI)—a composite of
infant mortality, life expectancy, and adult literacy—was developed in part to determine
“the degree to which government policy results in satisfying basic human needs”
(Abouharb & Cingranelli, 2007, p. 142). Research on the relationships among the quality
of life, civil liberties, economic freedom, and security suggests that all four are correlated
and mutually-reinforcing (Milner, Poe, & Leblang, 1999). However, the PQLI is too
broad to capture physical needs, because literacy is not a biological necessity.
Three other measures commonly used to indicate the ability to meet survival
needs are life expectancy, infant mortality rate, and GDP per capita (Goldstone et al.,
2010; Hegre, Karlsen, Nygard, Strand, & Urdal, 2013). As noted above, while GDP per
capita is highly correlated with ability to meet basic life needs, it is also indicative of
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state capacity. Therefore, its usefulness in theoretical tests of the grievance versus
opportunity debate is limited. There are a few drawbacks to using life expectancy as a
measure of the inability to meet base-level needs in conflict research as well. First, a low
life expectancy can be interpreted both as an inability to meet basic human needs and low
opportunity cost for potential rebels. In other words, if the citizens in a given country are
not expected to live long—whether it be due to rampant disease, lack of health care, or
limited security—the opportunity forgone by fighting is likely not as attractive as it
would be in a country where life expectancy is high. Second, and perhaps more
important, the measurement of life expectancy at birth is based upon current age-specific
death rates in the country. Because death rates increase during violent conflict, measures
of current life expectancy may also capture past conflict, leading to an endogeneity
problem.
Infant mortality, on the other hand, offers a measure of the current status of the
ability to meet base-level needs in the state by determining the proportion of children
who are able to survive in a given year. In addition to the theoretical links between
meeting survival needs and conflict onset, Goldstone et al.’s (2010) research on
forecasting political instability provides empirical support for the use of infant mortality.
They found that infant mortality was one of just four indicators7 that best helps predict
instability. However, none of those indicators were from CHR’s feasibility model.
Therefore, it is unknown whether the grievance of inability to meet survival needs
explains more than does feasibility alone. This ambiguity leads to the first set of
competing hypotheses:

7

Goldstone et al.’s (2010) model includes regime type, infant mortality, having four or more bordering
states with major civil or ethnic conflict, and state-led discrimination.
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H1: If the feasibility hypothesis is correct, adding infant mortality rates to
the feasibility model will not improve its predictive power.
However,
H1a: If grievances influence the likelihood of conflict onset, then the
inclusion of infant mortality will improve the predictive power of the
feasibility model.
Further
H1b: Infant mortality will have a positive relationship with civil conflict
onset.
Meeting Higher Order Needs. The process of conceptualizing and
operationalizing higher order needs is more complex than that of survival needs. As
mentioned above, there is no shortage of debate surrounding what should be considered a
“need.” Cohen (1966), for example, rejects the concept of universally agreed upon
higher-order needs. He suggests that—outside of attempts to meet biological
necessities—the goals people strive for are socially derived and culturally dependent.
Amartya Sen’s work (1999) offers a possible solution to this impasse. His theories
regarding the means and ends of development suggest that rather than focusing on
delineating, defining, and measuring specific needs, researchers can instead determine the
conditions under which people have the capability to meet the needs they prioritize. He
further argues that political freedoms, freedom of opportunity, and economic protection
from abject poverty are central to that capability.
Political Freedoms. Sen (1999) proposed that thinking in terms of political
freedoms allows academics and policy makers to avoid ethnocentric valuation traps
because those freedoms “give citizens [the opportunity] to discuss and debate—and to
participate in the selection of—values in the choice of priorities” (p. 31). Sen’s argument
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suggests that when evaluating states’ abilities to meet their citizens’ basic needs, rather
than attempting to determine what those needs are and the degree to which they are being
met, academics and policy makers would be better served examining whether the
political infrastructure is in place to allow citizens to determine and seek those needs
themselves. While the specific needs and desires of people within each state may vary,
higher degrees of voice and political autonomy in a state ought to signify an increased
ability to determine and address whatever needs are considered priorities.
Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers’s (2015) Polity Index was designed to capture that
voice, which is why the authors of the opportunity and feasibility literature employ
variations of the Polity score in their models. While they did not frame it in needs-based
terms, Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) and Fearon and
Laitin (2003) all used some measure or measures of democracy in their attempts to
capture grievances. Because democratic processes allow individuals to pursue, in the
political arena, the needs which they value, it can be argued that the abstract needs are
more likely to be achieved in democratic societies.
Fearon and Laitin (2003) used four different measures of regime type in an
attempt to capture a variety of potential grievance and state capacity levels. To capture
grievance propensity, they included the Polity IV measure from the Systemic Peace
dataset under the assumption that “democracy should be associated with less
discrimination and repression along cultural or other lines” (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p.
79). They also included a dummy for democracies following Przeworski et al.’s (2000)
democracy measures. Neither was a significant predictor of conflict in any of their
models.
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Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) two additional measures of regime type were meant to
capture state capacity. They argued that regimes in the middle of the Polity IV index
(those between -5 and +5 on the -10 to +10 scale) would likely have less capacity than
would full autocracies or full democracies. This argument stemmed from the assumption
that states that mix democratic and autocratic features do so due to “political
contestation,” which leads to state incapacity. Full autocracies, on the other hand, reflect
“the successful monopolization of state coercive and administrative power by an
individual or group” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 81). They termed these regimes with
mixed democratic and autocratic characteristics “anocracies,” and coded them using a
dummy variable. A 1 was assigned for all countries between -5 and +5 on the Polity IV
scale, while a 0 was assigned to those countries at the poles. They found that being an
anocracy was a significant positive predictor of violent conflict onset.
The final regime type measure Fearon and Laitin used was instability. Because
they were interested in political stability as an indicator of capacity rather than of
repression or voice, they suggested that a three-point change in either direction along the
Polity IV scale over the last three years was indicative of an unstable regime type. Both
the instability and anocracy scores were significant (p < 0.05) in all of the presented
models in which they were included. Fearon and Laitin used these findings to suggest
that regime type is important insofar as it proxies the capacity of the state, but it is not
salient as a measure of grievance.
CH and CHR’s findings were similar to Fearon and Laitin’s (2003). Rather than
using the Polity IV dataset, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) relied on the Polity III data that
range from 0-10 rather than from -10 to +10. They also included measures of autocracy,
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and Freedom House’s “Gastil Index” of political openness. They found that the Polity III
measure was significant in all models and concluded that repression increases conflict
risk. However, neither the autocracy nor political openness scores were significant in any
models. In their 2009 work, CHR used the Polity IV score on a 0-10 scale and found,
contrary to their earlier work, that democracy was not related with conflict.
Due to the inconsistent and contradictory evidence relating democracy with the
onset of civil violence, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner
(2009) concluded that political grievances do not drive conflict. However, there is both
theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that the ordinal polity scale is too crude to
adequately capturing the ability to pursue basic human needs. First, while autocracy may
indicate low ability to voice prioritized needs and democracies would have high ability to
voice needs, factionalized countries present the greatest chance for relative deprivation
(in which some groups have access to political freedoms and voice while others do not).
Second, both full autocracies and consolidated democracies tend to have higher capacities
to prevent rebellion than do transitional states. If the Polity index is capturing political
relative deprivation, then the expected relationship between Polity and conflict onset
likelihood would be an inverted U. Likewise, the shape of the relationship would be an
inverted U if the measure is capturing capacity along with repression. Therefore, the
inconsistent and contradictory findings relating democracy with conflict may be a result
of the Polity score measuring too wide a variety of characteristics of the state rather than
an indication that political grievances are unimportant. In addition, Fearon and Laitin’s
(2003) own research in which being an anocratic state was positively related with onset
suggests there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between polity and the likelihood of
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onset. The PITF’s Global Model (Goldstone, et al., 2010) further supported Fearon and
Laitin’s (2003) findings, suggesting full democracy and full autocracy are both protective
regime types, while partial democracies and partial autocracies experienced increased
likelihoods of conflict. These findings indicate that, rather than democracy and grievance
being unrelated to conflict, their relationship is more complex than the prior measures in
the opportunity and feasibility literature have allowed.
One solution to these issues, following Goldstone et al. (2010), is to create
separate dummy variables for full autocracies, partial autocracies, partial democracies
with factionalism, partial democracies without factionalism, and full democracies. The
dummy variables allow the effects of factional democracies to be considered separately
from those of non-factional democracies, and any non-monotonic relationship between
Polity and conflict likelihood can be observed. The expectation is that full democracies
and partial democracies would be the least likely to experience conflict, and partial
democracies with factionalism and partial autocracies would have the highest likelihoods
of conflict onset. Where full autocracies would fall is difficult to predict given the
potential relationship between repressive capabilities and state capacity; however, if Sen
and the absolute deprivation theorists are correct, full autocracies ought to experience a
greater conflict likelihood than do full democracies.
In Goldstone et al.’s (2010) research, these dummied regime types were found to
be significant predictors of instability. However, as mentioned above, none of the
feasibility variables are controlled for in their approach. Therefore, it is unknown whether
regime type will continue to be significant and salient when it is considered alongside
feasibility.
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This more sound measure of political opportunities coupled with the lack of
feasibility indicators in the prior research suggests the next hypotheses:
H2: If the feasibility hypothesis is correct, then knowing regime type will
not improve the predictive power of the feasibility model.
However:
H2a: If grievances influence the likelihood of conflict onset, the inclusion
of regime type will improve the predictive power of the feasibility model.
Further:
H2b: Full democracies will be less likely to experience conflict than will all
other regime types.
H2c: Partial democracies without factionalism will be less likely to
experience conflict than will partial autocracies or partial democracies
with factionalism.
Freedom of economic opportunity. In addition to the centrality of political
freedoms, Sen (1999) argues that economic opportunities are necessary if people are to
meet the needs they value. His argument centers on ideas of agency and options. He
contends that freedoms (economic or otherwise) should be “judged not just in terms of
the number of options one has, but [also] with adequate sensitivity to the attractiveness of
the available options” (Sen, 1999, p. 117, emphasis in original).
To that end, a number of indices have recently been created with the intention of
measuring economic opportunities. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (Singer,
Amoros, & Moska, 2014), for example, provides yearly survey data from 2007 through
2015 on individuals’ perceptions of entrepreneurship opportunities within their countries.
The Global Entrepreneurship and Development Institute (GEDI, 2016) also started
gathering data in 2014 on more objective measures of entrepreneurship opportunities.
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However, being able to start one’s own business and feeling that diverse and plentiful
opportunities for employment are possible are not equivalent.
Hegre (2013) suggests that economies that are primarily based in manufacturing
and service production tend to provide diverse opportunities and they tend to occur in
places where citizens have the skills and education both to create those opportunities and
to take advantage of their existence. This finding indicates that manufacturing and
service-based economies ought to provide a greater number of attractive economic
options that give people freedom of opportunity in employment options. A high degree of
manufacturing and service alone does not necessarily indicate an open market, however.
Communist Russia’s economy was heavily based in manufacturing, but it did not provide
a high number of attractive options for the people operating within it. An examination of
exports, though, may indicate the degree to which an economy is responding to market
forces rather than being dictated from above.
Felipe, Kumar, and Abdon (2010) followed this logic when they proposed a more
general “Index of Opportunities,” which examined the sophistication, diversification, and
standardness of countries’ exports. They argued that, “in the long run, a country’s income
is determined by the variety and sophistication of the products it makes and exports,
which reflect its accumulated capabilities” (Felipe, Kumar, & Abdon, 2010, p. 2).
Unfortunately, their data are only available for 2010, and the diversity and sophistication
of exports has likely varied considerably over the last forty years.
The closest widely-available economic indicator of the sophistication and
diversification of a country’s exports is its share of GDP that comes from manufacturing
and services exports (MSES). Following Hegre’s (2013) logic, this indicator should
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provide a relative measure of the number and quality of economic opportunities available
within a country, taking into account the openness of the market.
Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) are two of the few researchers who incorporated
MSES into quantitative models of conflict, using it as a proxy for level of
industrialization in explaining non-violent uprisings. They found no statistical link
between the two, but the theoretical justification suggests it may be worthwhile to include
it in this exploration of the causes of violent conflict onset.
Using MSES as a proxy for grievances based in economic opportunity leads to the
following hypotheses:
H3: If the feasibility hypothesis is correct, the addition of MSES will not
improve the predictive power of the feasibility model.
However:
H3a: If grievances influence the likelihood of conflict onset, then the
inclusion of MSES will strengthen the predictive power of the feasibility
model.
Further,
H3b: Countries with higher MSES will be less likely to experience civil conflict
onset.
Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy coupled with Sen’s (1999) arguments provides an
additional nuance, as well. If Maslow’s argument is correct that individuals are not
concerned with higher order needs until survival needs are met, then it is possible that
political and economic opportunities will not be related to conflict unless and until
survival needs are met. In that case, one would expect to find:
H4: The positive effect of autocracies on the likelihood of conflict onset is
greater in countries with lower levels of infant mortality.
Likewise,
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H5: The effect of MSES on the likelihood of conflict onset is greater in
countries with lower levels of infant mortality.
Conversely, Sen (1999) argues that freedoms are “the means and ends of
development,” implying that political and economic freedoms can and should
precede survival needs when the infrastructure does not exist to support those
physiological needs in the moment. While he does not state it in these terms, his
argument implies that countries with high economic opportunities and political
voice ought to experience limited conflict even when survival needs are not being
met. If Sen’s arguments are correct, then one would expect to see the same
protective effects of democracy and MSES regardless of the infant mortality rates
in the country.
GDP per capita as a measure of absolute deprivation. Per capita income is one
of the strongest and most robust indicators of conflict onset. However, because it is
highly correlated with so many characteristics of the state, its precise role in explaining
conflict is difficult to discern. CHR, who concluded with a feasibility-based theory of
conflict, interpreted the variable as an indicator of opportunity cost for potential rebels.
They suggested that when GDP per capita is low, legitimate economic opportunities are
scarce. Therefore, the foregone alternatives to fighting are not as valuable as they would
be when GDP per capita is higher. Low GDP per capita, then, makes rebel recruitment
easier, which increases the feasibility and likelihood of conflict.
Fearon and Laitin (2003), on the other hand, took a capacity approach, and
interpreted GDP per capita in that light. They argued that a low GDP per capita is
indicative of limited state capacity to repress rebellion. The weak state is seen as a
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“condition that favors insurgency,” which they used to explain the relationship with onset
of violent conflict.
Because the opportunity theorists have found little evidence for the relationship
between grievance and conflict onset in their models, they do not acknowledge that low
GDP per capita may actually be capturing an inability for people to meet their basic
human needs. In other words, per capita income’s robust relationship with conflict onset
may be due to its connection with grievance rather than with opportunity.
One possible test to help decipher the role GDP per capita plays in explaining
conflict onset is to determine its effects at varying levels of grievance. If CHR are correct
that (1) GDP per capita captures the opportunity costs for potential rebels, and (2)
motives are indeterminate, then GDP per capita ought to continue to be negatively and
significantly related to conflict onset at all levels of grievance. However, if GDP per
capita is actually capturing grievance, then it ought not to have an effect when the sample
is divided into high and low grievance levels. Therefore, for a sample divided into high
and low infant mortality rates, the following hypothesis emerges:
H6: If the feasibility interpretation of GDP per capita is accurate, it ought
to remain positive and significant in the models for both high and low
levels of infant mortality.
Summary of the Absolute Deprivation Literature
Absolute deprivation theorists subscribe to the idea that there are basic human
needs that, if left unmet, will lead to deviant and violent behavior (e.g., Burton, 1979;
Burton, 1990; Sites, 1973). While some needs theorists suggest that all needs are equally
important, others (e.g., Maslow, 1954) believe that they can and should be ranked.
Further, Maslow argues that people will not seek “higher order” needs until their survival
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needs are met. Following Maslow’s hierarchy, needs are separated into “survival” and
“higher order” types here.
There have been a few attempts to measure survival needs in the prior literature,
including through access to food and water resources (Evans, 2010), the PQLI (Dixon,
1984; Dixon & Moon, 1986), and life expectancy. The case is made here, though, that the
most logical measure of the ability to meet basic physiological needs in a country is the
infant mortality rate. In addition, while Goldstone et al. (2010) found a strong positive
relationship between infant mortality and conflict onset, it is still unknown whether that
relationship will remain when feasibility is controlled for and to what degree it affects
onset likelihood.
The ability to meet abstract needs proposed by the human needs theorists is more
difficult to determine, but it is proposed that measures of democracy may proxy the
conditions under which even culturally-dependent needs are more likely to be met. In the
opportunity literature, the results involving democracy have been inconsistent. Fearon
and Laitin (2003) suggested based on their combination of democracy measures that
those capturing capacity are more salient than are those capturing grievance, and that the
grievance argument therefore has little merit. However, both Fearon and Laitin’s tests of
democracy and other models relating regime type with onset suggest that the relationship
is likely more nuanced than an ordinal measure of autocracy or democracy allows. A
dummy for five regime types: full democracies, partial democracies, partial democracies
with factionalism, partial autocracies, and full autocracies allows for greater freedom in
exploring the relationships among political voice and conflict, while recognizing roles of
state capacity and the potential for relative deprivation in factionalized countries. While
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Goldstone et al. (2010) found that there is a statistical correlation between these regime
types and conflict onset, it is unknown whether it remains when feasibility is considered.
Just as political opportunities represent the likelihood that people can pursue the
needs they value, Sen (1999) also suggests that a variety of quality economic
opportunities are necessary. While there are several organizations currently charting
entrepreneurial opportunities across the globe, the short time frames and types of data
available do not lend themselves well to inclusion in the cross-national panel dataset used
in the feasibility literature. However, it is argued that the share of GDP that comes from
manufacturing and services exports may proxy the relative amount and quality of
economic opportunities available within a country.
Maslow (1954) and Sen’s (1999) arguments also provide nuances that deserve
exploration. If Maslow’s argument that people do not seek higher order needs until
physiological needs are met is correct, then it is possible the effect of political and
economic opportunities on the likelihood of conflict varies depending on a country’s
infant mortality rate. However, if Sen’s argument that political and economic freedoms
are the ends and means of “development” is correct, then their relationship with onset
ought not to be affected by infant mortality rates.
Finally, the relationship between GDP per capita and conflict onset deserves
further exploration. While it is well known that the relationship is negative and robust,
the interpretation of the variable is still debated. Fearon and Latin (2003) and Collier,
Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) both interpret GDP per capita in light of their theories of
capacity and feasibility, respectively. However, its role as an indicator of absolute
deprivation ought not be discounted yet. It is suggested that a possible test to
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disambiguate the role of GDP per capita is to consider its effects at varying levels of
grievance as well. If GDP per capita is best thought of as a measure of capacity or
opportunity cost, and if motives are indeterminate, then GDP per capita ought to remain
significant and negative at all levels of grievance. However, if GDP per capita best
captures grievance levels, then its effects may be negated in samples at high and low
grievance.
Relative Deprivation: The Role of Inequality in Conflict
While Basic Human Needs theorists argue that an inability to meet some absolute
standard of living is a driver of conflict, proponents of the relative deprivation approach
contend that the more salient factor is how a group’s characteristics compare with a
referent. Ted Gurr (1970) is often credited with the application of the theory to civil
conflict. He defines relative deprivation as the “perceived discrepancy between value
expectations and value capabilities” (Gurr, 1970, p. 37), and proposes that if expectations
cannot be met, frustration results, followed by aggression.
Gurr further suggests that there are three arenas in which a group can feel
relatively deprived. The first is what he terms “aspirational deprivation.” Aspirational
deprivation occurs when value expectations increase, but one’s capabilities remain the
same. This type of deprivation may be felt when one group sees another group that has a
higher standard of living, and believes that they should be at that standard. The second
type of relative deprivation Gurr proffers is what he calls “decremental deprivation.” This
idea may also be thought of as “deprivation relative to time.” That is, if a person or group
comes to expect one standard of living, and that expectation does not continue to be met
over time, then they are experiencing decremental deprivation. For example, when food
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prices rise, people have to spend more of their income on meeting physiological needs.
Therefore, they do not have the disposable income they once had, leading to a decrease in
value capabilities relative to what they have come to expect. This decrease in capabilities
compared with the prior expectation may lead to frustration and aggression. The final
classification of deprivation is “progressive deprivation,” which occurs when both
expectations and capabilities grow, but capabilities do not increase at the same rate as do
expectations.
There are two major qualifiers regarding the theory of relative deprivation and its
application to the study of conflict onset. The first is that in order to induce grievance,
relative deprivation must be a subjective rather than objective experience. That is,
inequalities in their own right do not necessarily lead to frustrations. As Tilly, Tilly, and
Tilly (1975) illustrate through their historical analyses, there is little empirical evidence
linking objective inequalities with rebellion. It is only when these inequalities exist
between groups that consider themselves comparable, and when there is “a subjective
sense of injustice that collective action to redress the injustice is likely to occur” (van
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008, p. 505).
The subjectivity involved in relative deprivation was illustrated by Stouffer,
Suchman, deVinney, Star, and Williams (1949) in their comparison of the promotion
patterns of military police and air corpsmen. They found that air corpsmen received
promotions more rapidly, but that military police reported greater satisfaction. The
authors concluded that the members of the military police did not consider the air corps a
comparable group, and so the objective differences between them did not translate into
feelings of subjective injustice or related dissatisfaction.
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The second major qualifier relating relative deprivation to conflict is that
collective action is more likely to be triggered by inequalities that occur along identitybased lines than by inequality that is randomly distributed among individuals (van
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Kawakami and Dion (1995) argue that when a
person experiences relative deprivation at the individual level, their response is likely to
be at the individual level. In addition, the response is likely to be within the rules or
parameters of the existing social system. However, when groups experience relative
deprivation, not only is the response likely to be at the group level, but it is also likely to
be socially disruptive (Kawakami & Dion, 1995). Kawakami and Dion’s theory is
supported by van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears’s (2008) meta-analysis of research
regarding collective action. In their words, “when members of a lower status group
perceive the intergroup status differential to be illegitimate and unstable, they are more
likley to identify with their group and engage in collective action to change the intergroup
status differential” (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008, p. 507). Therefore, measures
of relative deprivation ought to include inequalities that occur along group-based lines
and are likely to be related with perceived injustices rather than objective differences.
Aspirational Deprivation
The first type of relative deprivation discussed above is “aspirational
deprivation,” or deprivation relative to what one expects to achieve. Ted Gurr (1970)
argues that this type of deprivation may occur when a person is exposed to a higher
standard of living, and wants to live at that standard, but does not have the capability to
do so at that moment. This type of deprivation would be most likely to occur in nonegalitarian societies. Therefore, one of the primary methods in the opportunity literature
50

of operationalizing inequality-based grievances like aspirational deprivation is through
the Gini coefficient (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).
As mentioned previously, Gini is a measure of the difference between the
distribution of income one would expect to find in a perfectly equal society and the actual
distribution, so the indicator captures individual income inequality in a country. The
assumption in the economic literature is that “the poor” may have incentives for fighting
with the aim of a redistribution of wealth.8 However, the qualifiers stated above suggest
that in order for such mobilization to occur, “the poor” would have to identify with one
another as a group.
In Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) comparison of models of civil war onset related
to “greed”/opportunity and grievance, neither income inequality nor land inequality was a
significant predictor of conflict. Similar findings occurred in Fearon and Laitin’s (2003)
models, and Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditch’s (2003) work. CHR do not include any
measures of inequality in their latest models, because they found in initial tests that none
of them were related with onset. Due to the lack of correlation between Gini and onset,
the opportunity and feasibility authors have concluded that inequality does not affect the
likelihood of civil conflict. However, the lack of a correlation between the Gini
coefficient and conflict does not necessarily mean that relative deprivation is not a driver
of violence.
Gini fails to incorporate either of the qualifiers attached to Gurr’s theory noted
above. First, it captures objective differences, while there is little evidence to suggest that
such differences necessarily lead to frustration or aggression (Green, Glaser, & Rich,

8

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) note that “the rich” may also be incentivized to attempt to secede from the
whole in a society.
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1998; Tilly, Tilly, & Tilly, 1975). Rather, “it is only when social comparisons result in a
subjective sense of injustice that collective action to redress the injustice is likely to
occur” (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008, p. 505, emphasis added). The second
problem with using the Gini index in this manner is that it can only indicate individual
difference, while
the majority of internal conflicts are organized group conflicts—they are neither
exclusively nor primarily a matter of individuals committing acts of violence
against others. What is most often involved is group mobilization of people with
particular shared identities or goals to attack others in the name of the group.
(Stewart, 2008, p. 11, emphasis added.)
Denny and Walter (2014) further suggest that ethnicity may be a principal form of
identity in this regard. They argue for the salience of ethnicity due to political power
often falling along ethnic lines, ethnic groups often being concentrated in geographic
space, and shared language and customs making mobilization easier.
Stewart’s (2008) and Denny and Walter’s (2014) observations suggest that
inequality among individuals may not lead to group-level violence. It is when these
perceived inequalities and injustices fall in line with identity-based (and particularly
ethnically-based) cleavages that frustrated groups may engage in collective violent
action. The suggestion, then, is that the Gini coefficient has an inconsistent relationship
with conflict onset because it measures inequality without regard for the perception of
that inequality or its identity-based distribution.
Stewart’s (2000) arguments about inequality along identity-based lines began to
supply a framework for thinking about alternative approaches to measuring group-based
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relative deprivation by distinguishing between horizontal and vertical inequalities.
Horizontal inequality, he suggested, was the differences among identity-based groups in
“political participation, economic assets, incomes and employment, and social aspects”
(2000, p. 249). Vertical inequality, on the other hand, was the term assigned to individual
differences such as those captured by the Gini index.
Since Stewart (2000) made his observations, there have been several attempts to
better identify the existence of these horiztontal inequalities. For example, Østby (2008)
measured asset-based horizontal inequalities using Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS) data on the ownership of household goods. Combining the 86 DHS surveys
(covering 39 countries) that included ethnicity data, Østby compared the two largest
ethnic groups in each country regarding their average number of assets owned. Countries
with a large disparity in assets between ethnic groups were said to have high horizontal
economic inequality.
Østby (2008) found that horizontal economic inequality had a positive but notsignificant relationship with conflict onset. However, she acknowledged her work was
somewhat limited in that the DHS survey is most widely distributed in the global south,
the un-weighted assets in her indices ranged from a radio to a car, and there is little
reason to assume that the disparity between the two largest groups in a country would
accurately represent the disparities among all groups. Therefore, while that initial work
suggested only a tenuous link between horizontal inequalities and conflict, it set the stage
for future researchers to find new ways of measuring the concept that included broader
coverage of countries and years, and are more valid (e.g., Cederman, Weidmann, &
Gleditsch, 2011; Buhaug, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014).

53

Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) expanded on this idea of horizontal
inequalities by comparing the G-Econ data set on economic activity by regions of a
country with the GeoEPR data set on ethnic group settlements. Combining the two geospacial datasets, they were able to create estimates of the amount of wealth controlled by
each group. They measured inequality in both directions; that is, they considered both
when a particular ethnic group was poor relative to the national average and when a
group was relatively wealthy. The authors found that both types of inequality were
related to civil conflict onset. Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014) also used this
method of operationalizing group-level inequality, and their findings remained consistent,
providing further evidence that horizontal inequalities are conflict-causing grievances.
The current body of quantitative literature relating identity-based inequalities to
conflict has two major limitations, however. First, it tends to include only a few limited
variables in order to control for feasibility. The matrix presented in Appendix A
illustrates this limitation. While much of the research listed includes GDP per capita and
population in their models, primary commidities exports, terrain, and youth bulge are
often excluded. As primary commodities exports are considered a proxy for ability to
finance a rebellion, and youth bulge is an indicator of the availability of a recruitablebase, both variables may influence whether an existing grievance translates into violent
action. Therefore, it is unknown whether these identity-based grievances continue to be
salient when feasibility is fully taken into consideration.
The second limitation to the literature discussed and that presented in the matrix is
that because disparities are often observed through outcomes (e.g., people’s resources,
assets, or incomes), it is unclear whether these differences between groups are actually
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perceived as unjust, and therefore whether they cause grievance. Disparate access to
economic opportunities, however, may be encoded in policy where groups may be
actively and overtly excluded from certain employment opportunities. In those instances,
it is more likely that the group-level injustice is perceived to exist, because it is clearly
due to an external factor.
Taken together, the arguments for conceptualizing economic relative deprivation
as group-level disparities that are subjectively perceived as unjust and exist in the
economic arena suggest that a possible means for capturing it exists in the Minorities at
Risk (MAR) dataset. Through the Minorities at Risk Project (2009), Gurr and colleagues
track 272 ethnic groups on over 70 characteristics including the groups’ populations, their
concentrations, whether there are restrictions on their religion or use of language, and the
degree of political and economic discrimination they face.
The economic discrimination data are measured on a zero to four scale, in which a
0 represents no discrimination and a 4 indicates “Public policies (formal exclusion and/or
recurring repression) substantially restrict the group’s economic opportunities by contrast
with other groups” (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009, p. 11).9 There are a few features of
this indicator that are worth noting. First, data are gathered and coded at the ethnic-group
rather than at the country level. For example, rather than having one score for the amount
of discrimination present in the United States, African-Americans and Native Americans
would receive different scores for the amount of discrimination they face. Second,
discrimination is measured relative to other ethnic groups rather than to some absolute
referent. That is, lack of access to certain economic sectors does not automatically grant a

9

The complete coding criteria for economic discrimination are given in Appendix B.
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certain score in this dataset. It would only be considered “discrimination” if one ethnic
group has access to those opportunities and another does not. Likewise, it is only
considered discrimination if the differences between groups are based on ethnic identity.
As such, the data capture inequalities that fall along identity-based lines, in which one
group experiences obstacles to economic participation that other groups do not face.
Because the economic discrimination data measure differences that fall along ethnic
cleavages that affect not only outcomes but also access, it is assumed that they more
accurately capture perceptions of injustice among groups than would simply differences
in assets or resources.
The arguments outlined above regarding economic relative deprivation lead to the
following hypotheses:
H7: If the feasibility hypothesis is correct, the addition of economic
discrimination will not improve the predictive power of the feasibility
model.
However,
H7a: If grievances influence the likelihood of conflict onset, then the
inclusion of economic discrimination will strengthen the predictive power
of the feasibility model.
Further,
H7b: Countries with higher economic discrimination will be more likely to
experience civil conflict onset.
Social and Political Aspirational Deprivation. The discussion above centered
around disparities among groups regarding economic resources, assets, and access to
economic opportunities. However, aspirational deprivation can occur in the social and
political arenas as well. For example, in the same article in which Østby (2008)
introduced her asset-based measure of horizontal inequality, she included a measure of
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education-based horizontal inequality. She argued that unequal access to education that
fell along identity-based lines represented social, group-level inequalities that may also
be grievance-causing. Not only was this indicator for the social horizontal inequality in
the expected direction, but it was also significant in spite of her limited sample.
One difficulty with measuring social inequalities is that in many cases they are
indistinguishable from economic inequalities. For example, if one group, on average, has
lower levels of education than does another group, it is likely that difference is both a
result and a cause of differing access to resources. Inequality in the political arena,
however, may be more readily distinguishable from that in economic spheres.
Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) expanded on this idea of political
horizontal inequalities. They relied heavily on the Ethnic Power Relations data, which
classifies “politically relevant” ethnic groups’ positions within their respective countries’
political structures as monopolies, dominant, the senior partner in a power-sharing
arrangement, the junior partner in a power-sharing arrangement, a powerless excluded
group, or a discriminated excluded group. Using group-level onset of civil war as the
dependent variable, the authors found that groups that were excluded, powerless, or
discriminated against all experienced increased likelihoods of conflict when compared
with groups that had senior status in power-sharing arrangements. Again, these data
suggest that grievances, properly specified, do affect civil conflict likelihood. However,
the dependent variable was different from that of the feasibility and opportunity
literature, Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013) do not provide a measure for the
overall strength of the model, and again the only variables related to feasibility that are
controlled for are per capita GDP and population.
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Goldstone et al. (2010) followed the same logic as Cederman, Gleditsch, and
Buhaug (2013), testing whether states that restricted certain ethnic groups from political
participation experience an increased likelihood of conflict. Using the Minorities at Risk
project’s political discrimination dataset in their case-control model, they found that
countries with politically exclusionary policies do face an increased risk of conflict. As
mentioned, however, the authors in this case were not testing theory, and therefore they
did not include any of the indicators of feasibility in their model. While political
exclusion based on ethnicity may be correlated with onset, then, it is as yet unknown
whether and how much it adds to the feasibility explanation of where civil conflict
occurs.
Following Goldstone et al. (2010), the political discrimination indicator in the
Minorities at Risk dataset will also be used here as an indicator of aspirational
deprivation along ethnic lines. As with the economic discrimination variable, the political
descrimination indicator assigns levels of discrimination for each ethnic group in the
dataset. A group with a score of 0 experiences no discrimination, while a score of 4
indicates that “public policies substantically restrict the group’s political participation by
comparison with other groups” (Minorities at Risk Codebook, p. 37).10 These data also
measure differences in access to opportunities between groups, which suggests that it is a
better measure of the likelihood of perceived injustice than are outcome-based measures,
and it captures group-level differences unlike the general political exclusion and political
voice variables used in the opportunity and feasibility literature.
The following hypotheses result from the arguments above relating political
discrimination to relative deprivation and conflict onset:
10
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H8: If the feasibility hypothesis is correct, the addition of political
discrimination will not improve the classificatory power of the feasibility
model.
However,
H8a: If grievances influence the likelihood of conflict onset, then the
inclusion of political discrimination will strengthen the classificatory
power of the feasibility model.
Further,
H8b: Countries with higher political discrimination scores will be more likely to
experience civil conflict onset than will those with lower political discrimination
scores.
Decremental Deprivation.
The final theoretical grievance that is considered in this section is decremental
deprivation, that is, relative deprivation with respect to time. Where aspirational
deprivation occurs when a group perceives that its assets or opportunities are unjustly
lower than those of a referent group, decremental deprivation occurs when a group
perceives that it has fewer assets or opportunities than it did in the past. The argument
linking decremental deprivation to conflict is that when individuals come to expect the
capability to do certain things (whether in the political, economic, or social arena), and
those capabilities no longer exist, the decrease in capabilities can lead to frustration and
aggression.
For example, the case has been made that one of the drivers of the Arab Spring
was the increase in global food prices (Werrell & Femia, 2013). Well over 50 percent of
the wheat, corn, and rice consumed in North Africa is imported (Nigatu & Motamed,
2015), making the region particularly susceptible to global price fluctuations. Between
2007 and 2008, the price of wheat increased 87 percent. Between 2010 and 2011, it
increased a further 84 percent (Oakland Institute, 2017). As Marktanner and Noiset
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(2013) illustrate, the effect of increasing food prices is felt disproportionately by the poor,
as individuals with lower incomes are forced to spend a greater percentage of that income
on meeting sustenance needs. An increase in global food prices, then, leads to
decremental deprivation as people are no longer able to use their incomes in the same
manner as before the increase. While these effects are felt everywhere, they are
particularly strong in poorer countries that are heavily reliant on imports such as Tunisia.
A logical indicator of decremental deprivation would be change in GDP per
capita. As a country experiences negative growth, the capacity both of the citizens to live
at a standard they are accustomed to and of the government to continue to provide
services at past rates diminishes. The challenge with using the change in GDP per capita
is that it, like overall GDP, captures both grievances and opportunities for rebellion.
Fearon and Laitin (2003) do not include any indicators of growth in their capacity
models. However, they do argue that growth correlates with fewer civil wars, suggesting
they considered the variable at some point. They also use this relationship to advance
their “capacity” hypothesis, arguing that “while economic growth may correlate with
fewer civil wars, the causal mechanism is more likely a well-financed and
administratively competent government” (p. 88). In other words, they suggest that change
in GDP per capita is indicative of state capacity rather than of grievance of any sort. If
that is the case, one would expect the inclusion of GDP per capita in any models to
suppress the effect of growth. However, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) find the
opposite to be true. Growth is a more robust indicator of onset than is GDP per capita in
their models.
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CHR draw a more logical conclusion than Fearon and Laitin’s that growth, like
GDP per capita, indicates changing opportunity costs. When growth occurs, so does the
demand for labor, which increases the value of a potential rebel’s foregone opportunities.
Likewise, as negative growth occurs, the opportunity costs for joining a rebellion
decrease, increasing the feasibility of a rebellion. Again, though, it is argued the absolute
level of GDP per capita would be a better indicator of overall opportunity cost than
would its change. For example, if Country A has a GDP per capita of $45,000 while
Country B has a GDP per capita of $1,200, the countries would still have very different
opportunity costs for joining a rebellion even if both experienced a 1% decrease in per
capita GDP over a year.
In this research, then, the conceptual argument is made that a decrease in GDP per
capita represents a decrease in capabilities rather than opportunity cost or state capacity.
No specific hypotheses to that effect are proposed or tested, but the shift in the
interpretation of the variable is considered with the recognition that it ought to be treated
with caution.
Summary of the Relative Deprivation Literature
While the opportunity literature considered inequality and ethnic diversity as
drivers of conflict, the measures used largely have not been valid for capturing the
essence of relative deprivation. Ted Gurr (1970) argued that when one group feels
relatively deprived compared with another, conflict may occur. Stewart (2000; 2008)
further clarified that such inequalities ought to occur along identity-based lines in order to
motivate collective action, with Denny and Walter (2014) suggesting ethnicity as a
particularly salient form of identity. Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) added
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that the existence of actual inequalities is not as important as is the perception that such
inequalities are unjust. Current measures in the opportunity and feasibility literature of
inequality and ethnic tension do not fully encapsulate these concepts. The Gini index is a
measure of vertical rather than horizontal inequality, and ethnic or religious
fractionalization and polarization measure heterogeneity but do not indicate the level of
inequality, perceptions of injustice, or tension among the groups.
Since the publication of Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) opportunity model and
Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner’s (2009) feasibility model, several advances have been
made in the attempts to measure relative deprivation. Geo-spatial economic and ethnicity
data have been combined to estimate the distribution of assets among ethnic groups, and
unequal distributions have been found to be significant predictors of onset (e.g., Buhaug,
Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014; Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011). In addition,
various measures of political exclusion are related to onset (Buhaug, Cederman, &
Gleditsch, 2014; Goldstone et al., 2010). However, in each of these cases the only
country-level opportunity and feasibility-based measures that are controlled for (if any)
are GDP per capita and population. In addition, in some cases there are no measures
given for the overall strengths of the models proposed, and in others, the models are
relatively weak. Therefore, in spite of the found correlations, it is not yet known whether
these improved measures of horizontal inequality merit amending the feasibility
explanation of conflict onset.
It is argued here that the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project’s economic and
political discrimination data best fit the criteria for conflict-causing aspirational relative
deprivation. These data capture inequalities that occur along ethnic lines. Further,
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because they measure discrimination codified in policy rather than simply unequal
outcomes, it is more likely that there is a perception that these inequalities are unjust. The
MAR data, then, will be used to test the degree to which horizontal inequalities add to the
likelihood of conflict when feasibility is controlled for.
Decremental deprivation has largely been ignored in the opportunity-based
research. Growth in GDP per capita is well-established as an indicator of civil conflict
likelihood, but it is consistently and sometimes illogically interpreted in the manner that
best suits the current agenda. Here, the possibility that growth in GDP per capita captures
decremental deprivation will be explored.
Next Steps: Testing the Role of Grievances
Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Collier, Hoeffler, and
Rohner (2009), used findings from their research to argue that hypotheses derived from
theories of opportunity and feasibility are more compelling than are grievance-based
theories of conflict onset. However, their methods of conceptualizing and
operationalizing grievances as fractionalization, ordinal levels of democracy, and vertical
inequality do not fit well with the theoretical notions of absolute and relative deprivation,
which are thought to drive conflict. Instead, it is proposed that infant mortality, dummied
regime types, and MSES may be more valid indicators of absolute deprivation, while
political discrimination, economic discrimination, and change in GDP per capita may
more accurately capture relative deprivation.
These updated measures are derived from a combination of the theories of
absolute and relative deprivation, and the prior literature on the subject. While several
advancements have been made in the measurement of grievances since the opportunity
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and feasibility literature was published, few grievance-oriented authors adequately
control for the feasibility model. Therefore, while there is an understanding that
grievances are associated with conflict onset, it is as yet unknown whether they remain
salient when included in the feasibility model.
.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS AND MEASURES
The major questions guiding this research are: Do improved measures of
grievance add to our ability to explain where and when civil conflict occurs? And, does
the development of more theoretically justifiable measures of grievance merit altering the
feasibility hypothesis, and in what ways? In chapter 2, several competing hypotheses
related to answering those questions were proposed. In this chapter, the methods and
measures used for testing those hypotheses will be discussed. In addition, there are two
related sub-questions that have received little attention thus far: How do these updated
grievance indicators compare as a whole with the feasibility model? And, do the new
grievance measures remain salient when feasibility is taken into account? The techniques
for answering each of these questions will also be outlined below.
The Logic of the Research Approach
CHR came to the conclusion that feasibility is more important than is motive in a
series of stages. In the first stage, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) compared models intended
to capture the level of grievance in a country with those intended to capture the level of
opportunity, and they found that the opportunity models of conflict onset statistically
explained nearly twice as much as did the grievance models. From those data, they
concluded that economic, geographic, and demographic features of the state were more
important in explaining conflict onset than were grievances. In the second stage, CHR
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(2009) refined their measures to include less ambiguous indicators of feasibility of
rebellion, and again found those measures to be strong predictors of onset.
In order to determine whether and to what extent these new measures of motive
compare with and add to CHR’s feasibility model, a similar logical process will be
followed in chapter 4. First, the strength of an overall “new grievance” model is
compared with CHR’s feasibility model. In the next stage, the new indicators are
included in the feasbility model (using updated data), and the relative merits of the
models with and without the new indicators are compared.
In the first section of this chapter, CHR’s feasibilty model is reviewed. This
review includes a discussion of the data used, and the proposed methods for the
comparison of the relative strengths of the feasibility models with those including the
updated measures of grievance. In the next section, a detailed account is given of how
Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner’s data were updated for use in this research, including the
time periods, data sources, and the justification for any imputations that were preformed.
The statistical tests and findings are presented in chapter 5.
The Feasibility Model
CHR’s intent was to determine the conditions that make countries prone to civil
war. In order to make this determination, they used Gleditsch’s (2004) list of war starts
from the Correlates of War project (Small & Singer, 1982; Singer & Small, 1994) which
included starts from 1960 through 2004. According to the Correlates of War inclusion
criteria, to be consdiered a civil war conflicts must have resulted in at least 1,000 battle
deaths over the length of their course, at least 100 people must have been killed on both
sides, and the fighting must involve an organized non-state group against the agents of
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(or claimants to) a state. The battle deaths criterion is meant to help distinguish “wars”
from other types of violence, while requiring at least 100 deaths on each side prevents
one-sided massacres or pogroms from being coded as war.
As noted above, CH (2004) and CHR (2009) measured the probability of identitybased grievances using variations of fractionalization and polarity measures. In their most
recent work they created a social fractionalization measure that combined the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index and the religious fractionalization index. It was intended
to “capture the possible cross cutting of ethnic and religious diversity” (Collier, Hoeffler,
and Rohner, 2009, p. 14). They further measured repression using the Polity IV dataset’s
0-10 democracy scale. There were no measures of inequality in their final analyses,
because they determined in initial stages that none of those indicators were significant
predictors of conflict onset. These two social and political grievance measures were
considered alongside variables intended to capture conditions that affect the feasibility of
rebellion, including: economic growth,11 being a former French African colony,12 GDP
per capita,13 the number of years since the end of the last civil war, population,14 primary
commodities exports,15 the extent of moutainous terrain,16 and the proportion of the total
population who are young men aged 15-49.17

11

Data source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators
This includes: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, The Republic of Congo,
Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo. Following
Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009), it is coded 0 for all countries from 2000 until the most recent
observation.
13
Data source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators (measured in constant 1995 USD).
14
Data source: The natural logarithm of the World Bank’s population data.
15
Data source: World Bank WDI.
16
Data source: Fearon and Laitin (2003), extended from AJ Gerard’s DECRG civil war project data at the
World Bank.
17
Data source: UN Demographic Yearbook 2005.
12
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Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) created a five-year panel dataset from 19601965 through 2000-2004. Using that 208-country, 9-time period panel, they performed a
series of logits to determine what characteristics of the state were most likely to be
associated with civil war onset. In each of their models, GDP per capita (p < 0.10), GDP
per capita growth (lagged) (p < 0.01), primary commodities exports (p < 0.10), squared
primary commodities exports (p < 0.10), peace years (p < 0.01), being a former French
African colony (p < 0.10), social fractionalization (p < 0.01), and population (p < 0.01)
were significant and in the expected directions. A dummy for post cold war and previous
war were not significant, nor was the mountainous terrain variable. The measure of
democracy was both not significant and in the opposite direction hypothesized.
When testing whether and to what extent the new motives indicators improve our
understanding of the drivers of conflict, an updated version of the same data are used,
including country years 1960 through 2009.18 A more detailed account of those data and
their sources is given below. The original CHR model is compared with the same model
plus the addition of the new indicators to determine the extent to which different
measures of motives change the strength of the model. The argument is that if the new
grievance measures add to our ability to explain and understand where civil conflict
occurs, then they ought to be statistically significant, in the hypothesized direction, and
significantly add to the model’s ability to correctly classify conflict and non-conflict
periods.

18

The dataset ends at 2010 because conflict data are only available through 2012, which would lead to a
truncated 2010-2014 period.
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Updated Motives and Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner Data
Because this research relies on adding independent variables to CHR’s original
analysis, the dependent variable is an updated version of their onset variable. The more
recent list of coded conflict onsets is given in Table 1, below. The dataset includes 177
countries, with ten five-year time periods from 1960-2009. Data for each of the countries
begin at independence. Once a conflict begins in a given 5-year period, the data following
Table 1: Updated Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner Civil War Onset
Country
Afghanistan
Algeria
Algeria
Angola
Angola
Angola
Azerbaijan
Burundi
Burundi
Burundi
Burundi
Burundi
Cambodia
Cambodia
Cambodia
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Colombia
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.
Cote d’Ivoire
Dominican
Republic
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Guatemala
Guatemala

Onset
1978
1962
1992
1975
1992
1998
1991
1972
1988
1991
1993
2000
1970
1978
1993
1966
1980
1990
2005
1973
1967
1984
1998
1960
1993
1996
1997
2002
1965
1979
1974
1966
1978

Country
Guinea-Bissau
India
India
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Jordan
Laos
Laos
Korea, Rep.
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Liberia
Liberia
Liberia
Liberia
Mozambique
Myanmar
Myanmar
Nepal
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Nigeria
Nigeria
Pakistan
Pakistan
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Philippines
Philippines
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Onset
1998
1985
2002
1961
1974
1985
1996
1970
1960
1963
1949
1960
1975
1989
1992
1996
2003
1979
1968
1983
2002
1978
1982
1967
1980
1984
1971
1994
2007
1982
1972
2000
2005

Country
Romania
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Rwanda
Rwanda
Rwanda
Rwanda
Serbia
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Somalia
South Africa
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Sudan
Sudan
Thailand
Turkey
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
Uganda
North Yemen
South Yemen
Yemen, Rep.
Yemen, Rep.
Zambia

Onset
1989
1994
1998
1963
1990
1994
1998
2009
1991
1998
1991
1998
1982
2006
1989
1999
1971
1983
1995
2006
1963
1983
1995
1970
1991
1966
1980
1996
2004
1962
1986
1994
2007
1972

onset are removed from the analysis, to avoid conflating the effects of conflict with their
causes. Removal of country-years during which regions are colonized and of ongoing
conflict results in 1452 valid observations out of the potential 1770.
The updated list of onsets includes all of the onset observations in CHR’s data
except Cameroon in 1959, Indonesia in 1956, and Yemen in 1962 and 1986. The
episodes from the 1950s are not coded as conflict “starts” because the dataset begins in
1960. However, those country-years are treated as ongoing conflict and are removed from
the dataset. The Yemeni conflicts occurred in North and South Yemen, respectively, and
they are coded for those countries rather than for Yemen as a whole. The additions to the
onset data since CHR conducted their research include Chad in 2005, Pakistan in 2007,
the Philippines in 2005, Rwanda in 2009, Somalia in 2006, Sri Lanka in 2006, and
Yemen in 2007.
Motives Indicators
In this research, six indicators of potential grievances are outlined. They include
infant mortality, manufacturing and services exports as a share of GDP, regime type,
political discrimination, economic discrimination, and change in GDP per capita. The
first three are intended to capture absolute deprivation, while the intent of the last three is
to attempt to capture perceived relative deprivation with respect to both other groups and
with respect to time. The data sources and methods of calculating each of those indicators
are outlined below.
Infant Mortality. Infant mortality is the number of children per 1,000 live births
who do not survive to age one. The infant mortality rate in a country depends on a
number of factors related to the capacity of both the state and individual households to
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meet basic survival needs. The availability and quality of health care, maternal education,
and access to food and water resources all play a role. Therefore, the infant mortality rate
is used here as a measure of the ability of citizens to meet their basic survival needs.
The infant mortality data are drawn from the World Bank. Because advances in
technology and investments in public health and education that affect infant mortality
rates do not occur at a steady pace, missing data are not imputed. Instead, only originally
reported data are included. This decision results in approximately 15 percent of the
possible country-periods missing observations for infant mortality.
Manufacturing and Services Export Share (MSES). The share of GDP per
capita derived from manufacturing and services exports (MSES) is a function of the
amount and the desirability of exportable goods created in a country. If there are not
many economic opportunities in the manufacturing or services sectors, then MSES will
be low. Likewise, if those opportunities exist but they are driven by forces other than the
global market (e.g., centralized control of the economy), then the percentage of exports
would not be as high as they would be if those forces were driven by the market.
Therefore, MSES is used as a proxy for the number and quality of economic
opportunities in a country.
MSES data are also drawn from the World Bank. Because MSES can be highly
variable over time, these data are also not imputed. Fortunately, 92% of the countryperiods include observations.
Regime Type. Regime type data include dummies for full autocracies, partial
autocracies, partial democracies with factionalism, partial democracies without
factionalism, full democracies, and “transitional” countries. The coding criteria follow
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Goldstone et al. (2010), and they combine Polity’s values for openness of executive
recruitment with the competitiveness of political participation. Goldstone’s table
representing the categories created is below.
Figure 1: Goldstone’s Regime Types
Executive Recruitment

Repressed
(0)

Competitiveness of Political Participation
Suppressed Unregulated
Factional
Transitional
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Competitive
(5)

(1) Ascription
(2) Ascription +
Designation
(3) Designation
(4) Self-Selection
(5) Transition from
Self-Selection
(6) Ascription +
Election
(7) Transitional or
Restrict. Election
(8) Competitive
Election
Black = Full Autocracy. Dark Grey = Partial Autocracy. Very dark grey = Partial Democracy with
Factionalism. Light Grey = Partial Democracy. White = Full Democracy

Countries are considered “transitional” if they changed from one type to another
during the coded 5-year period. Because this transition may occur in the direction of
more or less restriction, there is no a priori expectation regarding the effect of transition
on onset. This method of coding is to avoid arbitrarily treating countries that changed
regime types as one type or another.
Political and Economic Discrimination. Political and economic discrimination
data are culled from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) discrimination dataset. The data range
in value from zero to four, with zero representing no discrimination, one representing
neglect with remedial policies in place, two representing neglect with no remedial
policies in place, three representing social exclusion with neutral policies in place, and
72

four representing exclusion or repressive policies. The MAR descriptions of those
categories are given in Appendix B. In the current dataset, only “at risk” populations are
included, which means models that include discrimination data should be interpreted to
have a sample restricted only to countries with minorities considered at risk as defined by
MAR.19
Each country-period is assigned the score corresponding to the most discriminated
group in the dataset. For example, in Afghanistan in 1950, the Pashtuns are given a
political discrimination score of zero, the Tajiks are given a three, the Hazaras are coded
three, and the Uzbeks are coded three. Therefore, the political discrimination score for
Afghanistan in 1950 is three. The only group that was considered economically
discriminated against in 1950 was the Hazaras, who have a score of two. Therefore,
Afghanistan’s economic discrimination score in 1950 is two. When the data are
combined into five-year periods, the maximum discrimination score for that period (prior
to any conflict onset) is entered, under the assumption that it represents the highest
grievance level for the period.
Change in GDP per Capita. The final motive indicator to be considered is the
change in GDP per capita. In order to improve the number of observations, GDP per
capita data were drawn from the World Bank, the Relative Political Capacity (RPC)
dataset, and the Penn World Tables. The World Bank data were used as the basis from
which the others were adjusted. For example, if the World Bank and RPC datasets
included 10 overlapping observation, the average quotient of the two was multiplied by

19

The Minorities at Risk project defines a “’minority at risk’ as an ethnopolitical group that: collectively
suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; and/or
collectively mobilizes in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests” (Minorities at Risk Project,
2009, p. 1).
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all RPC data for that country in order to obtain values for years in which World Bank
data were missing. A similar procedure was performed for all Penn World Tables data.
Due to the high probability of endogeneity between the change in GDP per capita and
conflict onset, the independent variable is lagged one year.
Other Independent Variables
The other independent variables included in the models are based on those used
by CHR. They include: primary commodities exports, peace years, being a former French
African colony, a social fractionalization score, the proportion of young men (aged 1549), the population, and the extent of mountainous terrain. The sources and calculations
for each are presented below.
Primary Commodities Exports (PCE). CHR drew on the World Bank’s primary
commodities exports variable for their PCE data. However, that variable is no longer
available through the World Development Indicators databank. Therefore, CHR’s
replication dataset is used as the foundation of the PCE variable, and additional data
points are calculated using the sum of food, fuel, ores and minerals, and agricultural
goods from the World Trade Organization. Where data overlap, the quotient between the
WTO’s data and the World Bank’s data is determined, and used to adjust the WTO data
during years the World Bank data are not available.
Peace Years. CHR counted peace years as every year since World War II in
which no onset or on-going conflict occurred. They also counted every year between the
end of one conflict and the start of the next as a peace year. In this research, a similar
approach is taken, except peace years are counted starting at independence rather than
starting in 1945. This difference is because the CHR data do not include anti-colonial
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wars, so countries prior to independence may have been engaged in civil conflict, but it
would not be captured by the CHR onset variable.
Former French African Colony. Former French African colony data are coded
in this research in the exact way in which CHR coded them. Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Repblic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Djibouti,
Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo are all
considered former French African colonies. CHR include the variable as a measure of
feasibility of rebellion due to the security guarantees the French provided the former
colonies’ governments. Because those guarantees lasted between 1965 and 1999, all
countries are coded as 0s from 2000 forward.
Social Fractionalization. CHR’s social fractionalization score described above is
the product of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (EFI) and the religious
fractionalization index (RFI). Each of the indices ranges from 0 (a homogenous society)
to 1 (in which every member of society would be from a different ethnic group or
different religion). The social fractionalization index, then, is the interaction between
ethnic and religious diversity in a country. Because the EFI and RFI are only available for
one time period, the same social fractionalization score is coded for all time periods for a
given country. Those data are drawn from CHR’s replication dataset.
Proportion of Young Men. The proportion of men between the ages of 15 and
49 in a given population are believed to represent the possible recruitment base of a
potential rebel group. CHR drew their data from the World Bank, and updated World
Bank Data are used here. Because the demographic composition of a country is not likely
to change drastically over time, missing data are imputed using the nearest available

75

observation. That is, the observations prior to the first observation are coded the same as
the first observation, and the observations after the last observation are coded the same as
the last observation.
Population. CHR also consider the overall population of a country an indication
of the size of the availble recruitment pool. Their population data are drawn from the
World Bank, and updated World Bank data are again used here. While populations do not
remain steady over time, drastic changes in population growth rates are unlikely.
Therefore, the average population growth rate of the five years closest to any missing
cases are used to impute their values.
Mountainous Terrain. Mountainous terrain is thought to increase the feasibility
of rebellion and decrease the capacity of the state to put down rebellions, because rough
terrain that is difficult to access is also difficult to govern. Fearon and Laitin (2003) point
out that measuring the degree of “mountainousness” does not capture terrain such as
swamps and jungle that may also be favorable to insurgents, but the mountainous terrain
variable is employed by CHR so it is also used here. The variable started to be used after
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) commissioned geographer John Gerrard to code the
percentage of a given country that can be considered “mountainous.” Fearon and Laitin
(2003) later extended the measure using the difference in elevation between the highest
and lowest point in the country, and CHR (2009) used this extended measure in their
most recent work. Because the percentage of mountainous terrain does not change over
time, the data from CHR’s replication dataset is used here.
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Modeling Conflict Onset
Because the dependent variable in this research is dichotomous, a series of logit
regressions are run to determine the extent to which each of the models is able to predict
conflict onset. Logits are appropriate because they set the linear regression equation equal
to the log-odds of an event occuring. In this case, the equation looks like this:
ln

!
= !! + !! !! + ⋯ + !! !! + !!
1−!

Where p is the probability of conflict occuring, Xi is the value of the independent
variables, ε is an error term and each βi is a constant coefficient. This form of modeling is
useful for dichotomous variables, because rearranged, the formula becomes:
!=

1
1 + ! !(!! !!! !! !⋯!!! !! !!! )

That is, the probability of the event occurring is expressed as a function of the
exponentiated linear regression equation, which is bound between 0 and 1.
Because the regression equation must be exponentiated before a probability is
obtained, the interpretation of the effect sizes of independent variables in logit
regressions is not as intuitive as it might be with a linear regression. Instead,
interpretation often relies on comparing the probability of a country-period with one set
of characteristics to that with another set. Thus, once coefficients are obtained for a
model, the estimated probability of conflict occurring can be determined for countries at
varying levels of the independent variables, which helps illustrate the impact a change in
any of the independent variables has on the likelihood of conflict. The interpretation of
direction remains the same between logit and linear regressions. In this case, any positive
coefficient suggests that an increase in the value of the independent variables leads to an
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increase in the likelihood of conflict, while a negative coefficient suggests that an
increase in the independent variable is related with a decrease in the probability of onset.
Time
Following CHR, the time series data from 1945-2009 are divided into ten 5-year
periods. This consolidation of the time-series data into a panel dataset helps to reduce the
number of observations with missing data, and provides a higher percentage of
observations in which onset occurs. In order to avoid treating all observations as if they
are independent from one another, a “period” variable is included in each model that
codes each period one through ten. All findings from the panel dataset, then, should be
interpreted to give the probabilities of conflict within a five-year period, rather than in the
following year.
Methods of Comparing Models
Determining whether and to what extent updated measures of grievance improve
our ability to explain when and where civil conflict occurs depends on the ability to
compare models with and without these grievance measures. Because the major question
centers on the relative strengths of the grievance and feasibility models, three different
approaches are taken in their comparison. The first test of the updated grievance
measures—following Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) consideration of “greed” versus
grievance explanations of conflict onset—will be to compare the feasibility model with a
general “grievance” model developed from the grievance indicators proposed above.
Evaluating the relative strengths of the two models will give some indication of the
validity of both the updated measures and of the grievance argument. This feasibility
versus “grievance” model test leads to the following hypotheses:
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H9: If the feasibility hypothesis is correct, then CHR’s feasibility model
will be significantly better at classifying conflict onset periods than will
the updated grievance model.
However,
H9a: If grievances influence the likelihood of conflict onset, the grievance
model will have similar or more classificatory power than will CHR’s
feasibility model.
The second test of the proposed grievance indicators will be to add each of them
independently to the feasibility model, and compare the strength of the models with and
without the measure of grievance. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous and
logits are run, the Receiever Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is used to determine
the relative strengths of the models. The ROC curve is similar to an R2 in that it provides
a method of comparing the strength of one model with that of another. However, an R2 is
never appropriate for models with dichotomous dependent variables, because its
assumptions are violated in non-linear approaches.20 Due to the limited usefulness of a
true R2 in non-linear regression, a number of pseudo-R2 measures exist. These measures
are termed “pseudo” because they are structured similarly to an R2, being bound between
zero and one with higher values indicating improved goodness of fit or predictive power.
The interpretation of the pseudo-R2 values are not particularly intuitive, though, and they
generally cannot be used for comparing models drawn from different datasets or samples.
In addition, the different pseudo-R2 techniques can lead to drastically different
measures.21 While these pseudo-R2 measures are often reported in civil conflict research,

20

R2, when applied to OLS, assumes both homoscedasticity and that the total sum of squares is equal to the
regression sum of squares plus the residual sum of squares. Neither of those assumptions hold for nonlinear regression models.
21
E.G., it is unclear which pseudo-R2 Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) report in their tests of the
feasibility model.
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it is not always clear which method is employed, making comparisons among models
even more difficult.
In this research, a method of comparison is needed that is useful across samples,
has a somewhat intuitive interpretation, and is not dependent upon the base rate of the
“event” (in this case, civil conflict onset) occurring. Therefore, the ROC curve is
employed. The ROC curve considers the ability of a model to rank “events” higher than
“non-events” in the dataset, making it appropriate for the nominal dependent variable
used in this research. The curve is a plot of the relationship between the percentage of
correctly predicted conflicts and the percentage of incorrectly predicted conflicts (“false
positives”) at any given cutoff point for the probability of onset (Hanley & McNeil,
1982).
If a model accurately predicts conflicts at any given cutoff point, then there will
be a point on the curve where the true positive rate (a correctly predicted conflict) is close
to 100 percent, and the false-positive rate (and incorrectly predicted conflict) is close to
zero. In that case, the area under the ROC (AUROC) curve will be close to one. More
errors in the model, however, decrease the point on the Y-axis or increase the point on the
X-axis, thereby decreasing the area under the ROC curve. In this case, the area under the
ROC curve can be intuitively thought of as the probability that the model will rank a
randomly chosen conflict higher than a randomly chosen non-conflict (Cortes and Mohri,
2004).
The logic of the ROC curve can be seen graphically in Figure 2, below. If, at a
given cutoff point, the true positive rate is high (e.g., conflict onsets are correctly
classified at a rate of 80%), while the false positive rate is low (e.g., only 5 percent of
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non-conflict periods are classified as conflicts), then the area under the curve will be
close to one. However, if the model is only able to correctly classify conflicts at the
expense of incorrectly classifying non-conflicts, then the curve will remain close to the
dotted line, and the area under the curve will be close to 0.50. Therefore, in practice, the
area under the curve ranges from 0.50 to one, with higher areas indicating improved
classificatory power in a model.
Figure 2: Visual of a Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve22

The ability of two models to classify onset and non-conflict periods correctly can
be compared using Hanley and McNeil’s (1982) test of the differences in ROC curves.
The test is based on the actual differences between the two areas, and an estimate of the
standard error of the Wilcoxon statistic. The calculation of the standard error depends on
both the AUROC of each curve and the sample sizes. Increases in either the AUROC or
sample size decrease the standard error, with increases in the number of “event”
observations having a greater effect than increases in “non-event” observations (Hanley

22

Image source: Medcalc (2017, April 3). The ROC curve [image]. Retrieved from
https://www.medcalc.org/manual/roc-curves.php
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& McNeil, 1982). The effect sizes of the independent variables are also explored by
determining their impact on the likelihood of conflict holding other variables at their
means.
The third method that will be employed for determining the utility of the updated
grievance meausres in explaining conflict onset is stepwise regression. Stepwise
regression is a method that can be used to determine, statistically, which of a series of
proposed independent variables best explain a given dependent variable. There are three
general approaches to stepwise regression. In forward selection, the model starts with no
independent variables, and the IVs are added to the model according to which provides
the most statistically signifcant improvement in fit. In backward elimination, the model
begins with all of the proposed independent variables, and they are removed one by one
until the removal of the last variable would cause a statistically significant decrease in fit.
The third approach, bidirectional elimination, is a combination of the two (Wang,
Wright, & Buswell, 2013).
In this research, backward elimination is used. A backward stepwise is
appropriate, because the end goal is to determine which of the feasibility and grievance
variables can be eliminated without decreasing our ability to understand where conflict
occurs. The assumption is that if a grievance variable remains after the backward
elimination, then removing it would significantly decrease the power of the model. The
stepwise portion of this research leads to the final hypotheses to be tested:
H10: If CHR’s feasibility hypothesis is correct, and motives are
indeterminant, then the measures of grievance ought not to remain in the
final version of the stepwise regression.
However,
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H10a: If grievances influence the likelihood of conflict onset, then the
grievance variables ought to remain in the stepwise regression after the
backward elimination procedure is complete.
Software Packages
For this research, the majority of the regressions were run using the open source
software package GRETL. The ROC curves were graphed using GRETL’s ROC add-on
package. GRETL does not have an automated stepwise function, so the stepwise
regressions were run in SPSS.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND FINDINGS

The data and findings regarding the multiple hypotheses proposed in chapter 2 are
presented here. The summary statistics for the data are given first, illustrating that there
are few substantial differences between Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner’s (2009) original
data and the updated dataset. Next, bivariate tests between the grievance measures and
onset are performed and discussed. Finally, the findings from the hypotheses proposed
are presented.
Univariate Analysis
The summary statistics for all variables included in the models are given in Table
2. In addition, the mean values for CHR’s original data are presented, illustrating that
there are few substantial differences between the two. The greatest discrepancies are in
average peace years and population. The difference in peace years is explained because
CHR began counting from 1945 for all countries. In the updated dataset, peace years are
counted from the year independence is granted, because anti-colonial wars are not
considered civil conflicts in the onset data. Therefore, countries involved in anti-colonial
wars prior to independence would have been coded as “peace years” using CHR’s
methodology. The difference in population is due to the inclusion criteria for the two
datasets. CHR included countries with populations less than 500,000, where the updated
dataset does not due to limitations in the grievance data available for smaller countries.
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Table 2: Univariate Data
Variable

Current Mean
(SD)
0.067 (0.250)

CHR Mean
0.067

Current
Min
0.000

Current
Max
1.000

Current
Obs.
1452

(ln) GDP/capita

8.041 (1.567)

8.604

4.774

11.723

1335

PCE

0.173 (0.235)

0.164

0.002

4.973

1257

PCE Squared

0.085 (0.734)

0.000

24.725

1257

Peace Years

26.460 (17.313)

32

1.000

63.000

1452

Former French African Colony

0.086 (0.281)

0.101

0.000

1.000

1452

Social Fractionalization

0.177 (0.172)

0.180

0.000

0.651

1386

Young Men (Prop of Total Pop)

0.129 (0.019)

0.129

0.081

0.278

1341

lnPopulation

15.758 (1.699)

10.32

9.659

21.002

1378

Mountainous Terrain

16.766 (20.190)

15.779

0.000

94.300

1064

Infant Mortality

61.033 (49.565)

2.180

234.400

1236

MSES

0.326 (0.228)

0.001

2.225

1338

Full Democracy

0.176 (0.381)

0.000

1.000

1324

Partial Democracy

0.111 (0.314)

0.000

1.000

1324

Partial Democracy w/ Faction.

0.082 (0.274)

0.000

1.000

1324

Partial Autocracy

0.088 (0.283)

0.000

1.000

1324

Full Autocracy

0.411 (0.492)

0.000

1.000

1324

Transition

0.133 (0.340)

0.000

1.000

1324

Political Discrimination (0-4)

2.954 (1.277)

0.000

4.000

867

Economic Discrimination (0-4)

2.598 (1.325)

0.000

4.000

869

GDP Growth (Lag)

0.020 (0.045)

-0.315

0.360

1324

Conflict Onset (Dummy)

N

1063

1452

Missing data only appear to be a concern for the political and economic
discrimination variables. Because listwise deletion is used, the findings for those models
should be interpreted to apply only in countries in which there are minorities at risk. The
highest number of missing cases for other variables is infant mortality, which is missing
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216 country-periods out of the possible 1452. As noted earlier, infant mortality data are
not imputed because in many countries the earliest data available are from the 1970s,
when advances in health care and maternal education led to drastic changes in mortality
rates that affected countries at different times, increasing the likelihood of errors in
backward projections. While it is not likely that the missing periods are random, with 85
percent of the possible cases available, the missing data are not an immediate cause for
concern.
Comparing the data in onset years with those in “peace” years also yields the
expected results (Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C). GDP per capita, lagged GDP per
capita growth, primary commodity exports, peace years, and the likelihood of being a
former French African colony are all higher in “peace” periods than they are in onset
periods. Social fractionalization, proportion of young men, total population, and
mountainous terrain are all higher in onset periods than they are in peace periods. The
univariate data are also consistent with what is expected regarding the grievance
variables. Infant mortality, political discrimination, and economic discrimination are all
higher in onset periods than they are in peace periods. MSES and GDP growth are higher
in peace periods than they are in onset periods.
The major statistical problem arising from the univariate analysis is that there are
no observations of onset in full democracies. While these data support the argument that
decreased voice increases the likelihood of conflict, it makes statistical analysis of the
difference between the likelihood of conflict in full democracies and in other regime
types impossible. Due to this issue, full and partial democracies are combined for some of
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the analyses, and full democracies are removed in some models.23 Those instances are
noted in the text.
Bivariate Findings
Bivariate analysis between the grievance indicators described above and the
updated CHR conflict variable illustrate that all of the motives are significant predictors
of conflict onset and in the expected direction when feasibility is not controlled for. Table
3 presents the hypothesis table and the bivariate findings. Because a panel dataset is used,
in each case the country-period is also controlled for so the observations for each country
are not treated as independent from one another.
The regime type data presented provide some insight into the inconsistent and
contradictory findings in the opportunity research relating democracy to conflict onset.
The results indicate an inverted U-shaped relationship between the original Polity scores
and conflict, where full and partial democracies along with full autocracies are the least
likely to experience conflict, and partial democracies with factionalism are the most
likely to experience conflict. The relative stability of both full democracies and full
autocracies lends credibility to the argument that states on the poles of the Polity index
tend to have greater capacity than do those in the middle. However, the difference
between full and partial autocracies is not significant (Table D1); therefore, this apparent
“protective effect” of capacity may not be real. The increased likelihood of conflict in
partial democracies with factionalism compared with partial democracies without
factionalism (Regime Type 2 in Table 3) supports the argument that factionalism
increases the likelihood of relative deprivation. However, there is not a significant
23

In the tests that follow, all democracies without factionalism are considered one group in the initial
stages. However, when it is necessary to test differences between the different “partial” regime types, full
democracies are removed from the sample. Those instances are noted in the text.
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difference between the likelihood of conflict in partial democracies without factionalism
and that in partial autocracies, which indicates that the relative deprivation of voice may
be more salient than is absolute deprivation of voice. This relationship between regime
type and the other measures for motive will be explored further below.
Table 3: Bivariate Hypothesis Table – Motives and Onset Logit
Variable (Period = Control)

Predicted

Relationship w/ 5 Yr Panel Onset

Infant Mortality

+ (H1b)

0.016 (0.003)***

MSES

- (H3b)

-2.577 (0.714)***

Regime Type 1
(Ref = Full or Partial Democ)
Full Autocracy
Partial Autocracy
Part. Democ w/ Factionalism
Transitional

+ (H2a)
+ (H2a)
+ (H2a)
?

1.452 (0.422)***
1.617 (0.505)***
1.989 (0.483)***
1.363 (0.485)***

Regime Type 2
Full Democracies Removed
Ref = Partial Democ
Full Autocracy
Partial Autocracy
Part. Democ w/ Factionalism
Transitional

?
+ (H2c)
+ (H2c)
?

0.444 (0.436)
0.625 (0.513)
0.998 (0.491)**
0.372 (0.493)

Political Discrimination

+ ( H8 b )

0.312 (0.113)***

Economic Discrimination

+ ( H7 b )

0.215 (0.098)**

-

-8.564 (2.171)***

Change in GDP/capita
** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01

In order to be aware of potential multicollinearity, the correlations between each
of the key independent variables were tested. The results are presented in Table 4. The
highest correlations are between infant mortality and logged GDP per capita (R = -0.741),
and between political and economic discrimination (R = 0.646). There are also moderate
relationships between MSES and logged GDP per capita (R = 0.380), MSES and primary
commodities exports (R=0.438), MSES and logged population (R = -0.349), and MSES
and infant mortality (R = -0.335).
88

Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Key Independent Variables
Variable
dy
EconD
PolDisc
MSES
InfMort
SocFract
lnPop
lny

lny
0.044
0.103
-0.027
0.380
-0.741
-0.299
-0.048
0.101

PCE
0.101
-0.113
0.001
0.438
0.004
0.107
-0.253
1

lnPop
0.061
0.203
0.149
-0.349
-0.071
-0.022
1

Soc Frac
-0.068
-0.197
-0.070
-0.001
0.358
1

Inf Mort
-0.097
-0.092
0.128
-0.335
1

MSES
0.035
-0.188
-0.062
1

Pol Dis
-0.043
0.646
1

Eco Dis
0.035
1

Multivariate Findings
To establish a baseline against which models that include the new motives
indicators can be compared, CHR’s original model is run using the updated data. The
only variable added to CHR’s core model is a code for the period (1-10), so that
observations within the same country are not treated as completely independent from one
another. The results from this model are given in Table 5.
The coefficients and significance levels from the model with the updated data are
comparable to CHR’s original model. All of the coefficients maintain their signs, and the
only variable that loses significance between CHR’s model and the same model in this
research is social fractionalization. This finding is initially surprising because the social
fractionalization data are unchanged from the original version, and the indicator was
highly significant (p < 0.01) in CHR’s models.
The discrepancy in the social fractionalization coefficients and significance levels
are accounted for by the increased number of observations for GDP per capita in the
updated dataset. When social fractionalization is entered into a logit alone with onset, the
coefficient and significance levels are similar to what CHR found in their models
(B=2.447, p<0.01 compared with B=2.173, p<0.01 in CHR). However, when GDP per
capita is entered into the model, it suppresses the effect of social fractionalization,
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dy
1

Table 5: Logit Models of Civil Conflict Onset – Original Data
DV = onset

Model 1
CHR Orig Data
0.029 (0.046)

Model 2
CHR – No lny
0.018 (0.045)

Model 3
CHR Core in Disc
0.027 (0.054)

-0.448 (0.114)***

--

-0.456 (0.132)***

PCE

3.853 (2.749)

3.432 (2.731)

5.875 (3.494)*

PCEsq

-5.967 (4.567)

-6.851 (4.652)

-10.314 (6.450)

Peace Years

-0.034 (0.009)***

-0.046 (0.008)***

-0.025 (0.010)**

Former Fr Afr Col

-1.194 (0.576)**

-0.923 (0.581)

-1.211 (0.600)**

Social Fract.

0.362 (0.728)

1.197 (0.702)*

0.444 (0.758)

Young Men

8.955 (9.275)

8.870 (7.727)

7.703 (11.397)

lnPopulation

0.296 (0.083)***

0.319 (0.082)***

0.179 (0.098)*

Mountainous

0.006 (0.006)

0.011 (0.006)*

0.006 (0.007)

-12.787 (2.941)***

-13.531 (2.864)***

-12.814 (3.188)***

-4.849 (1.963)**

-8.430 (1.758)***

-2.779 (2.323)

1194

1194

721

0.832 (0.019)

0.802 (0.023)

0.792 (0.023)

0.535

0.501

0.466

93.2% at 0.528

93.3% at 0.492

90.2% at 0.701

Period
(ln)GDP per capita

GDP Growth (Lag)
Constant
N
ROC Area
Youden Index
Max Corr Predicted

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

decreasing the coefficient to 1.078 and raising the p-value to 0.07. When primary
commodities exports are added, the coefficient falls further to 0.839, and the p-value
increases to 0.178. While the GDP per capita values for CHR’s dataset and the current
dataset are highly correlated (R=0.97), the updated dataset includes two hundred more
observations. Included in those observations are several onset periods in relatively
homogenous societies. The average social fractionalization score for all country periods
is 0.178, and the newly added onset periods include three in Cambodia (SFI = 0.028), one
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in Lebanon (0.101), and one each in Afghanistan (0.179), Iraq (0.178) and Serbia (0.179).
The only onset added in the updated dataset in a country where social fractionalization is
well above the mean is in Laos where SFI is 0.288. This expanded dataset can be said to
give a more complete picture of the relationship between fractionalization and conflict
onset. Contrary to CHR’s findings, ethnic and religious diversity does not seem to have
an effect on the likelihood of a civil war occurring.
The area under the ROC curve (AUROC) of 0.832 provides a baseline against
which the models that include the motive indicators can be tested. The ROC curve is a
plot of the relationship between the percentage of correctly predicted conflicts and the
percentage of incorrectly predicted conflicts at any given cutoff point for the probability
of onset. Higher areas indicate improved predictive power in a model. Therefore, while
the 0.832 means little in its own right, higher and lower values in the following models
indicate higher and lower classificatory power, respectively.
CHR’s core model is also run without (logged) GDP per capita in model 2. This
second model is necessary because GDP per capita is moderately correlated with infant
mortality and MSES, so some models intended for hypothesis tests are run without it. The
AUROC of 0.802 in model 2 is a useful baseline for evaluating those models in which
GDP per capita is not included.
In the third model, CHR’s core model is run with the sample limited to countryperiods that are included in the Minorities at Risk discrimination dataset. This model and
its 0.792 unit area under the curve can be used as the basis for assessing the models that
include the political and economic discrimination variables. In the MAR countries, the
sign and significance of most of the variables remains unchanged, suggesting that the
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sample of MAR countries, while not random, does not deviate substantially from overall
sample.
The Grievance Model
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) first concluded that opportunity is better at explaining
onset than is grievance when they compared a model of their grievance measures with a
model of their opportunity measures and found that the opportunity model had
substantially greater explanatory power than did their grievance model. The argument
presented here and by Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014) is that the primary
reason for the limited power of Collier and Hoeffler’s grievance model is that the
grievance measures were not theoretically justifiable. Therefore, in order to provide an
initial test of the validity of the grievance measures, the updated grievance model is
compared with CHR’s feasibility model, below.
Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) grievance model included all of their indicators of
grievance24 as well as peace duration, mountainous terrain, and geographic dispersion. In
order to re-create the same test, a similar logical approach is taken, with the inclusion of
the six proposed indicators of grievance: infant mortality, MSES, regime type, political
discrimination, economic discrimination, and GDP growth along with peace years and
(logged) population. The results are presented in Table 6.
In the first model, political and economic discrimination are not included, due to
the limits the two variables place on the sample. In this model, all of the signs are in the
expected direction, infant mortality and regime type are significant predictors of onset,

24

They include: ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, polarization, ethnic dominance,
democracy, and population. In their second model, they add income inequality, and in the third, income
inequality is removed and land inequality is added.
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Table 6: A Grievance Model of Civil Conflict
DV = Onset

Model 1
No Discrim
0.133 (0.059)**

Model 2
With Pol Discrim
0.155 (0.069)**

Model 3
With Econ Discrim
0.180 (0.071)**

Peace Years

-0.033 (0.010)***

-0.025 (0.011)**

-0.024 (0.010)**

(ln)Population

0.304 (0.091)***

0.194 (0.100)*

0.187 (0.097)*

Infant Mortality

0.009 (0.003)**

0.010 (0.004)**

0.012 (0.004)***

-1.285 (0.848)

-1.228 (0.887)

-0.856 (0.903)

Full Autocracy

1.036 (0.499)**

0.783 (0.567)

0.842 (0.561)

Partial Autocracy

1.110 (0.600)*

0.648 (0.680)

0.610 (0.680)

Part Democ w/ Fact

1.746 (0.535)***

1.360 (0.589)**

1.418 (0.584)**

Part/Full Democracy

ref

ref

ref

Transitional

1.026 (0.557)*

0.635 (0.631)

0.644 (0.628)

GDP/Capita Growth

-2.760 (2.846)

-4.489 (3.075)

-5.539 (3.154)*

Pol Discrimination

--

0.244 (0.141)*

--

Econ Discrimination

--

--

0.336 (0.129)***

-8.942 (1.802)***

-7.723 (1.936)***

-8.187 (1.930)***

1770

700

702

0.793 (0.024)

0.760 (0.030)

0.765 (0.030)

0.436

0.414

0.427

93.8% at 0.621

91.4% at 0.504

91.9% at 0.382

Period

MSES

Constant
N
ROC Area
Youden Index
Max Corr Predicted

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

and regime type maintains its inverted U-shaped relationship with the probability of
onset. The AUROC is 0.793, which is a decrease from CHR’s core model of 0.832, but a
Hanley and McNeil test indicates that the differences in areas are not significant
(p=0.185). Therefore, grievance and feasibility can be said to classify onset and nonconflict periods correctly at similar rates using the updated measures of absolute
deprivation.
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In the second and third models, political and economic discrimination are added
independently, due to their being highly correlated with one another (R = 0.646). Both
discrimination measures are significant predictors of onset and in the expected direction.
Infant mortality and regime type also maintain their significance, although (as noted
above), the relationship between partial and full autocracies changes due to the
limitations to the sample. Again, the AUROC decreases between CHR’s feasibility model
and the grievance model, but the difference between the two is not significant (p = 0.256
and 0.290 in models 2 and 3, respectively). These findings suggest that, using
discrimination as a measure of relative deprivation rather than Collier and Hoeffler’s
fractionalization and polarization scores, grievance and feasibility explain civil war onset
to similar degrees.
The comparison between the grievance and feasibility models provides some
support for the proposal that there may be more merit to the grievance argument than
CHR allowed; however, as in the prior literature incorporating alternative measures of
grievance, it is impossible to discern from this approach which grievance indicators add
what to our current understanding of civil conflict. Therefore, in the next section the
grievance indicators are added to the feasibility model alone and in conjunction with one
another in order to determine to what extent they enhance our understanding of where
civil conflict occurs.
Ability to Meet Survival Needs
The first potential grievance discussed above is the inability to meet basic survival
needs, which is operationalized using the infant mortality rate. The related minor
hypothesis (H1b) is that the likelihood of conflict onset will be higher in countries in
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which people are unable to meet their basic survival needs, and the results of the models
in Table 7 support that hypothesis. The second set of hypotheses (H1 and H1a) are related
to the idea that comparing the predictive power of the feasibility model plus infant
mortality with that of the feasibility model alone ought to give an indication of whether
the ability to meet basic survival needs explains more regarding where conflict occurs
than does feasibility alone. The results in that regard initially favor the feasibility
hypothesis; adding infant mortality does not significantly improve the predictive power
of the model. However, the findings also suggest that the relationships among infant
mortality, GDP per capita, and conflict onset deserve further exploration.
Model 1 includes all of CHR’s core variables, and infant mortality. Not only is the
infant mortality rate a significant predictor of conflict in the direction hypothesized, but
the AUROC also increases from 0.832 in the core model to 0.837 in the infant mortality
model. This increase is not statistically significant according to Hanley and McNeil’s test
(p = 0.45); which indicates that the difference in strength between the model including
infant mortality and that which does not include infant mortality is not large enough to
suggest it is real in the population. However, the significance of the variable does suggest
that the ability to meet survival needs is related to whether or not civil wars begin.
The effect of infant mortality on the probability of onset can be better understood
when the coefficients are entered into the equation
!=

1
1+

! !(!! !!! !! !⋯!!! !! !!! )

According to the coefficients found in model 1, the probability of a country with average
feasibility indicators experiencing a conflict in a given 5-year period is 1.4 percent. If that
country’s infant mortality rate increases one standard deviation (from 56 deaths per 1,000
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live births to 104 deaths), the probability of onset increases to 2 percent. If the infant
mortality rate increases two standard deviations (to 151 deaths per 1,000 live births), the
Table 7: Logit Models of Civil Conflict Onset – Feasibility and Infant Mortality
DV = Onset

Model 1
Inf Mort
0.072 (0.064)

Model 2
No lny
0.124 (0.060)**

-0.347 (0.163)**

--

6.320 (3.635)*

6.540 (3.611)*

PCEsq

-14.816 (7.556)**

-16.657 (7.596)**

Peace Years

-0.030 (0.010)***

-0.036 (0.009)***

Former Fr Afr Col

-1.900 (0.767)**

-1.856 (0.768)**

Social Fract.

0.068 (0.810)

0.242 (0.814)

Young Men

20.275 (10.304)**

19.074 (9.362)**

lnPopulation

0.252 (0.091)***

0.264 (0.092)***

Mountainous

0.003 (0.006)

0.005 (0.006)

Infant Mortality

0.008 (0.004)*

0.014 (0.003)***

GDP Growth (Lag)

-10.652 (3.401)***

-10.766 (3.395)***

Constant

-7.309 (2.650)***

-10.584 (2.134)***

1097

1097

0.837 (0.018)

0.834 (0.020)

0.553

0.537

93.7% at 0.647

93.7% at 0.572

Period
(ln)GDP per capita
PCE

N
ROC Area
Youden Index
Max Corr Predicted

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

probability of onset more than doubles from the average country to 3 percent. Therefore,
while the predictive power of the model may not improve significantly with the addition
of infant mortality, the model suggests that an increase in infant mortality rate of two
standard deviations influences the likelihood of conflict to the same degree as does a two
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standard deviation increase in the proportion the population composed of young men
(from 12.7 to 16.9 percent of the population composed of men between 15 and 49).
The findings in Model 2 are also telling. In this model, (logged) GDP per capita is
removed in order to account for the effects of multicollinearity between GDP per capita
and infant mortality rates. Not only do the significance and effect size of infant mortality
increase, but the AUROC also increases from CHR’s original model (although not
significantly). This finding suggests that infant mortality rates contain approximately the
same predictive power regarding civil conflict onset as does GDP per capita. In addition,
if GDP per capita and infant mortality are explaining similar components of likelihood of
onset, the robust relationship between GDP per capita and conflict onset may actually
exist because it captures a country’s levels of absolute deprivation rather than proxying
potential rebel’s opportunity costs (as Collier and Hoeffler contend), or state capacity (as
Fearon and Laitin suggest). This argument will be explored further below.
Economic Opportunities
The second measure of absolute deprivation to be tested is manufacturing and
services exports as a share of GDP (MSES). The minor hypothesis (H3b) is that the higher
the MSES, the higher the quality and quantity of economic opportunities in the country,
so the lower should be the likelihood of conflict onset. When MSES is added to CHR’s
core model, the sign is in the expected direction, but the relationship is not significant
(presented in Table 8).
As noted above, MSES and GDP per capita are moderately correlated, so GDP
per capita is removed in the second model. In that model, MSES is significant and in the
expected direction. In addition, the AUROC increases slightly from 0.802 in the
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Table 8: Logit Models of Civil Conflict Onset – Feasibility and MSES
DV = Onset

Model 1
MSES 1
0.035 (0.048)

Model 2
MSES 2 – No lny
0.048 (0.048)

-0.428 (0.121)***

--

PCE

4.166 (2.842)

4.762 (2.807)*

PCEsq

-6.134 (4.574)

-7.291 (4.586)

Peace Years

-0.034 (0.009)***

-0.045 (0.008)***

Former Fr Afr Col

-1.197 (0.576)**

-0.986 (0.579)*

Social Fract.

0.347 (0.728)

1.005 (0.702)

Young Men

8.878 (9.326)

8.953 (8.181)

lnPopulation

0.288 (0.085)***

0.274 (0.085)***

Mountainous

0.005 (0.006)

0.009 (0.006)

MSES

-0.410 (0.932)

-1.837 (1.000)*

-12.709 (2.951)***

-13.189 (2.912)***

-4.807 (1.964)**

-7.484 (1.831)***

1192

1192

0.832 (0.018)

0.808 (0.022)

0.529

0.504

93.2% at 0.523

93.3% at 0.397

Period
Ln(GDP per capita)

GDP Growth (Lag)
Constant
N
ROC Area
Youden Index
Max Corr Predicted

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

feasibility model with GDP per capita removed to 0.808 in the same model with MSES.
However, the increase is not significant. The findings suggest that the grievance due to
lack of economic opportunity measured through MSES does not explain more regarding
the probability of conflict onset than does feasibility alone.
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Political Voice
The third measure of absolute deprivation suggested above is regime type. The
types were originally coded as full democracies, partial democracies, partial democracies
with factionalism, partial autocracies, full autocracies, and countries that transitioned
from one type to another during the 5-year period. There were no episodes of onset
during any 5-year periods in which a country was a full democracy, which supports the
suggestion that decreased voice increases the risk of conflict. However, because there are
no onsets, statistical analysis comparing full democracies with other regime types is
impossible. Therefore, partial and full democracies were combined for much of this
analysis, and entered into the model as the reference group. For the models in which
partial and full democracies are included as the reference group, the findings regarding
other regime types should be interpreted as being in comparison with all democracies
(full or partial) without factionalism.
Consistent with H2b, the regime type model indicates that all regime types are
more likely to experience conflict onset in a 5-year period than are democracies without
factionalism. The difference between democracies without factionalism and democracies
with factionalism is significant, as well as the difference between democracies without
factionalism and full autocracies. The AUROC remains relatively unchanged from the
CHR model (0.832 to 0.830) when regime types are included, suggesting that while the
effect of political voice on conflict likelihood may be real, it may not be substantial and it
may not explain more than does feasibility alone.
The bivariate analysis presented in Table 3 indicates that partial autocracies are
more likely to experience conflict than are full autocracies, but the findings in Table 9
appear to suggest that partial autocracies are less likely to experience conflict than are full
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Table 9: Logit Models of Civil Conflict Onset – Feasibility and Regime Type
DV = Onset

Model 1
Regime Type
0.066 (0.051)

Model 2
No PCE/Gr
0.021 (0.046)

Model 3
Part Autoc Ref
0.021 (0.046)

Model 4
No FD, Fact Ref
0.054 (0.052)

-0.350 (0.137)**

-0.373 (0.123)***

-0.373 (0.123)***

-0.294 (0.141)**

PCE

3.524 (2.851)

--

--

3.258 (2.845)

PCEsq

-5.698 (4.665)

--

--

-5.475 (4.642)

-0.037 (0.010)***

-0.034 (0.009)***

-0.034 (0.009)***

-0.035 (0.010)***

-1.242 (0.638)*

-1.235 (0.634)*

-1.235 (0.634)*

-1.285 (0.638)**

Social Fract.

0.662 (0.763)

1.045 (0.706)

1.045 (0.706)

0.647 (0.767)

Young Men

7.156 (9.785)

6.326 (8.992)

6.326 (8.992)

5.100 (9.892)

lnPopulation

0.312 (0.088)***

0.270 (0.076)***

0.270 (0.076)***

0.302 (0.088)***

Mountainous

0.010 (0.006)

0.004 (0.006)

0.004 (0.006)

0.009 (0.006)

Full Autocracy

0.940 (0.488)*

0.838 (0.469)*

-0.046 (0.400)

-0.263 (0.395)

Partial Autocracy

0.555 (0.614)

0.884 (0.545)

ref

-0.623 (0.538)

Part Dem w/ Fact

1.227 (0.527)**

1.336 (0.510)***

0.452 (0.469)

ref

Part/Full Democ

ref

ref

-0.884 (0.545)

-0.922 (0.529)*

0.881 (0.528)*

0.904 (0.516)*

0.020 (0.466)

-0.344 (0.457)

GDP Gr (Lag)

-9.822 (3.347)***

--

--

-9.646 (3.315)***

Constant

-6.705 (2.194)***

-5.454 (2.043)***

-4.570 (1.978)**

-5.368 (2.128)**

1101

1175

1175

888

0.830 (0.020)

0.808

0.808

0.789

0.553

0.527

0.527

0.486

93.6% at 0.714

93.4% at 0.605

93.4% at 0.605

92.0% at 0.687

Period
Ln(GDP/cap)

Peace Years
Fmr Fr Afr Col

Transition

N
ROC Area
Youden Index
Max Corr Predict

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

autocracies. This finding is due to cases that are removed from the model when primary
commodities and GDP growth are included rather than the suppression effect of any of
the control variables. This skewing of the data can be seen when regime type is run alone
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with conflict onset for a sample restricted to those for which there are observations for
PCE and growth (Appendix D1). When the same model is run again removing PCE and
growth, the difference between democracies without factionalism and partial autocracies
remains non-significant, but the true inverted U-shape of the relationship returns.
As mentioned in chapter 2, one of the limitations of the ordinal polity measure is
that states at the poles of the measure may have greater capacity than do anocratic states
that measure in the middle of the polity spectrum. If polity is capturing capacity, then it is
possible that full autocracies will be more stable than are partial autocracies. In that case,
the fully autocratic states out to be significantly less likely to experience conflict than are
partially autocratic states, in spite of their lower levels of political voice. In order to test
this assertion, in model 3 partial autocracies are included as the reference category. Again
PCE and growth are removed from the model due to the effect the missing data.
In this model, partial autocracies are not significantly different from any of the
other regime types. Therefore, in spite of the coefficient suggesting that there is a
protective effect to the capacity of full autocracies, it does not appear as though the
difference between the types of autocracy is large enough to conclude it is real in the
population.
The second limitation to polity suggested above is that partial democracies with
factionalism are in the middle of the polity spectrum, but they may also provide the
highest probability of relative differences in political voice among ethnic or religious
groups. In order to test the difference between democracies with factionalism and other
regime types, democracies with factionalism are entered into model 4 as the reference
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group. In addition, all full democracies are removed from this model, to get a more
accurate comparison between partial democracies and democracies with factionalism.
According to the data presented in model 4, democracies with factionalism are
significantly more likely to experience conflict than are partial democracies without
factionalism. This finding lends further support to the idea that factionalism may capture
some form of relative deprivation regarding political voice. In order to further test this
assumption, a cross tabulation (Appendix Table D2) of regime type (factionalized versus
non-factionalized) and political discrimination scores was performed. This initial test
indicates that there is no difference in the likelihood of discrimination in factionalized
versus all non-factionalized countries. However, in an examination of only democracies,
47.1 percent of the factionalized democracies enacted politically repressive policies
against specific ethnic groups, while only 27.5 percent of the other democracies in the
Minorities at Risk dataset. Those findings are presented in Table 10. The cross-tabulation
Table 10: Cross Tabulation of Political Discrimination and Factionalized
Democracies among Democracies Only
No Discrimination
Neglect/Remedial Policies
Neglect/No Remedial Policies
Exclusion/Neutral Policy
Exclusion/Repressive Policy
Total N
2
= 15.208, p < 0.01

Not Factionalized
5.7%
20.4%
14.7%
31.8%
27.5%
221

Factionalized
4.7%
5.9%
12.9%
29.4%
47.1%
85

Total
5.4%
16.2%
14.2%
31.1%
33.1%
296

should be treated with caution, because it only contains countries that meet the Minorities
at Risk inclusion criteria. However, these data do suggest that the increased likelihood of
relative deprivation may play some role in distinguishing factionalized from nonfactionalized democracies regarding their likelihood of conflict.
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Further, there is no significant difference between factionalized democracies and
either type of autocracy regarding their conflict likelihood. This finding initially suggests
that the effect of relative political deprivation is similar to that of absolute political
deprivation regarding its relationship with onset. However, an examination of the
political discrimination scores of autocracies compared with factionalized countries
(Appendix Table D3) suggests that the regime types implement repressive policies at
similar rates. Therefore, rather than autocracy representing absolute deprivation, it
appears that it may represent a greater likelihood of relative deprivation.
All Absolute Deprivation Measures
In Table 11, all of the basic human needs variables are considered together. If
knowing the degree to which absolute deprivation is present adds to our understanding of
where civil wars occur, then the area under the ROC curve ought to be larger than is the
area under the curve in CHR’s original model, and the absolute deprivation variables
ought to be significant predictors of conflict. In the original model, the AUROC was
0.832, with a standard error of 0.021. In the absolute deprivation model, the AUROC
increases to 0.843, with a standard error of 0.020. However, the Hanley and McNeil test
indicates that this increase in AUROC curves is not significant (p = 0.396); therefore, it
cannot be argued that the basic human needs model explains more than does CHR’s
feasibility model. In addition, in the first model, neither MSES nor infant mortality is a
significant predictor of conflict onset, but regime type remains significant and in the
expected direction.
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Table 11: Logit Models of Civil Conflict Onset – Feasibility and Basic Human Needs
DV = Onset

Model 1
BHN – All
0.089 (0.071)

Model 2
BHN – No MSES
0.088 (0.070)

Model 3
BHN – no FullDemo
0.075 (0.072)

Model 4
BHN – no lny
0.136 (0.067)**

(Ln) GDP per capita

-0.323 (0.187)*

-0.331 (0.181)*

-0.279 (0.191)

--

PCE

6.534 (3.938)*

6.439 (3.885)*

6.256 (3.897)

6.609 (3.917)*

PCEsq

-15.651 (8.258)*

-15.647 (8.264)*

-15.161 (8.111)*

-16.735 (8.265)**

Peace Years

-0.029 (0.011)***

-0.029 (0.011)***

-0.028 (0.010)***

-0.033 (0.010)***

Former Fr Afr Col

-2.393 (1.039)**

-2.392 (1.039)**

-2.428 (1.039)**

-2.386 (1.039)**

Social Fract.

0.203 (0.854)

0.204 (0.855)

0.221 (0.856)

0.358 (0.854)

Young Men

19.528 (11.075)*

19.574 (11.050)*

17.303 (11.260)

17.349 (10.356)*

lnPopulation

0.252 (0.101)**

0.256 (0.098)***

0.236 (0.101)**

0.259 (0.102)**

Mountainous

0.005 (0.007)

0.005 (0.007)

0.004 (0.007)

0.006 (0.007)

Full Autocracy

0.904 (0.515)*

0.898 (0.514)*

0.662 (0.511)

1.120 (0.510)**

Partial Autocracy

0.430 (0.671)

0.423 (0.669)

0.189 (0.667)

0.701 (0.656)

Part Democ w/ Fact

1.339 (0.548)**

1.333 (0.546)**

1.070 (0.550)*

1.510 (0.543)***

Part/Full Democracy

ref

ref

Partial = Ref

ref

Transition

0.724 (0.564)

0.722 (0.564)

0.460 (0.564)

0.880 (0.564)

Infant Mortality

0.007 (0.005)

0.007 (0.005)

0.006 (0.005)

0.011 (0.004)**

MSES

-0.165 (1.009)

--

-0.256 (1.015)

-0.613 (1.018)

GDP Growth (Lag)

-7.716 (3.816)**

-7.755 (3.808)**

-7.579 (3.783)**

-7.754 (3.794)**

Constant

-8.243 (2.911)***

-8.285 (2.903)***

-7.550 (2.917)***

-11.011 (2.419)***

1010

1770

804

1010

0.842 (0.020)

0.842 (0.020)

0.798 (0.025)

0.839 (0.020)

0.569

0.572

0.498

0.598

94.0% at 0.616

94.0% at 0.617

92.4% at 0.603

94.0% at 0.330

Period

N
ROC Area
Youden Index
Max Corr Predicted

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

In the models in which each of the grievances were entered independently, the
highest AUROC returned was 0.837, with neither MSES nor regime type improving on
the power of CHR’s original model to classify onset and non-conflict periods. The
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combination of regime type and infant mortality does yield a non-significant increase in
AUROC (0.842) compared with the use of either of them independently (0.830 and 0.837
respectively). As given in model 2, the infant mortality variable is not significant, but
controlling for infant mortality does seem to be necessary in order for regime type to be
meaningful in terms of helping improve the power of the model to classify cases of onset
accurately in the sample.
Using the coefficients given in model 1 the effect of regime type can be more
fully understood. The probability of the average country in the sample entering into
conflict in a given 5-year period is 1.0 percent. If the same country is a democracy
without factionalism, the probability is cut almost in half to 0.6 percent. However,
changing that country from a democracy without factionalism to a democracy with
factionalism more than triples the probability of conflict onset to 2.1 percent. In
comparison with the feasibility model, in order to achieve the effect of changing a
democracy without factionalism to a democracy with factionalism on conflict likelihood
using the feasibility indicators, one would have to decrease GDP per capita by more than
2.5 standard deviations, increase the proportion of young men in the population by more
than 3.5 standard deviations, or increase the overall population by more than three
standard deviations.
These findings suggest that, in spite of the overall model not being a significant
improvement over CHR’s model, regime type is a salient predictor of conflict onset both
in absolute terms and relative to the feasibility indicators. The mechanisms underlying
why, however, are still somewhat obscure. The theory proposed above was that
factionalism represents a greater chance for relative deprivation. However, it was also
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posited that the “partial” regime types tend to have less capacity than do the “full”
democracies and autocracies. Because partial and full democracies were combined in this
analysis, it is difficult to determine whether the difference between the factionalized and
non-factionalized democracies is a result of differences in capacity or differences in
factionalism.
In order to test these competing theories, the model was run again with full
democracies removed from the analysis rather than being combined with partial
democracies without factionalism (model 3). If the difference between partial
democracies and partial democracies with factionalism remained significant, it could be
attributed to factionalism rather than to capacity. If partial democracies and partial
democracies with factionalism were not significantly different, however, then the original
difference between the two groups should be attributed to differences in capacity between
full and partial democracies. In the model with full democracies completely removed
from the analysis, partial democracies with factionalism remained significantly more
likely to experience civil conflict than did partial democracies without factionalism
(β=1.070, SE=0.550). Therefore, it can be concluded that the difference in the types of
democracy is due to factionalism rather than to capacity.
In model 3, GDP per capita is removed from the model to account for potential
multicollinearity, and two worthwhile results emerge. First, and perhaps most important,
the model increases strength compared with CHR’s original model (AUROC = 0.839
compared with 0.832). This finding is important because the feasibility and capacity
theorists tend to interpret GDP per capita in terms of their theories. That is, CHR argue
that a smaller GDP per capita is indicative of lower opportunity costs for potential rebels,
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which increases the feasibility of rebel recruitment. Fearon and Laitin (2003) suggest that
a low GDP per capita is indicative of weak state capacity, which favors the conditions for
insurgency. The fact that the model improves when GDP per capita is removed but
indicators of absolute deprivation are added suggests, however, that GDP per capita’s
robust relationship with conflict onset may actually be due to it capturing levels of
grievance within the state. In states with a low GDP per capita, it is difficult to have basic
human needs met. It may be this relationship with grievance, rather than with feasibility
or low state capacity that links per capita income with conflict onset.
Second, when GDP per capita is removed, infant mortality becomes a significant
predictor of conflict onset. If GDP per capita is actually capturing absolute deprivation
rather than feasibility or weak government capacity, then this result suggests that the
relationship between the ability to meet survival needs and conflict onset is likely to be
real in the population. The result also brings to light a competing theory to that currently
espoused by the absolute deprivation theorists. It is possible that rather than absolute
deprivation leading to frustration which leads to aggression, absolute deprivation
represents decreased opportunity costs for potential rebels, which leads to aggression in
the event the relative deprivation is present. This theory will be explored further in the
next section.
Stepwise Regression. The last set of models that are explored relating absolute
deprivation alone to conflict onset is a stepwise regression to explore whether the
grievance variables are as salient as are the opportunity variables in explaining conflict
onset. If grievances influence the likelihood of conflict onset, then the grievance variables
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ought to remain in the stepwise models. If CHR are correct that conflict occurs where it is
feasible regardless of motives, then only their core variables ought to remain.
Table 12: Stepwise Logit Models of Civil Conflict Onset – Basic Human Needs
DV = Onset

Model 1
Bwd Conditional

Period

0.086 (0.068)

(Ln) GDP per capita

-0.352 (0.179)**

PCE

6.221 (3.681)*

PCEsq

-15.520 (8.093)*

Peace Years

-0.028 (0.010)***

Former Fr Afr Col

-2.454 (1.034)**

Social Fract.

--

Young Men

20.868 (10.617)**

lnPopulation

0.246 (0.095)***

Mountainous

--

Full Autocracy

0.897 (0.511)*

Partial Autocracy

0.445 (0.665) †

Part Democ w/ Fact

1.326 (0.547)**

Part/Full Democracy

ref

Transition

0.702 (0.562) †

Infant Mortality

0.007 (0.005)

MSES

--

GDP Growth (Lag)

-7.516 (3.770)**

Constant

-8.018 (2.851)***

N

1013

ROC Area

0.814 (0.020)

Youden Index

0.578

Max Corr Predicted
94.0% at 0.629
Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
†
Did not appear in original stepwise. Added later for interpretation.

A backward conditional stepwise regression was run. The backward was chosen
rather than the forward because the intent was to consider all of the variables that are
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thought to explain conflict onset, and remove those that do not add to the “story.” A cut
point of 0.10 was chosen for inclusion in the model, and 0.15 for exclusion. The results of
the regression are presented in Table 12 above.
Social fractionalization, mountainous terrain, and MSES were removed from the
backward conditional stepwise regression as statistically irrelevant indicators. Initially,
the time period, partial autocracies, and transitional countries were also removed by SPSS
in its automatically generated model. However, the period was re-added to the model so
that the observations for each period are not treated as independent from one another. The
regime types were also re-added manually for interpretation. If partial autocracies and
transitional countries were removed, then any effect of the regime types that remained
would be considered in comparison to partial autocracies, partial democracies, full
democracies, and transitional countries. By re-inserting the removed types into the model,
the effect of being a full autocracy or a partial democracy with factionalism can be
interpreted with reference to being a democracy without factionalism. The removal of the
social fractionalization scores and mountainous terrain from the stepwise model does not
seriously impact CHR’s argument that feasibility plays a role in determining where
conflict will occur. Other strong indicators of feasibility such as being a former French
African colony with protection guarantees and youth bulge remain significant predictors
of conflict onset in the directions a feasibility hypothesis would suggest.
The addition of infant mortality and regime type, however, suggests that there is
more to the story of conflict onset than simply feasibility. While CHR’s “potential for
grievance” indicator of social fractionalization does not add to our understanding of
onset, there does seem to be a statistical role for the new indicators of absolute
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deprivation. These preliminary findings indicate that knowing the levels of grievance in a
country may add to the feasibility explanation, in spite of the AUROC curves not being
statistically significantly different.
Relative Deprivation
There are three indicators posited above for measuring relative deprivation.
Political and economic discrimination along ethnic lines are tested as indicators of
aspirational deprivation, as codified discrimination is likely to be perceived as unjust, and
the discrimination measured by the Minorities at Risk Project falls along identity-based
cleavages. Negative or slow growth in GDP per capita is used to capture decremental
deprivation, because in countries where negative or limited growth occurs, people may
perceive that their current opportunities do not compare favorably with those they had in
the past.
Decremental Deprivation. Change in GDP per capita was one of CHR’s core
variables, so it is included in all of the models tested above. For CHR, negative or low
changes in GDP per capita represented decreasing opportunity costs for potential rebels.
In this research, it is argued that changes in GDP per capita are best thought of in terms
of decremental deprivation. Where a change from high growth to low growth may
represent fewer economic opportunities, those opportunities would be better captured by
the overall GDP per capita than by the growth rate. It would be difficult to argue that a
country with high GDP per capita that experiences several years of negative growth
would have the same opportunity costs for potential insurgents as would a country with a
low GDP per capita that experiences several years of negative growth. Citizens’
opportunities may be decreasing at the same rate, but their overall opportunity costs
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would not be the same. However, the same two countries would be experiencing similar
rates of decremental deprivation. In other words, people’s value expectations would be
decreasing at the same rate, even if the absolute values of those expectations were vastly
different. With that, in this research it is argued that the (lagged) change in GDP per
capita is more logically interpreted as decremental deprivation than as opportunity cost.
Change in GDP per capita is one of the most robust indicators of conflict onset
that is tested in this research. It remains significant and in the expected direction for all
models, including the stepwise regressions. In addition, when the feasibility model is run
without growth included as an indicator, the AUROC drops from 0.832 to 0.810,
indicating the substantial role change in GDP per capita plays in determining where
conflict will occur. However, this decrease in the AUROC is still not significant
according to the Hanley and McNeil criterion.
This change AUROC curves is depicted graphically in Figure 3. CHR’s original
model is shown in red, with the model without change in GDP per capita illustrated in
green. It is clear that the inclusion of change in GDP per capita improves the ability of the
model to correctly classify cases at almost all cut-points. This improvement suggests that
if change in GDP does capture decremental deprivation rather than opportunity, then such
deprivation substantially affects when and where civil conflict occurs.
To determine the extent of this impact, the original feasibility model can be used.
The average country—which experiences a 2.2 percent growth rate in GDP per capita—
has a 2.1 percent chance of experiencing conflict in a given 5-year period. If the per
capita GDP growth rate falls one standard deviation to -2.1 percent, the probability of
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Figure 3: ROC Curves for Feasibility v. Feasibility w/out Growth in GDP per capita

conflict increases more than 60 percent to 3.5 percent. If it falls another standard
deviation to -6.4 percent, the probability of conflict jumps to 6 percent. The only other
variables that have this degree of an effect on conflict probability in the feasibility model
are GDP per capita and population. Therefore, if change in GDP per capita is better
interpreted as a measure of decremental deprivation than of changes in state capacity or
opportunity cost, then these findings suggest that relative deprivation with respect to time
does increase the likelihood of violent conflict to a substantial degree.
Aspirational Deprivation. Political and economic discrimination are used to test
the degree to which aspirational deprivation affects the likelihood of conflict. Those data
are drawn from the Minorities at Risk discrimination dataset, in which only countries that
have minority groups that meet MAR’s definition of “at risk” are included. Therefore, the
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findings should be interpreted as applicable to a sample of countries with minorities at
risk rather than being generalizable to all countries.
Due to the change in sample, a new baseline established by running CHR’s core
model with a sample only from the countries included in the discrimination dataset. In this
limited sample dataset (Table 13, model 1), the coefficients and significance levels of the
variables remain consistent with previous models. The AUROC drops slightly to 0.792,
and the percent of cases correctly predicted falls slightly to 90.2 percent.
In the second model, only political discrimination is included, while economic
discrimination is entered in the third. The discrimination variables are entered
independently at first for two reasons. First, using this method the effect of each on the
strength of the overall model can be determined. Second, political and economic
discrimination are highly correlated (R = 0.646), and complications due to
multicollinearity are likely.
In both models 2 and 3 the discrimination variables are significant and in the
expected direction. In model 2, the average country has a 3.5 percent chance of
experiencing conflict in a given 5-year period. This increase from the general model is
expected, as the sample is drawn from countries with at-risk populations. When there is no
political discrimination present within a country, that risk drops to 1.1 percent. When a
country’s public polices “substantially restrict [a] group’s political participation by
comparison with other groups,” however (a code of 4 in the discrimination dataset), the
likelihood of conflict increases five-fold to 5.3 percent.
A similar story unfolds relating economic discrimination to onset. Where there is
no economic discrimination, the probability of conflict among the sample of minorities-at-
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Table 13: Logit Models of Civil Conflict Onset – Relative Deprivation
DV = Onset
Period

Model 1
CHR Core in Disc
0.027 (0.054)

Model 2
Pol Discrimination
0.076 (0.058)

Model 3
Econ Discrimin.
0.070 (0.057)

Model 4
All Rel Dep
0.084 (0.059)

(Ln)GDP per capita

-0.456 (0.132)***

-0.481 (0.136)***

-0.483 (0.135)***

-0.487 (0.136)***

PCE

5.875 (3.494)*

6.900 (3.595)*

6.752 (3.581)*

7.056 (3.616)*

PCEsq

-10.314 (6.450)

-12.098 (6.717)*

-11.701 (6.624)*

-12.354 (6.747)*

Peace Years

-0.025 (0.010)**

-0.026 (0.010)**

-0.025 (0.010)**

-0.026 (0.010)**

Former Fr Afr Col

-1.211 (0.600)**

-1.343 (0.607)**

-1.025 (0.600)*

-1.227 (0.618)**

Social Fract.

0.444 (0.758)

0.459 (0.767)

0.773 (0.784)

0.591 (0.787)

Young Men

7.703 (11.397)

0.735 (11.803)

2.243 (11.847)

-0.180 (11.909)

lnPopulation

0.179 (0.098)*

0.137 (0.097)

0.133 (0.099)

0.127 (0.098)

Mountainous

0.006 (0.007)

0.005 (0.007)

0.004 (0.007)

0.004 (0.007)

Political Discrim

--

0.414 (0.135)***

--

0.342 (0.163)**

Economic Discrim

--

--

0.324 (0.125)***

0.123 (0.153)

GDP Growth (Lag)

-12.814 (3.188)***

-13.278 (3.197)***

-13.323 (3.232)***

-13.421 (3.212)***

-2.779 (2.323)

-2.595 (2.327)

-2.359 (2.366)

-2.475 (2.346)

721

721

723

721

0.792 (0.023)

0.802 (0.024)

0.798 (0.024)

0.802 (0.025)

0.466

0.472

0.446

0.464

90.2% at 0.701

90.7% at 0.447

90.6% at 0.437

90.7% at 0.461

Constant
N
ROC Area
Youden Index
Max Corr Predicted

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

risk countries is 1.6 percent. However, when the economic participation of some groups is
substantially restricted in comparison with others (coded 4), the probability increases to
5.6 percent. In both discrimination models the AUROC also increases slightly over model
1, but the improvement is minimal.
In the fourth model, both discrimination variables are included along with the
change in per capita GDP. All three of the indicators of relative deprivation maintain their
signs, but economic deprivation is no longer significant. This loss of significance is likely
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due to political and economic discrimination explaining the same variance in the log odds
of onset. Because they are explaining similar variances, it is appropriate to remove one
from the model, and treat models 2 and 3 as the more instructive in the table.
The findings in Table 13 suggest that both aspirational and decremental
deprivation affect the likelihood of conflict onset. High degrees of political or economic
discrimination can have a five-fold increase in the probability of conflict, even when only
considering countries where there are already at-risk groups. Likewise, as discussed
above, a decrease in growth rates by two standard deviations from average can triple the
likelihood of civil war occurring.
Stepwise Regressions. In model 1 in Table 14, the relative deprivation measures
are entered into a stepwise regression in order to determine which of CHR’s and the
proposed indicators of relative deprivation best explain onset. GDP per capita, primary
commodities exports, peace years, being a former French African colony, political
discrimination, and growth in GDP per capita remained in the model. This result suggests
again that indicators of grievance are salient predictors of conflict onset.
In model 2, all of the motives variables are considered together. Because the
Minorities at Risk data are included in the initial model, these findings should also be
interpreted to apply only in the countries in which there are “at risk” groups. The motives
variables that remain after the stepwise regression is performed include infant mortality,
political discrimination, and GDP growth per capita. This model suggests that even
controlling for relative deprivation, absolute deprivation plays a role in conflict onset and
vice-versa.
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Table 14: Logit Models of Civil Conflict Onset – Stepwise Regressions
DV = Onset
Period

Model 1
SW Rel Dep Bwd
0.090 (0.055)

Model 2
SW All
0.156 (0.076)**

Model 3
SW – No lny
0.186 (0.075)**

(Ln)GDP per capita

-0.513 (0.131)***

-0.401 (0.191)**

--

5.941 (3.265)*

9.573 (4.343)**

5.797 (4.236)

PCEsq

-11.332 (6.387)*

-19.680 (9.378)**

-15.260 (9.039)*

Peace Years

-0.027 (0.010)***

-0.023 (0.011)**

-0.027 (0.011)**

Former Fr Afr Col

-1.504 (0.576)***

-2.647 (1.039)**

-2.560 (1.049)**

Social Fract.

--

--

--

Young Men

--

--

19.921 (12.838)

lnPopulation

--

0.156 (0.105)

--

Mountainous

--

--

--

Infant Mortality

--

0.009 (0.005)*

0.015 (0.004)***

MSES

--

--

--

Full Autocracy

--

--

0.622 (0.571)

Partial Autocracy

--

--

0.014 (0.714) †

Part Democ w/ Fact

--

--

0.894 (0.596)

Part/Full Democ

--

--

ref

Transition

--

--

0.224 (0.642) †

0.440 (0.133)***

0.322 (0.150)**

0.311 (0.156)**

Economic Discrim

--

--

--

GDP Growth (Lag)

-13.058 (3.169)***

-8.144 (4.122)**

-8.128 (4.233)*

0.153 (1.010)

-4.406 (2.609)*

-7.960 (1.854)***

721

632

632

0.793 (0.026)

0.811

0.810 (0.028)

0.431

0.500

0.514

90.6% at 0.405

91.3% at 0.315

91.5% at 0.466

PCE

Political Discrim

Constant
N
ROC Area
Youden Index
Max Corr Predicted

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

In model 3, per capita GDP is removed in order to test whether the motives
explain the same variance in probability of conflict onset as does GDP. The AUROC
only drops 0.001 units, which suggests again that when grievances are controlled for in
models of conflict onset, GDP per capita does not add much to the explanation of where
conflict occurs. Therefore, contrary to Collier and Hoeffler (2004) or Fearon and Laitin’s
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(2003) arguments, GDP per capita may capture grievances rather than opportunity cost or
capacity.
Digging Deeper: The Interactions Among the Independent Variables
In addition to the hypotheses regarding the independent effects of each of the
measures of grievance on the likelihood of conflict, there were also several hypotheses
proposed regarding the effects of some of the independent variables at varying levels of
other independent variables. Those hypotheses will be explored further, here. The first
question is whether GDP per capita should be thought of as a measure for the likelihood
of grievance rather than for capacity or opportunity cost. The second is the question of
whether the level of some basic needs impacts the effects of other basic needs. A third
question came out of the data rather than the literature review, which is whether
indicators of absolute deprivation are better thought of as proxies for opportunity cost
than for grievance. That question will also be explored below.
Does GDP/capita Capture Opportunity Cost, Capacity, or Grievance Propensity?
GDP per capita is one of the most robust indicators of civil conflict across the
literature. However, because GDP per capita is often highly correlated with many factors
in a given country, the mechanisms underlying this relationships are not well understood.
CHR argue that GDP per capita is best thought of as a measure of the opportunity cost for
potential rebels. When GDP per capita is high, legitimate economic opportunities exist,
and citizens would have to forego those opportunities in order to join a rebellion. As the
cost of the foregone opportunities increases, so does the cost of joining an insurgency.
Therefore, as GDP per capita increases, the likelihood of conflict decreases.
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Fearon and Laitin (2003) prefer to look at GDP per capita through the lens of state
capacity. They contend that when GDP per capita is low, so are the state’s resources and,
therefore, so is the state’s ability to prevent and put down insurgencies. As GDP per
capita decreases, then, the projected cost of insurgency decreases, the probability of
victory increases, and therefore the probability of conflict increases.
In the models above, when measures of either absolute or relative deprivation are
included, the importance of GDP per capita in explaining conflict onset was greatly
diminshed. Those findings suggest that rather than capturing capacity or opportunity,
GDP per capita may best be thought of as an indicator of the likelihood of grievance. As
GDP per capita decreases, so does the likelihood of the ability to meet basic needs, which
then leads to conflict.
In order to test these competing explanations of the relationship between GDP per
capita and civil conflict onset, the effect of GDP per capita will be considered at high and
low levels of grievance. Per H6, if CHR are correct, and GDP per capita is a measure of
feasibility, and feasibility drives conflict independent of motive, then GDP per capita
ought to remain negative and significant at all motive levels. In other words, if CHR are
correct, regardless of whether absolute or relative deprivation levels are low or high, the
effect of GDP ought to remain the same. However, if GDP per capita is actually
capturing either absolute or relative deprivation rather than feasibility, then its effects
when grievance levels are restricted to high or low ought to disappear.
Because the infant mortality rate is used to capture the ability to meet basic
survival needs within a state, it is also used as a measure of base-level absolute
deprivation here. It is presumed that if infant mortality rates are low, people are largely
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able to meet their most basic survival needs. However, when infant mortality rates are
high, it signifies difficulty meeting those needs. Therefore, the sample is split into low,
medium, and high infant mortality rates in order to test the effects of GDP per capita at
each level.
When infant mortality rates are divided into equal thirds, there are too few cases
of conflict onset in the “low” category country-periods to perform any meaningful
analysis. Therefore, in order to ensure a reasonable number of onsets for each of the
models, the infant mortality rates during onset country-periods are compared. The periods
were ranked by infant mortality rate and cut into thirds. The top third, considered “high”
infant mortality, is those with greater than 114 deaths per 1,000 live births. The bottom
third, considered “low” infant mortality, includes those with fewer than 74 deaths per
1,000 live births.
The GDP per capita growth rate is used as the indicator for high and low relative
deprivation levels. It would be ideal to include differences in aspirational deprivation as
well as those for decremental deprivation; however, that method of dividing the sample is
not feasibile due to the limitations of the Minorities at Risk dataset. Because growth has a
clear and logical division point at 0, positive growth is considered “high” and negative
growth is considered “low.”
The findings given in Table 15 indicate that at high levels of grievance (high
infant mortality and negative growth), GDP per capita is not significant. However, at low
levels of grievance (low infant mortality and positive growth), GDP per capita is both
negative and signifcant. This suggests that a combination of the competing stories
proposed above is at play.
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Table 15: The Effect of GDP per Capita at Varying Levels of Grievance
DV = Onset

Model 1
High Inf Mort
0.332 (0.128)***

Model 2
Low Inf Mort
-0.079 (0.092)

Model 3
Positive Growth
0.036 (0.054)

Model 4
Negative Growth
0.002 (0.093)

(Ln)GDP per capita

-0.294 (0.435)

-0.404 (0.200)**

-0.528 (0.147)***

-0.331 (0.201)

PCE

4.811 (7.204)

7.508 (8.302)

3.409 (3.464)

6.987 (4.977)

-11.094 (13.757)

-30.152 (24.275)

-5.771 (5.782)

-10.504 (8.352)

Peace Years

-0.041 (0.025)

-0.025 (0.015)*

-0.034 (0.012)***

-0.034 (0.015)**

Former Fr Afr Col

-1.637 (0.970)*

--

-1.548 (1.058)

-0.810 (0.687)

Social Fract.

2.903 (1.896)

0.007 (1.524)

0.075 (0.934)

1.265 (1.221)

Young Men

50.815 (27.327)*

34.163

7.449 (12.806)

12.826 (15.040)

lnPopulation

-0.079 (0.222)

(14.785)**

0.255 (0.094)***

0.406 (0.174)**

Mountainous

0.017 (0.014)

0.295 (0.148)**

0.004 (0.007)

0.010 (0.011)

-12.986

0.011 (0.011)

--

--

(5.825)**

-10.982 (6.302)*

-3.758 (2.443)

-7.989 (3.685)**

-7.073 (4.615)

-8.374 (4.171)**

947

246

183

716

0.829 (0.022)

0.811 (0.036)

0.839 (0.037)

0.874 (0.023)

0.532

0.579

0.551

0.697

94.5% at 0.463

87.0% at 0.348

90.2% at 0.568

96.5% at 0.511

Period

PCEsq

GDP Growth (Lag)
Constant
N
ROC Area
Youden Index
Max Corr Predicted

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01

The finding that GDP per capita does not influence onset at high levels of
grievance provides evidence against CHR’s argument that feasibility drives conflict
independently of motive. In contrast, when grievance levels are high, the only indicators
of feasibility that remain significant are French security guarantees and the proportion of
the population composed of young men, which suggests that at this level of grievance
conflict seems to occur largely independently of feasibility. However, the findings that
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GDP per capita is related to onset at low levels of grievance also provides evidence
against the “low GDP as grievance” argument.
The most logical explanation of these findings relies on a merging of the
grievance and opportunity arguments through the lens of a cost-benefit analysis. If GDP
per capita is thought of as a proxy for state capacity, the findings begin to make sense.
When grievance levels are low, there is low general motivation for conflict, because there
is little to gain by engaging in it. However, if state capacity is also low in these lowgrievance societies, then the cost of entering into conflict decreases, the cost-benefit ratio
shifts, and conflict becomes more likely. This shift is why GDP per capita matters in lowgrievance country-periods. Conversely, when grievances are high, then the benefits of
engaging in conflict increase. In those cases, higher costs (e.g., engaging with a higher
capacity state) are worth bearing. Therefore, GDP per capita (state capacity) becomes less
salient in high-grievance situations. Citizens are more willing to rebel against a higher
capacity state when grievances are high. This ratio of grievances to capacity in explaining
onset will be worth exploring further in future research.
Does the Level of Some Basic Needs Affect the Impact of Others on Conflict Onset?
Maslow (1954) suggested that people do not tend to pursue higher order needs
until lower order needs are met. If this is the case, then one reason why MSES does not
appear as a significant predictor of conflict could be that it is included in a model that
includes country-periods at all ranges of base-level human needs. Maslow’s argument
suggests it is possible that limited economic opportunities (proxied using MSES) only
increase frustration and aggression when survival needs are already being met. Likewise,
while political voice (regime type) was a significant predictor of conflict across all levels

121

of infant mortality, it is possible that the effect of this higher order need is more
pronounced when survival needs are being met.
Conversely, when Amartya Sen (1999) calls freedoms the means and ends of
development, he implies that political and economic freedoms can and ought to precede
survival needs when the infrastructure does not exist to support those basic needs in the
moment. He does not put it in these terms, but his argument suggests that countries with
high economic opportunities and political voice ought to experience limited conflict even
when survival needs are not being met.
Similar to the GDP per capita tests, these competing hypotheses are tested using
high (greater than 114) and low (less than 75) infant mortality samples. If Maslow’s
theory is correct that people will not consider higher order needs unless lower order needs
are met, then the effects of MSES and regime type on conflict onset ought to be greater in
low infant mortality countries than they are in high infant mortality countries. However,
if Amartya Sen is correct that people need freedoms to the same (or greater) degree as
basic survival needs, then the models of the different samples ought to look similar.
The findings from the high and low infant mortality models are presented in Table
16. The effect of MSES on conflict onset remains non-significant in both models. This
finding suggests that either limited absolute economic opportunities are not drivers of
conflict or the use of MSES is too crude to capture those opportunities. As more data are
gathered on the indices of entrepreneurship mentioned in chapter 3, it will become
possible to test more refined measures of economic opportunity. At the moment,
however, there is little to glean from these models regarding Maslow and Sen’s
competing theories.
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Table 16: Effects of MSES and Regime Type at Varying Levels of Infant Mortality
DV = Onset

Model 1
MSES - High IM
0.305 (0.131)**

Model 2
MSES - Low IM
-0.073 (0.095)

Model 3
RT - High IM
0.353 (0.161)**

Model 4
RT - Low IM
-0.043 (0.095)

(Ln)GDP per capita

-0.579 (0.531)

-0.404 (0.198)**

-0.561 (0.513)

-0.352 (0.227)

PCE

2.456 (8.115)

7.014 (8.205)

8.610 (9.347)

7.295 (8.529)

-14.412 (16.594)

-30.060 (24.219)

-18.871 (18.812)

-30.114 (24.841)

Peace Years

-0.039 (0.025)

-0.027 (0.015)*

-0.012 (0.031)

-0.028 (0.015)*

Former Fr Afr Col

-1.872 (1.021)*

††

-2.009 (1.204)*

††

Social Fract.

2.882 (1.897)

0.284 (1.475)

1.863 (2.019)

0.643 (1.524)

Young Men

57.402 (28.491)**

34.430 (14.674)**

62.946 (28.819)**

31.956 (15.603)**

lnPopulation

-0.026 (0.229)

0.300 (0.150)**

-0.066 (0.264)

0.329 (0.153)**

Mountainous

0.018 (0.014)

0.009 (0.011)

0.008 (0.016)

0.006 (0.012)

MSES

4.593 (4.309)

-0.107 (1.399)

--

--

Full Autocracy

--

--

†

0.252 (0.676)

Partial Autocracy

--

--

†

-0.516 (1.149)

Partial Democ Fact

--

--

†

0.783 (0.684)

Part/Full Democ

--

--

ref

ref

Transitional

--

--

†

0.732 (0.694)

-13.931 (5.902)**

-12.042 (6.182)*

-5.630 (7.982)

-10.075 (6.357)

-7.256 (4.642)

-8.366 (4.046)**

-28.504 (†)

-9.498 (4.357)**

183

721

170

664

0.837 (0.038)

0.876 (0.023)

0.862

0.874

0.534

0.702

0.604

0.636

90.7% at 0.569

96.4% at 0.522

90.6% at 0.667

96.2% at 0.465

Period

PCEsq

GDP Growth (Lag)
Constant
N
ROC Area
Youden Index
Max Corr Predicted

Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
†
There are no cases of conflict among partial or full democracies in the high infant mortality countries,
inflating the coefficients and standard errors for the regime types and the standard error of the constant.
††
There are no cases of conflict among former French African colonies in the low infant mortality
countries.
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The inclusion of regime type, however, yields unexpected and intriguing results.
Contrary to what Maslow predicts, not only does regime type not seem to matter in the
low infant mortality countries, but there are no cases of conflict onset in either partial or
full democracies in the high infant mortality countries. In other words, having political
voice has a greater protective effect when survival needs are not being met than when
they are being met. When survival needs are being met, political voice becomes
insignficant in both the statistical and practical uses of the word.
The findings in model 3 support Sen’s argument and counter Maslow’s with the
indication that even when basic needs are not being met, freedoms matter. Similar to
Sen’s contention that there has never been a famine in a democracy (in spite of
institutions having little effect on factors such as arable land and rainfall), it appears that
democratic institutions protect against conflict onset even when grievances are high.
Model 4’s findings provide further support for the cost-benefit approach discussed above.
It appears that when survival needs are being met, that is when the feasibility of conflict
(young men in a large population from which to draw) becomes more important than
political voice. Therefore, again, as grievances—the “benefits” side of the equation—
decrease, the “cost” side becomes more salient.
Is Absolute Deprivation Better Thought of as Motive or as Opportunity Cost?
The data presented in the initial tests suggested that GDP per capita and measures
of absolute deprivation capture similar characteristics of the state. What precisely, those
characterists are, however, is unclear. It is possible that GDP per capita is best thought of
as an indicator of absolute deprivation. The findings in the previous section suggest that
GDP per capita is primarily an indicator of state capacity. Conversely, it is also possible
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that absolute deprivation is best thought of as an indicator of opportunity cost rather than
grievance or willingness in its own right. If that is the case, one would expect that the
measures of absolute deprivation have a greater impact on the likelihood of conflict when
relative deprivation is high than when it is low. In other words, a lower opportunity cost
alone in the absense of grievance (relative deprivation) ought not be associated with
onset. However, a low opportunity cost in a high grievance environment may incite
violence. Conversely, if absolute deprivation is a form of conflict-inciting grievance and
not simply another form of opportunity cost, then it ought to remain a signficant predictor
of conflict at both high and low relative deprivation.
In model 1 below, the sample is restricted to country-periods in which positive
growth in GDP per capita occurred. In model 2, the sample is restricted to countryperiods in which negative growth occurred. As the “absolute deprivation as opportunity
cost” hypothesis predicts, infant mortality rate is significant in the periods of negative
growth, but not significant in the periods of positive growth. However, infant mortality
rate is significant at all levels of political discrimination. In the models presented, a
discrimination score of four is considered “high grievance,” and three or lower is
considered “low grievance.”25
Based on these findings, the precise role of absolute deprivation in conflict onset
remains ambiguous. There does seem to be some support for the idea that absolute
deprivation actually represents opportunity cost, as it has a greater impact on the
likelihood of conflict onset in periods of decremental deprivation than it does in positive

25

When three or higher is considered “high,” infant mortality is significant in the high grievance sample
but not in the low grievance sample. However, there are only 11 cases of onset in that low-grievance
sample of 181 country-periods, making statistical analyses less reliable.
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Table 17: The Effect of Infant Mortality at Varying Levels of Relative Deprivation
DV = Onset
Period

Model 1
Positive Growth
0.084 (0.074)

Model 2
Negative Growth
0.093 (0.134)

Model 3
Low Disc (<= 3)
0.355 (0.143)**

Model 4
High Disc (= 4)
0.100 (0.099)

lny

-0.374 (0.197)*

-0.249 (0.356)*

-0.189 (0.358)*

-0.305 (0.236)

PCE

9.294 (5.564)*

9.724 (6.256)*

-0.406 (2.501)*

23.134 (6.852)***

PCE squared

-25.715 (14.562)*

-17.968 (11.691)*

-0.140 (1.528)*

-48.425 (16.579)***

Peace Years

-0.033 (0.012)***

-0.028 (0.018)***

-0.042 (0.018)**

-0.005 (0.016)

Former French

-1.677 (1.063)

-1.697 (1.076)

-0.634 (0.933)

†

Social Fract

-0.079 (1.004)

0.356 (1.499)

-0.955 (1.620)

-0.521 (1.080)

Young Men

16.374 (14.045)

33.895 (16.814)**

21.509 (21.216)**

-3.197 (16.267)

(ln) Population

0.236 (0.103)*

0.337 (0.230)*

0.026 (0.212)*

0.196 (0.128)

Mountainous

0.000 (0.007)

0.012 (0.013)

-0.009 (0.012)

0.005 (0.009)

Infant Mortality

0.007 (0.005)

0.016 (0.008)*

0.019 (0.009)**

0.014 (0.006)**

-6.680 (3.352)**

-12.499 (5.187)**

-6.777 (5.668)

-5.371 (3.778)

1030

223

352

305

0.837 (0.021)

0.835 (0.042)

0.814 (0.047)

0.805 (0.030)

Youden Index

0.584

0.558

0.497

0.550

Max Corr Pred

94.5% at 0.344

91.0% at 0.377

95.2% at 0.286

87.9% at 0.463

Constant
N
ROC Area

† There were no cases of onset in Former French African countries in the high discrimination countries.

growth periods. In addition, because of the restriction in the discrimination dataset to
countries with minorities at risk, it could be said that all countries in that dataset have a
known degree of grievance. Therefore, the fact that infant mortality remains significant in
low discrimination countries does not necessarily mean that it remains significant in nondiscriminatory countries. These data, then, are not well-suited for further tests of whether
infant mortality is better thought of as an indicator of grievance or of opportunity cost,
and future research may be instructive in this regard.
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Summary
The addition of the newly proposed motives variables—infant mortality, MSES,
regime type, political discrimination, economic discrimination, and change in GDP per
capita—to the CHR model suggests that motives may play more of a role in the
explanation of conflict onset than CHR’s feasibility hypothesis allows. Not only is the
ability to meet survival needs a robust predictor of conflict, but it also seems to better
help correctly classify onset periods than does GDP per capita.
Further tests suggest that GDP per capita may best be thought of as an indicator
for state capacity, and that its effect on conflict onset is dependent upon levels of
grievances. The likelihood that GDP per capita influences conflict onset is greater at low
grievance levels than it is at high grievances levels. Therefore, it appears that the
interaction between capacity and grievances (which might be thought of in cost-benefit
terms) is worth exploring further.
Regime type remained a significant indicator of conflict in both entered and
stepwise regressions, although the precise role is somewhat difficult to discern due to the
absence of observations of onset in full democracies. There are still several meaningful
findings regarding the variable. First, the apparent U-shaped relationship between Polity
scores and conflict onset helps explain the inconsistent and contradictory findings from
past research involving democracy and onset. Second, the findings lead to several
questions regarding the relationships among political voice, capacity, and conflict that
deserve further exploration.
Political discrimination remained significant and in the expected direction in all of
the models in which it was included. These findings suggest that the Gini index may not
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be the most appropriate method for measuring relative deprivation. Instead, measures that
take into account the likelihood of perceived, unjust deprivation that falls along identitybased lines ought to be explored further. Likewise, change in GDP per capita was
robustly related with onset, indicating that decremental deprivation may deserve
increased attention in the conflict literature.
Neither MSES nor economic discrimination was a robust indicator of conflict.
The possibility that the limited role of MSES was due to it being a higher-order need was
considered. While MSES remained an insignificant predictor, it was found that—contrary
to Maslow’s arguments regarding the order of needs and in support of Sen’s—regime
type matters more when survival needs are not being met than it does when those basic
needs are being met. Again, these interactions among the grievance variables and
between the grievance and capacity variables deserve further exploration.
The final question tested in this chapter is whether measures of absolute
deprivation such as infant mortality are better thought of as indicators of opportunity cost
than of grievance. The findings are somewhat ambiguous, but they do provide a little
support for the “absolute deprivation as opportunity cost” hypothesis. This interaction
between absolute and relative deprivation should also be explored further in future
research.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

Two major premises provide the foundation for this research. The first is that the
proponents of the opportunity and feasibility explanations of conflict onset did not use
theoretically justified measures of grievance in making their determination that motives
have little bearing as drivers of conflict. The second is that the grievance literature that
improved upon those measures did not fully control for feasibility in their models,
leaving questions remaining regarding whether and to what degree improved measures of
grievance help explain when and where conflict occurs. These premises combined with
an exploration of the theories underlying the link between grievance and conflict onset
led to a series of competing hypotheses whose outcomes are beneficial in distilling the
extent to which grievances matter in explaining civil conflict onset. The findings
presented in chapter 4 suggest several conclusions, which will be discussed in more detail
in the first section below. There are also several limitations to the research and questions
that arose from the data that suggest directions for future research. Those suggestions are
presented in the following section.
Conclusions and Discussion
The data and findings presented in chapter 4 provide evidence supporting several
conclusions. First, it appears that arguments in both the opportunity and grievance
literature have been over-stated to a degree. Knowing the levels of grievance in a country
is beneficial in determining the likelihood of conflict onset. However, the onus is still on
129

the grievance theorists to illustrate specific grievances that significantly increase our
ability to explain where conflict occurs. Second, indicators of relative deprivation seem to
provide greater power in classifying onset periods than do those of absolute deprivation.
Further, it is possible that it is better to think of absolute deprivation as opportunity cost
rather than grievance. Third, the data support Sen’s (1999) contention that improvements
in institutions lead to positive outcomes even if those improvements precede
improvements in other forms of grievance. Fourth, while GDP per capita is indicative of
a number of characteristics of the state, it is perhaps most accurately thought of as an
indicator of state capacity. Fifth and finally, it is possible that the interaction between
levels of grievance and feasibility is more salient than is either facet of the state
independently. Each of these conclusions will be explored further in this chapter.
The Grievance versus Opportunity Debate
The first overall conclusion noted above is that grievances are salient in the
explanation of where conflict occurs; however, the onus is still on the proponents of the
grievance line of thought to illustrate how knowing grievance levels significantly
improves researchers’ abilities to assess which states are most at risk. This conclusion is
drawn from the results of several of the hypothesis tests. When CHR’s feasibility model
was compared with a model including the updated grievance measures, GDP per capita,
population, and peace years, the CHR model was better than the grievance model at
classifying onset and peace periods (AUROC=0.832 compared with 0.793). However, the
difference between the models was not statistically significant, suggesting that knowing
the level of grievance in a country gives a person approximately the same ability to
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determine whether a conflict will occur in that country as does knowing the level of
feasibility.
The stepwise regressions again illustrated the merits of the grievance indicators as
a whole. When indicators of absolute deprivation were included with those of feasibility,
both infant mortality and regime type remained in the model after those variables without
sufficient explanatory power were removed. Their remaining suggests that they do add
explanatory power to the model, even if they do not improve the classificatory power of
the model to a statistically significant degree. In addition, both political discrimination
and growth in GDP per capita remained in the relative deprivation stepwise model.
Of the originally proposed grievance indicators, infant mortality, regime type,
political discrimination, economic discrimination, and growth in GDP per capita all
improved the ability of the feasibility model to classify periods of onset and those of
peace correctly. They also all remained significant and in the expected directions when
added to CHR’s feasibility model. In addition, regime type and infant mortality each had
impacts on the probability of conflict similar to those of GDP per capita and population,
while discrimination had a greater effect on the likelihood of onset than did any of the
feasibility indicators, with codified exclusion increasing the probability of conflict fivefold from countries in which there is no codified exclusion.
However, it is important that the case for the role of grievances not be overstated.
None of the models that included grievances provided a significant increase over CHR’s
feasibility model in the ability to classify onset and non-conflict periods. Therefore, from
the standpoint of the models as a whole, it cannot be said that knowing grievance levels
adds significantly to researchers’ overall understanding and explanation of where conflict
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occurs. As such, the onus is still on the proponents of the grievance explanation of
conflict to illustrate where their indicators improve upon what is already known.
So what? Why does the “greed” v. grievance debate matter? The role of
grievances in civil conflict onset is not only important regarding theoretical debates, but
also due to the policy implications that follow. Much of the research regarding correlates
of onset is funded by the World Bank and USAID, who are involved in directing aid
flows and determining the conditions attached to them. For example, while the Bretton
Woods Institutions’ Structural Adjustment Programs preceded the “greed”/grievance
literature, the programs flow from the logic underlying the opportunity and feasibility
arguments. That is, the assumption is that if the fiscal policy is “right,” even if it is
constructed at the expense of the social sector, it is considered a net benefit to the
country.
This research suggests that this logic deserves to be re-examined. The findings
presented here suggest that social grievances such as unequal access to political
opportunities and lack of political voice are related to onset independently from economic
characteristics. In addition, the fact that GDP per capita is not a significant predictor of
conflict in high infant mortality or low growth country-periods suggests that under
conditions of high grievance, improved economic characteristics do not help mitigate the
likelihood of conflict. In other words, if a goal of aid is to increase stability, proposed
policies ought to address both the social and economic sectors simultaneously. Improving
fiscal conditions with the intent to repay loans at the expense of social conditions may do
more harm than good for both the lenders and the borrowers, as it may drive countries
further into the conflict-poverty cycle.
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The finding that grievance measures are statistically significant in risk assessment
models such as those presented here also lends credibility to their continued consideration
in early warning research. Chiba and Gleditsch (2007), for example, incorporated
Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch’s (2014) model of horizontal inequality (HI) into their
early warning model, and found that the HI model was better at forecasting civil wars
than was a model including vertical inequality and structural state characteristics.
However, Chiba and Gleditsch were limited in that the measures of HI proposed by
Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch do not tend to change much over time, reducing their
usefulness for early warning. More dynamic measures such as change in GDP per capita
or (to a more limited extent) political or economic discrimination levels may prove more
useful in forecasting.
Relative versus Absolute Deprivation
In addition to providing insight into the question of whether knowing grievance
levels as a whole adds to the feasibility theory of where conflict occurs, this research also
sheds some light on the question of whether relative or absolute deprivation better
explains onset. While no definitive conclusions should be drawn, the data suggest that
relative deprivation offers a more compelling explanation for conflict onset than does
absolute deprivation.
The original intent of the dummied regime types was to capture absolute
deprivation of political voice—with greater democracy associated with greater voice—
while recognizing that factionalized countries may be more likely to enact unequal
policies along identity-based lines than are countries without factionalism. Bivariate tests
of the regime types with conflict onset indicated that partial democracies with
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factionalism were the most likely to experience onset, and that there was no significant
difference between partial democracies without factionalism and either partial or full or
autocracies (Table 3). These findings were corroborated in the multivariate logit
regressions, which again found partial democracies with factionalism to be significantly
more likely to experience conflict than were partial democracies without factionalism, but
no difference between partial democracies with factionalism and either type of autocracy.
Initially, these findings were interpreted to mean that relative deprivation of voice
(indicated by factionalism) has a similar effect on conflict likelihood as does absolute
deprivation of voice (indicated by autocracy). However, further examination of the data
also indicated that factionalized countries and autocracies enact political policies intended
to repress specific ethnic groups at similar rates. Therefore, autocratic regimes may
experience conflict at similar rates to partial democracies due to the levels of relative
political deprivation experienced rather than the expected absolute deprivation of voice.
In addition to the findings related to political grievances, the economic variables
also suggested that relative deprivation is more salient than is absolute deprivation.
MSES, meant to capture the absolute number and quality of economic opportunities, was
only weakly related with civil conflict onset. MSES was a significant predictor of onset
in bivariate tests, but it lost its significance when feasibility was controlled for. Further,
the inclusion of MSES in the feasibility model did not change the area under the ROC
curve. Both economic discrimination and change in GDP per capita, on the other hand,
were significantly related with onset and both improved the ability of the model to
correctly classify onset and non-conflict periods. These findings could be interpreted in a
few ways. MSES may not adequately capture economic opportunities. However, it is also
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possible that absolute economic deprivation does not have the same impact on the
likelihood of conflict onset as does relative economic deprivation either with respect to
other groups or with respect to time.
Finally, the evidence intimates that absolute deprivation might better be thought
of on the “cost” side of the equation (as opportunity cost) for potential rebels than on the
“benefits” side. The significant role of infant mortality in predicting onset suggests that
absolute deprivation does play a role, but it is unclear whether the deprivation in itself is
a grievance-causing motive or an indication of low opportunity cost to entering into
conflict.
In order to test these competing theories, the sample was split into countries with
high and low relative deprivation levels. The assumption was that if absolute deprivation
were simply another indicator for opportunity cost, then it would not be associated with
conflict in the absence of motive. The two potential motives that were used were
decremental deprivation and political discrimination. Consistent with the opportunity cost
account of absolute deprivation, infant mortality was not a significant predictor of
conflict in positive growth scenarios, but it was a significant predictor of conflict in
negative growth scenarios. This finding indicated that absolute deprivation is more likely
a component of the “cost” side of the equation rather than a “benefit” that stands on its
own. However, infant mortality was a significant predictor of conflict in both low and
high discrimination countries. This finding initially seems to counter-act the opportunity
cost explanation of absolute deprivation, except the sample of countries included in the
Minorities at Risk data may be skewing the results. Therefore, these initial findings
provide slightly greater support for an “opportunity cost” interpretation of absolute

135

deprivation than a “grievance” or “motive” interpretation, but there is much room for
further research on the topic.
So what? Why does the relative deprivation versus absolute deprivation
debate matter? Similar to the broader “greed” versus grievance debate, the comparative
strengths of relative and absolute deprivation in explaining onset also matter for both
policy and theoretical reasons. If an end-goal of a country is stability, these findings
suggest that grievance-limiting policies can positively affect stability even in countries
with few resources. That is, both the feasibility and basic physiological needs arguments
rely on resource-based responses to limit conflict likelihood. However, if aspirational
relative deprivation—defined as the perception of unjust inequalities that exist across
identity-based lines—is a driver of conflict, then policy-based responses may also be
effective in diminishing the likelihood of conflict and the conflict-related traps that
follow. These two characteristics of relative deprivation also help derive potential policy
prescriptions. First, policies that improve the equality of opportunities may limit
perceived relative deprivation and conflict likelihood. Second, states may benefit from an
intentional de-politicization of identity.
This emphasis on the importance of relatively equal opportunities rather than
relatively equal outcomes suggests that steps toward a social market economy such as
Germany’s may help ameliorate some conflict-driving grievances. While there are
several potential manifestations of the social market economy, the defining
characteristics include a laissez-faire approach to the market, production, prices, and
labor combined with a just distribution of income (Marktanner, 2010). While “just” is a
nebulous term, Marktanner (2010) suggests that
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in Social Market Economics, just is whatever the market distributes, provided that
equal opportunities persist…The social in the Social Market Economy is therefore
the combination of an economic model to solve the scarcity problem with a
political model that gives individuals equal opportunities. (p. 173, emphasis
added)
The proponents of Social Market Economics argue its combination of the free market and
opportunity-equalizing policy is both positive for economic growth and beneficial from
the standpoint of improving social justice (Marktanner, 2010). The findings presented in
this research suggest that—due to its relationship with both growth and equal
opportunities—such an approach may also have the effect of decreasing the likelihood of
conflict.
Unequal economic opportunities were significantly related with conflict onset in
this research, but unequal political opportunities seemed to have an even greater effect.
Political discrimination had a slightly larger effect size than did economic discrimination
in the models in which they were entered separately. The data suggested that a country
with no political discrimination has a 1.1 percent chance of experiencing conflict onset in
a given 5-year period, while countries with exclusionary policies have a 5.3 percent
chance of experiencing violent civil conflict. CHR’s feasibility hypothesis relies on the
assumption that grievances are ubiquitous across time and space, and therefore a lowresource state has few options for minimizing its likelihood of conflict. Again, these data
suggest, contrary to CHR’s conclusions, that neither ethnicity nor qualities of governance
ought to be discounted.
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The most obvious policy prescription to follow from the findings relating to
political discrimination is that in order to minimize conflict likelihood in low-resource
states, the state ought to provide for equal opportunities in the political arena. Likewise,
in order to maximize the effect of aid, agencies and loaning countries ought to direct
funding toward states that provide equal opportunities. This approach, on its face, would
seem to be worthwhile regardless of its effect on the likelihood of conflict. In an attempt
not to over-simplify the role of political discrimination, however, it should be mentioned
that the empirical evidence presented here assumes that discrimination occurs in a
vacuum, and is exogenous to conflict. The reality is that codified discrimination is a
policy enacted that depends, in part, on the conflict situation in the state. That is, as
Fearon (2011b) points out, if states are enacting policies that they believe they can “get
away with,” then a model would underestimate the effect of an arbitrary shift toward
more discriminatory policies. However, if the policy is the result of fear of conflict or
rebellion, then the model may overestimate the effect of such discrimination. These
statistical limitations to including policy on the right hand side of the equation suggest
that further research is needed before definitive conclusions are drawn regarding the
direct effects of unequal political access on civil conflict onset.
In terms of its impact on conflict theory, this research points to two paths forward.
First, the findings provide some evidence that absolute deprivation is better thought of as
indicating opportunity cost than of conflict-causing grievance. If conflict is the result of
the combination of motive and opportunity, then absolute deprivation ought not to be
considered a sufficient condition for conflict onset; a separate motive in the form of either
greed or relative deprivation would have to be present in order for conflict to occur.
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Further research in this regard may be fruitful. The second area in which these findings
affect theory is through the suggestion that, contrary to CHR’s conclusions, the role of
the politicization of identity in conflict deserves further consideration. While much
research in this area has continued in spite of CHR’s findings, to date it had not
sufficiently controlled for feasibility. The finding that identity-based discrimination
continues to be salient even when feasibility is controlled for provides further support for
the continuation of this research into the intersection between identity and conflict.
Amartya Sen versus Abraham Maslow
The third conclusion drawn from these data is that Amartya Sen’s (1999)
suggestion that freedoms can and ought to precede more traditionally thought of forms of
“development” applies not only to enhancing human development but to conflict
mitigation as well. Sen’s argument was considered in contrast to Maslow’s, who
suggested that people do not tend to consider “higher order” needs until their base needs
are met. The test of Sen and Maslow’s competing theories began with the assumption that
more democratic regime types represent freedoms and infant mortality represents an
ability to meet physiological needs. According to Maslow’s theory, living in a more
repressive regime might not incite conflict unless survival needs are met because those
higher order needs would not be considered before physiological needs are satisfied.
Sen’s theory, on the other hand, suggests that democracy ought to limit the likelihood of
conflict even if survival needs are not being met.
The findings presented in chapter 4 support Sen’s assessment. Not only was
conflict less likely in democracies even under conditions of high infant mortality, but
there were no recorded conflicts any non-factionalized democracies in the high infant
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mortality sample. In contrast, there were no significant differences between the regime
types in the low infant mortality sample. In other words, freedoms had a greater
protective effect when physiological needs were not being met than when they were.
So What? Why does the Sen versus Maslow debate matter? The finding that
regime type matters when physiological needs are not being met matters for several
reasons. First, it is important to the theoretical debates surrounding the causes of conflict
because in the prior literature the link between democracy and conflict is tenuous. The
inconsistent and contradictory findings between the two have led to the conclusion that
increased political voice does not mitigate conflict likelihood. By dividing regime types
into dummies and considering their effects at varying levels of other grievances,
however, it can be seen that freedoms and conflict do seem to have an empirical
relationship, and that the relationship is more nuanced than some previous accounts of
conflict have allowed for.
This argument that social and political progress can precede economic
development is also theoretically important because it contradicts the “stages” of growth
theories proposed by Rostow (1960) and his successors. Rather than economic
development being necessary for the implementation and maintenance of democracy and
human rights, these institutions can both be established with few resources and can help
avoid conflict traps that would impede economic growth. These data suggest not only that
we need not sacrifice social progress for economic advancement, but also that to do so
may ultimately be detrimental to the goals of both economic development and conflict
mitigation.
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In addition to the theoretical implications of the Sen versus Maslow debate, there
are several policy recommendations that follow. The relationship between regime type
and onset again suggests—contrary to a feasibility or opportunity explanation of
conflict—that policy can mitigate conflict likelihood in the absence of resources. Even in
low-capacity states where basic human needs are less likely to be met, democratization
and access to political freedoms can be stabilizing.
These results are corroborated to a degree by the Institute for Economics and
Peace’s (IEP) 2011 Global Peace Index report. The IEP, using a more general
conceptualization of peace that includes low violent crime rates and positive relationships
with neighbors, demonstrated that the presence of civil liberties and freedom of the press
were more closely related to peace than were GDP, adult literacy, or unemployment
(Institute for Economics & Peace, 2011). Slovenia, for example, was ranked the eighth
most peaceful country in the world in 2011, but lower than 150th in GDP per capita. The
IEP argues that this high peace score is the result of the state’s emphasis on establishing
democratic institutions and respecting human rights.
The finding that political freedoms mitigate conflict likelihood in low-capacity
states but do not affect states where base-needs are being met also has implications for
aid flows and foreign policy. The results suggest that neither physiological nor “higher
order” needs must precede the other. Assistance in meeting physiological needs may help
mitigate conflict even in the absence of democratic institutions; likewise, assistance in the
development of institutions may help mitigate conflict likelihood even in the absence of
financial resources. Therefore, if the effectiveness of aid in limiting conflict likelihood is
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the only consideration, equality of access to economic and political opportunities
(discussed above) may influence the decision, but the level of democracy ought not to.
Per Capita GDP as an Indicator of State Capacity
The relationship between GDP per capita and conflict onset is one of the more
consistent and robust in the civil conflict literature. The cycle between poverty and
conflict is well known, as poorer countries are more likely to experience conflict and
conflict depletes states’ economic resources.26 The question of what GDP per capita
represents in theoretical terms, though, remains unclear. Because the indicator is highly
correlated with so many characteristics of the state, researchers often interpret it in the
light that best fits their needs. For example, in CHR’s feasibility research, the authors
suggest that GDP per capita is best thought of as an indicator of opportunity cost for
potential rebels. Fearon and Laitin (2003), while making the case that conflict occurs in
weak states, suggest that per capita income ought to be thought of as an indicator for state
capacity. It is also possible that income measures citizens’ abilities to meet their basic
human needs, and that a country’s low output therefore indicates high grievance.
The findings presented in this research suggest that it is best to think of GDP per
capita—as Fearon and Laitin do—as a measure of state capacity. This conclusion follows
from consideration of what the relationship between income and conflict onset would
look like at varying levels of grievance if income represented each of the possible
constructs. If GDP per capita best captures grievance, then it should be related with
conflict onset regardless of the levels of other indicators of grievance. If it best captures
opportunity cost, then it ought to be related with conflict at high grievance levels but not
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Collier (2007) refers to this cycle as the “conflict trap.”
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at low grievance levels, because opportunity in the absence of motive, in theory, should
not lead to conflict. If it best captures state capacity, then one would expect it to be
related with conflict at low grievance levels but not at high grievance levels. In that case,
a high grievance would lead to conflict with less regard for capacity, while at lower levels
of grievance a potential rebel group would be more likely to consider the level of state
capacity when determining whether to engage in conflict.
According to these data, GDP per capita is significantly related to conflict onset at
low grievance levels (measured both in terms of infant mortality and political repression),
but it is not related to conflict onset at high grievance levels. This finding is interpreted as
support for the argument that GDP per capita is better thought of as a measure of capacity
than of grievance or opportunity cost. In addition, it suggests that the interaction between
levels of grievance and of feasibility is worth further exploration.
Interacting Grievance and Feasibility. In much of the prior literature regarding
civil conflict, including that presented here, grievance and feasibility are treated as
competing theories of onset. As such, they tend to be considered independently, with the
intention of determining which of the theories best explains when and where conflict
occurs. The findings presented here regarding the relationships among GDP per capita,
grievances, and onset suggest, however, that researchers seeking to explain onset
likelihood would perhaps be better served considering the interactions between the
potential for grievances and the feasibility of rebellion.
For example, the findings discussed above regarding the significance of GDP per
capita in low and high grievance country-periods suggest that in relatively low grievance
environments, state capacity matters in determining where conflict will occur. However,
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in high grievance environments, capacity has a more limited role. It could be argued that
the reason GDP per capita appears not to be significant in the high grievance
environments is statistical rather than real. That is, the smaller sample leads to a higher
standard error, decreasing the statistical significance of the relationship. The effect size of
GDP per capita also decreases from the low to high grievance models, though, which
suggests that the lack of significance is more than a statistical problem. Instead, it appears
that the role of capacity does vary based on the magnitude of grievance.
So what? Why does the possible interaction between capacity and grievance
matter? This finding that capacity may have varying effects on conflict onset likelihood
depending on the level of grievance is theoretically significant because it highlights the
limitations of thinking of grievance and opportunities as competing, independent theories.
The idea that grievance and opportunity may interact is not new. Keen (2000, 2008), for
example, highlights the mutually reinforcing properties of opportunities and grievances,
suggesting that when state capacity is low, both the incentive for and opportunity to
exploit civilians increases. However, little attention has been paid to these interactions in
the quantitative literature. The finding offers empirical evidence that perhaps, by
continuing to explore whether opportunity or grievance explains more, researchers are
missing a fundamental element that the effects of each may depend on the level of the
other.
This interaction effect makes sense when conflict is thought of in terms of state
vulnerability, or the inability of the state to withstand the effects of its environment. If
grievance levels are thought of as the policy environment inherited by the current state,
and the state’s resources are thought of as the capacity of the state to off-set those
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grievances, then the ratio of the state’s grievances to its capacity (in other words, the
interaction between the two) ought to give some indication of how vulnerable the state is
to civil conflict onset. This merging of the opportunity and grievance literature is one
path forward in furthering the “greed” versus grievance debate.
As with all of the previous findings presented in this research, these data also
suggest that policies intended to limit grievances such as decreasing inequalities or
providing for basic needs can mitigate conflict likelihood even before resources are
available to improve state capacity. This line of thinking runs contrary to the belief that
economic advancement should supersede social or institutional changes. Therefore, the
practice of tying aid to economic but not social or political changes may decrease conflict
likelihood in low-grievance states but do little to limit the likelihood of onset where
grievances are high.
This practice of making economic aid contingent upon decreased investment in
social programs was particularly common in the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)
implemented by both the IMF and the World Bank starting in the 1960s (Boughton,
2001). The programs attached conditions to loans, ostensibly with the goal of reducing
“fiscal imbalances” and putting the country on a path toward long-term economic growth.
In addition to favoring free-market principles, the SAPs often called for the devaluation
of the local currency, the elimination of food subsidies, increased prices for public
services, and decreased wages for publicly funded employees (Riddell, 1992). During the
1990s, critics of the SAPs began to illustrate the negative social impacts of the policies,
and the Bretton Woods Institutions now ask borrowing countries to create their own
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). However, the policies proposed in the
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PRSPs remain similar to the original SAPs, and critics suggest the International Financial
Institutions and their funding members still heavily influence the process (Fraser, 2005).
The conditions outlined above have two major effects regarding the grievances
discussed. First, currency devaluation causes an immediate decline in citizen’s
purchasing power (Hoogvelt, 1987). Overnight, the cost of imported goods increases,
leading to a sense of decremental deprivation. Second, the increasing economic
competition has the potential to increase existing ethnic tensions (Adekanye, 1994).
Adekanye (1994) argues that market liberalization without providing equal opportunities
increases inequalities, stating:
[J]ust as SAP tends to increase the poverty of the very poor social groups or
classes, and to impoverish people in the managerial and professional occupations
other than perhaps the armed forces, while the very few rich grow even richer, so
does the socioeconomic incidence of SAP vary from one political region to
another, from ethnic group to ethnic group, and between different communities.
(p. 11).
The emphasis on improving a country’s economic status, without consideration for social
effects, then, may increase identity-based grievance propensity, and therefore may
increase the likelihood of civil conflict. Again, this research illuminates the merits of a
Social Market approach. Market liberalization may aid in economic growth, increasing
state capacity, and decreasing conflict feasibility, but if it is enacted at the expense of
social justice, it may not have the intended effect on conflict likelihood. However, if the
liberalization is accompanied by an emphasis on equal opportunities, the increased
capacity may not be at the expense of an increased likelihood of grievance.
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
There are several limitations to this research, each of which relate to potential
avenues for future research. The focus in this work was on improved operationalization
of grievances. While I would argue it advanced the debate, there is much room for further
progress regarding grievance measures. In addition, there are questions about the
dependent variable and the interaction effects that are worth exploring in future research.
Improvements in Measures and Interpretation of Grievance
This research illustrated several limitations to past measures of grievance.
Variables intended to capture basic human needs such as the Physical Quality of Life
Index are simultaneously too broad to capture physiological needs and too narrow to
capture “higher order” needs espoused by Burton and Sites. Further, using Polity as a
measure of absolute political repression or exclusion conflates absolute political voice,
relative political opportunities, and state capacity to the degree that the measure appears
to have an inconsistent and contradictory relationship with civil conflict onset. In
addition, regarding basic human needs, there is a need for a variable that captures
absolute economic opportunities along with political opportunities.
There are also several limitations to the variables used to measure relative
deprivation and inequalities. This research stressed the importance of finding measures
that capture perceived injustices that occur along identity-based lines, as well as
indicators of decremental deprivation. The research presented here addressed each of
these limitations in some way, but these stipulations should continue to inform future
research on the role of grievances in the process of civil conflict.
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Future measures of absolute deprivation. The statistical analyses in this
research relied on three variables to capture citizens’ absolute conditions, or the
likelihood of their ability to meet their basic needs. Infant mortality served as a measure
of whether physiological needs are being met, while the share of GDP from
manufacturing and services exports (MSES) was meant to capture the variety and quality
of economic opportunities, and regime type dummies proxied absolute political
opportunities. Each of these variables independently—and the three taken together—had
limitations that can be improved upon in future research.
Infant mortality was one of the stronger indicators of civil conflict onset both in
this study and in prior research (e.g., Goldstone et al., 2010). It is a logical measure of
ability to meet survival needs, and the findings presented here suggest that it is slightly
more helpful in classifying onset periods than is GDP per capita. The major weakness to
using infant mortality as an explanatory variable, though, stems from its strong
correlation with GDP per capita. Due to this correlation, it is not entirely clear whether
high infant mortality is better thought of as a proxy for high absolute deprivation or low
state capacity. Further, infant mortality rates tend to change steadily and slowly over
time. Therefore, while a country’s high infant mortality rate may provide some indication
that the state is at increased risk for conflict onset, it offers little help in determining
when such conflict will occur. These limitations suggest that it may be fruitful in future
research to attempt to determine measures of ability to meet survival needs that is less
dependent on state resources and has the potential to vary more over time. For example,
even a more localized measure of infant mortality would help un-couple the link between
the capacity of the state as a whole and the ability to meet basic survival needs.
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The relationship between MSES—intended to capture economic opportunities—
and civil conflict onset was not robust. This lack of a relationship may exist because
limited economic opportunities do not lead to violence, or it may be because MSES is not
the most appropriate measure of the variety and quality of economic opportunities
available. As MSES is the only measure of absolute deprivation used in this research that
does not also capture relative deprivation (as does regime type) and is not strongly
correlated with GDP per capita (as is infant mortality), it is possible that the lack of
correlation between MSES and onset is further evidence that—because civil conflict is
ultimately a result of collective action—absolute deprivation is better thought of as
opportunity cost than as conflict-driving grievance in its own right.
It is also possible that more valid measures of opportunity can be found. First,
MSES is inflated to a degree in states that are heavily dependent upon exports. Because it
is reported as a percentage share of GDP rather than as a raw number per capita, poorer
states that produce less in general but export to a greater degree may have a higher MSES
than do high producing states where more of the goods produced remain in the country.
Therefore, a high amount of goods and services exported per capita may be a more valid
measure of diverse, high quality economic opportunities than is the share of GDP that
results from manufactured goods and services. Second, the use of MSES as an indicator
of the variety and quality of opportunities depends on a culturally-derived assumption
regarding what makes an economic opportunity “good.” For example, if people desire to
be part of an agriculturally-based society, then MSES is a poor indicator of the quality of
economic opportunities. Therefore, a measure of the perception of the number and
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quality of economic opportunities may be more appropriate in future research on this
topic than is this more objective account of opportunities.
The use of dummied regime types was also an improvement over polity regarding
its ability to capture the nuanced relationship between political opportunities and civil
conflict onset. However, there are still many questions regarding this relationship. It was
methodologically unfortunate that there were no onset periods in full democracies,
because it became difficult to tease out the relationships among capacity, absolute
political opportunities, relative political opportunities, and conflict. The lack of onsets
suggests that being a consolidated democracy has a protective effect of some kind.
Because full democracies cannot be compared directly with partial democracies or partial
or full autocracies, though, it is unclear whether this effect is the result of decreased
grievance or increased capacity.
The non-significant difference between partial democracies and partial and full
autocracies suggests that the absolute level of political opportunity is not the driver of the
relationship between regime type and onset. In addition, the strong correlations between
political discrimination and full autocracies, partial autocracies, and partial democracies
with factionalism indicate that it is these regime types’ increased likelihood of
implementing policies that repress particular ethnic groups that leads to their increased
likelihood of conflict.
Hegre et al. (2001) argue along similar lines, suggesting that consolidated
democracies experience fewer civil conflict onsets than do other regime types because
they produce fewer grievances. The authors also suggest that full autocracies experience
fewer onsets than do other regime types due to their ability to repress rebellion. Onsets
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are most likely in “anocracies,” then, because they contain the combination of grievance
and opportunity most conducive to rebellion. Again, Hegre et al.’s line of thinking
illustrates the importance of considering the interaction between grievances and
opportunity in future research. Further, this approach suggests that combining the
political participation and competitiveness components of the polity index may cause
researchers not to fully understand which aspects of democracy are actually driving
conflict. Further research along the lines of Vreeland (2008), in which each of the
components of the polity index are treated separately, may help unpack this complex
relationship.
In summary, future researchers interested in the effects of absolute deprivation
could benefit from continuing to consider several of the limitations drawn out here. First,
it will be valuable to determine a measure of ability to meet basic physiological needs
that is independent from the capacity of the state. It is possible that measuring infant
mortality at more local rather than state levels would help de-link the two concepts, and
further our understanding of how the ability to meet basic needs influences when and
where conflict occurs. Second, the development of a less-culturally dependent and more
theoretically sound measure of access to a variety of quality economic opportunities
would help advance our understanding of how an ability to meet higher-order needs
affects the likelihood of conflict. Third, while the dummied regime types utilized here
offered an improved understanding of why polity and conflict seemed to have an
inconsistent and contradictory relationship in the opportunity and feasibility research, the
dummies coded in this manner may still conflate capacity, absolute deprivation, and
relative deprivation to a degree that it is difficult to discern which is at play in affecting
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conflict likelihood. Future research that treats the components of political institutions
separately and more mindfully considers the interaction between grievances and
opportunity may be beneficial in that regard.
Future measures of relative deprivation. This research drew on two major
variables to measure the likelihood and degree of relative deprivation in a given countryperiod. The Minorities at Risk political and economic discrimination data represented two
dimensions of aspirational deprivation, while decreases in GDP per capita denoted
decremental deprivation. Again, these measures signified an improvement over some
prior indicators of grievance, but they had limitations that should be addressed in future
research.
The major strength of the Minorities at Risk discrimination data was that the
coding for discrimination represented unequal access to political and economic
opportunities that fell along ethnic lines. This method of capturing relative aspirational
deprivation allowed for an important shift away from previous measures that captured
actual differences between groups, but had no indication of the likelihood that those
differences were considered unjust. Because groups that are discriminated against see
limitations not only in their outcomes but also in their opportunities, it is more likely that
these inequalities are frustrating than would be if the groups’ income or political
participation levels were simply different. However, even in the discrimination data, there
is no indication of whether discriminated groups actually believe the current policies or
restrictions in access are unfair. Therefore, it may be useful in future studies regarding
aspirational relative deprivation to capture perceptions of the justice of inequalities rather
than only their objective existence.
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The second major weakness of the Minorities at Risk data was that the sample
was limited to countries in which there are minorities “at risk,” but there was no
guarantee that all countries left out of the sample did not use discriminatory policies
against minority groups. Therefore, the countries that were not in the dataset could not be
coded 0s, but the models using the dataset had to be interpreted as representing only
countries in which there were at-risk populations. In other words, this restriction in the
sample meant that there was likely already a degree of identity-based grievance present in
every country in the dataset, which may have mis-represented the effects of other
grievances—such as political and economic discrimination—on the likelihood of
conflict.27 Future research would benefit from either a more complete measure of
aspirational relative deprivation, which includes a representative sample of countries and
the degree of perceived injustice between groups, or a version of the discrimination
dataset that better represents the population of country years.
The third limitation to nearly all prior research on aspirational relative deprivation
lies in its assumptions rather than its measurement. The theory linking relative
deprivation to conflict onset suggests groups that are discriminated against, or those that
are on the “bottom” of an unequal relationship, are the ones who experience frustration
and initiate aggressive behaviors. However, few studies explore which of the groups in an
unequal dyad actually incite the violence. Instead, when violence occurs in regions of
inequality the assumption is that such relative deprivation is the cause. Anecdotal
evidence of recent conflicts in Uganda, Haiti, and Iraq in which state-based repression is
used in an effort to maintain the status quo suggests that in some cases it may be the more
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The likelihood of conflict in a given country-period in the complete dataset was 2.4 percent, while that in
the sample restricted to Minorities at Risk countries was over 9 percent.
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privileged group that initiates the violence in an unequal relationship. This question of
whether violence is employed by those on the “bottom” to change the status quo or those
on the “top” to maintain it is worth further exploration as well.
With regard to decremental deprivation, the findings suggest that it may deserve
more attention in future research. Not only was change in GDP per capita one of the more
robust indicators of onset, but it also added substantial classificatory power in CHR’s
feasibility model. In addition, this measure of decremental deprivation was one of the few
independent variables included that may change rapidly over time. Therefore, while the
other characteristics of the state are helpful in determining where conflict is likely to
occur, change in GDP per capita is helpful in determining when conflict is likely to
occur.
Perhaps the measure’s greatest weakness is the potential of change in GDP per
capita to proxy several characteristics of the state. While in the past researchers
interpreted the variable as an indicator of capacity and opportunity cost, it is argued here
that it is best thought of as a measure of decremental deprivation. Similar to the use of
infant mortality, the use of other measures of changes in capabilities over time that are
not linked as closely with state capacity would buttress this argument. Recent research on
food prices, for example, has shown some promise in this regard.
The second arena in which the role of decremental deprivation may be furthered
is in expanding it beyond the economic. Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch’s (2014)
research, for example, examined the effects of group decreases in political power over
time. They drew on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data, which classifies ethnic
groups’ access to state power as monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner,
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regional autonomy, powerless, and discriminated. The authors classified any downward
shift in this scale from one year to the next as a “downgrade,” and they found that
downgrading related positively with the onset of both civil wars of all types and ethnic
territorial wars. As with other grievance-based literature, the authors used GDP per capita
and population to control for feasibility, so the effect of such downgrading while fully
taking into account the feasibility of conflict is not entirely known. Further exploration of
the effects of such political decremental deprivation may prove fruitful.
From this research there are three major areas, then, in which future research can
improve upon the current measures and interpretation of relative deprivation. First, a
continued emphasis on perceived injustices along identity-based lines rather than simply
objective differences among groups will help advance our understanding of the degree to
which aspirational deprivation influences conflict onset. Second, the mechanisms
underlying the link between aspirational deprivation and violence deserve further
exploration. The assumption is that the relatively deprived groups are the aggressors in
conflict onset, but there is a dearth of empirical research on the subject. Third, the role of
decremental deprivation merits further exploration. There is evidence provided in this
research that changes in economic capabilities over time are related to conflict onset.
However, the interpretation of change in GDP per capita is too ambiguous to make a
strong case at this time. Future measures that are independent from capacity and
emphasize additional dimensions of decremental deprivation such as that in the political
arena are worth exploring.
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The Effect of the Dependent Variable in Onset Research
The focus in this research was on whether and to what degree updated measures
of grievance add to our understanding and explanations of when and where conflict
occurs. In order to test whether these new measures improve upon CHR’s feasibility
model, the proposed indicators of grievance were added to CHR’s original model, using
both their modeling technique and their dependent variable. However, both the technique
and measurement of conflict may be the subject of scrutiny.
CHR identify civil wars using a dataset in which wars “start” when 1,000 total
deaths occur due to fighting between a state and a named opposition group. The intent of
the high threshold is to delineate civil wars from smaller-scale violence. However, this
threshold also has several unintended consequences.
One criticism against the 1,000 death threshold is that there is no practical
difference between a conflict that results in 1,000 deaths and one that results in 990.
While the former conflict would be coded as an “onset” in the Gleditsch dataset, the latter
would be considered a “peace year.” Therefore, it is possible that events that are for all
practical purposes “civil wars” are not included in these data. A potential path forward
related to this limitation is discussed below.
A second criticism is that CHR code “onset” as the year in which 1,000 deaths are
reached rather than the year in which the violence initially begins. This coding method
means that ongoing conflict could impact the levels of the independent variables prior to
the officially coded “onset,” conflating conditions that lead to war with those that result
from violence. Research that uses the Gleditsch data to determine causes of onset would
benefit from considering whether changing the “onset” year to the start of the conflict
rather than the year of the 1,000th death changes the effects of the independent variables.
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The third criticism that is particularly important in research regarding the role of
grievances is that the high death threshold may conflate conflict onset with conflict
duration. Unless a conflict escalates quickly, it is likely to take some time before reaching
1,000 deaths. It is also likely that high capacity states quell violent conflict more quickly
than do low capacity states. Therefore, it is possible that there are situations in which
grievance levels are high enough to motivate violent conflict, but a relatively high state
capacity prevents the conflict from reaching the threshold and being recorded as an onset.
If those assumptions are correct, the high death criterion for considering a conflict a civil
war would discount the role of grievance as a motivator in higher capacity in countries.
All research that codes onset as a single arbitrary point in the course of conflict
suffers from another significant limitation that deserves to be addressed moving forward,
which is that conflict is likely better thought of as a process than as an event. While
Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009), and Fearon and
Laitin’s (2003) coding of onset all treat conflict as a situation that occurs at a single point
in time, Young (2016) points out that manifestations of conflict are the result of multiple
interactions between the citizenry and the state. In the event that citizens have grievances,
they must first determine some action to address those grievances. The state must then
determine its response. These actions and responses ultimately determine the ways in
which perceived incompatibilities manifest themselves. The question then becomes
whether certain types or levels of grievance or types or levels of capacity lead people or
states toward different actions or responses.
The case of the Arab Spring countries and their differential responses to similar
behaviors among citizens based on similar grievances in states with similar levels of
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capacity is telling in this regard. In Egypt, there was a military presence at protests, but
they did not respond in a coordinated, violent manner to the expression of grievances.
Not long after the protests began, non-violent regime change took place. In Syria, on the
other hand, the state met initially non-violent protestors with brutality and imprisonment.
Factions of the Syrian military defected in response, and created the Free Syrian Army
with the stated aim of overthrowing the government. The civil war there recently entered
its sixth year. In both cases, civilians expressed discontent over similar levels of
grievance in similar ways. The very different responses of the states, though, led to very
different outcomes in how the conflict manifested itself in the long term.
The reverse of the question of how the state responds to citizens is how the
citizens approach the state regarding grievances. As Cunningham (2013) points out, the
decision whether to approach the state with the intention of becoming a violent or nonviolent movement may be strategically calculated by considering the “costs and benefits
of different types of mobilization” (p. 292). These nuances in interactions between the
state and citizens, and how and when grievance and capacity may influence citizens’ or
states’ responses, cannot be dissected in research that treats conflict as a singular event.
However, if the dependent variable were a scale measuring different steps along the
conflict process, a deeper understanding of the roles of both grievance and opportunity at
different stages of that process may be possible to achieve. Treating conflict as a process
over time rather than a single point may also help with the problem alluded to throughout
this research that characteristics of the state are beneficial in directing researchers and
policy makers to where conflict is likely to occur, but gives little indication of when it
may take place. Finally, this process-based approach helps alleviate the problems
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associated with the arbitrary death threshold discussed above, in addition to the
conflation of onset and duration. One possible indicator that may be useful in this regard
is the Heidelberg Conflict Intensity Index (HCII).
The HCII uses a five-stage ranking in order to classify the intensity of conflicts.
They code conflicts as disputes, non-violent crises, violent crises, limited wars, and wars.
The researchers define disputes as “political conflict carried out without resorting to
violence,” while non-violent conflict occurs when “one of the actors threatens to use
violence” (HIIK, 2016, p. 7). The determination for whether conflicts are considered
violent crises, limited wars, or wars is made based on a combination of factors, including:
the type of weapons used and their level of deployment, the number of people involved in
violent actions, the number of casualties, the number of refugees and internally displaced
persons, and the amount of destruction. As long as these criteria remain at low levels, the
conflict is considered a violent crisis. As higher levels start to appear, the conflict is
upgraded to a limited war. As the higher levels begin to appear in combination, the
conflict is coded an outright war.
Using either the HCII as a whole or its components as the dependent variable in
conflict studies would allow researchers to gain a greater understanding of how
grievances, feasibility, or a combination of the two may influence actors at each step of
the process. It is possible, for example, that grievances are useful for predicting disputes,
crises, and even violent crises, but that capacity and feasibility are better indicators of
limited wars and wars. As the possibility of conflict increases, the capacity of the state
may become a more salient piece of the equation for potential rebels. Treating conflict as
a singular event that occurs only at the end of this escalation process limits the ability of
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researchers to capture these nuances and to fully understand when and where violent
crises, limited wars, and outright wars occur.
The dependent variable employed by CHR and used in this research, then, has
several limitations that may affect the interpretation of the findings. Because the
threshold for onset is set at 1,000 deaths, it is possible that in some states ongoing conflict
influenced the measures of the independent variables prior to the coded onset. In
addition, the high threshold may conflate onset and duration, artificially deflating the role
of grievances in driving onset in mid- to high-capacity states. The use of this particular
dependent variable was appropriate in this case, because it allowed for the best
comparison between CHR’s original model and the updated version. However, it will be
beneficial to consider the role of grievances in cases in which the threshold for onset is
much lower, in order to determine whether grievance drives initial onset, but capacity is
more strongly related to duration.
In addition, further research in which conflict is treated as a process rather than as
an event may help distill the relationships among grievance, opportunity, citizens’
actions, states’ responses, and civil war. In coding conflict as a single point in time,
conditions that enable violent conflict have become better understood. However, knowing
the characteristics of a state that are most strongly associated with conflict offers little
insight into when that conflict might manifest itself. Alternative dependent variables such
as the HCII that allow researcher to distinguish among various phases in conflict may be
beneficial in future research.
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The Importance of Qualitative Case Studies
The final suggestion to advance our understanding of the roles of both feasibility
and grievance is that deviant cases should be selected and examined in more detail. There
are likely lessons to be learned from atypical cases of both conflict and peace. For
example, in the years leading up to Ethiopia’s civil war, the probability of conflict in the
country based on the feasibility model was near 25 percent. After the conflict, the
feasibility model suggested that the probability of conflict hovered over 50 percent for
the next decade, but the conflict has not returned. While there are no regime type data for
the post-war period, the country has experienced 5-year averages of positive growth, its
infant mortality rate has cut in half, and its highest political discrimination score has been
one. This cursory glance suggests that an effort to decrease grievances may at least
partially be responsible for the periods of peace, in spite of the high feasibility of conflict.
Exploration of other states in which the feasibility of conflict is high but violent conflict
has not occurred may be useful in determining methods for reducing conflict likelihood
in low-resource states.
On the other end of the spectrum there are countries such as Colombia in the
1980s and Turkey in the 1990s, where the overall models of both feasibility and
grievance suggest that the probability of conflict would be low, yet both experienced civil
wars. The question of Colombia may be explained away with purely greed-based motive,
which was not given much attention here. The case of Turkey, however, could provide a
great deal of insight into the role of grievances. During the 1980s, Turkey’s GDP per
capita was near average, its infant mortality rates were below average, and GDP growth
rates were above average. However, the high degree of political exclusion (scored four in
the MAR dataset) may have been sufficient to foment the Kurdish separatist movement.
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This brief inspection of the data suggests that neither feasibility nor grievance, as
currently defined and measured, sufficiently explains when and where conflict occurs.
Instead, the question raised is: In what ways do feasibility and grievance affect the
conflict process? Perhaps a qualitative examination of these diverse cases can offer some
insight in that regard.
Summary
The primary conclusion stemming from this research is that more theoretically
sound measures of grievance, when added to Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner’s model,
illustrate that higher grievance levels are associated with an increased risk of conflict
even when controlling for feasibility. However, there is still little evidence that knowing
these grievance levels increases the classificatory power of the feasibility model of
conflict. Therefore, the onus is on the proponents of a grievance theory of conflict to
illustrate the ways in which grievance explains what feasibility cannot regarding the
likelihood of conflict onset.
There were several additional findings, as well as limitations to the current
research, that may help pave a way forward for those interested in understanding the
causes of civil conflict. In this research, measures of relative deprivation appeared to be
more strongly related with conflict onset than were measures of absolute deprivation. An
emphasis on improved measures of perceived injustices that fall along identity-based
lines and are available for a representative sample of the population of country-years will
help advance our understanding of the degree to which relative deprivation increases the
likelihood of conflict. In addition, exploration of treating the existence of absolute
deprivation as opportunity cost rather than a conflict-driving grievance could be fruitful.
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There is compelling evidence for considering the interaction between grievance
and opportunity as a driver of conflict rather than treating each independently. The data
suggest that the effect of grievance may depend on the level of state capacity and vice
versa regarding where conflict occurs. By treating grievance and opportunity as
competing theories and pitting the two against each other in mathematical models,
researchers may be missing the critical feature of how they interact.
While the measures of grievance incorporated here represent improvements over
those used in the opportunity literature, there are still many advances to be made. Infant
mortality and change in GDP per capita are too highly correlated with indicators of state
capacity to make a clear and compelling case for their representing grievance rather than
opportunity. The regime type dummies provided some insight into the relationship
between political opportunities and conflict, but it was not always possible to discern
whether each type best represented political opportunities, the likelihood of relative
political deprivation, or state capacity. The discrimination data offered several advantages
over prior measures of aspirational deprivation, but were limited by the sample from
which the data were drawn. Improvements in the measurement of each of the explanatory
variables will help us develop our understanding of how the concepts they are meant to
capture influence the likelihood of conflict.
Finally, the dependent variable in future conflict research ought to be considered
carefully. Treating onset as a singular event that may be coded years after violent
skirmishes begin is fraught with challenges and limitations. The next step in civil conflict
research likely involves some merging of the “greed”-grievance debate in which the
components of each explanation are combined in order to better understand how each
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influences different stages of the conflict process rather than how they affect the
likelihood that a manifest conflict will reach some arbitrary point. The usefulness of this
approach will depend in part on the incorporation of theoretically sound measures of both
grievance and opportunity, toward which this research provides a step.
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Core Feasibility Variables
Primary Comm. Exports
GDP per Capita
GDP Growth
Peace Duration/Prior Conf
Mountainousness/Terrain
Population

Young Men

Authors (Year)

Buhaug, Cederman, Gleditsch (2014)

X

Cederman, Gleditsch, Buhaug (2013)
Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015)
Esteban and Ray (2011)

Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, Gleditsch (2001)

Huber and Mayoral (2014)

X

X

X

X

X

X
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Hegre, Karlsen, Nygard, Strand, Urdal (2013)

X
X

X

X

Nel and Righarts (2008)
Goldstone, et al. (2010)

Østby (2007)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X

Gubler and Selway (2012)

Østby (2008)
X

X

Østby, Nordås,and Rød (2009)

X
X

X

Regan and Norton (2003)

X
X
X

X

Taydas and Peksen (2012)

X

X

X

X
X
X

Vreeland (2008) - Anocracy Model
Vreeland (2008) - Full Polity Model
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X

X

X

X
X
X

Fearon (2011b)

Quantitative Grievance Tests and Their Control Variables

X
X

X

X

X
X

Buhaug, Gleditsch, Holtermann, Østby, Tollefsen (2011)

APPENDIX B
Coding Criteria for Political and Economic Discrimination28

Political discrimination

0 - No discrimination
1 - Neglect/Remedial policies. Substantial under representation in political office and/or
participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed
to protect or improve the group’s political status.
2 - Neglect/No remedial policies. Substantial under representation due to historical
neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion.
No evidence of protective or remedial public policies.
3 - Social exclusion/Neutral policy. Substantial under representation due to prevailing
social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral
or, if positive, inadequate to offset discriminatory policies.
4 - Exclusion/Repressive policy. Public policies substantially restrict the group’s
political participation by comparison with other groups.
99 - No basis for judgment

28

Given in the Minorities at Risk Codebook (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009, p. 11).
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Economic Discrimination
0 - No discrimination
1 - Historical neglect/Remedial policies. Significant poverty and under representation in
desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public
policies are designed to improve the group’s material well being.
2 - Historical neglect/No remedial policies. Significant poverty and under
representation due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of
deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group’s material
well-being.
3 - Social exclusion/Neutral policies. Significant poverty and under representation due
to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group
are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination.
4 - Restrictive policies. Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression)
substantially restrict the group’s economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.
99 - No basis for judgment
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APPENDIX C
Univariate Analysis of Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner Model Tests
Table C1: Summary Statistics for Onset Years Using Updated Data
Variable
Conflict Onset (Dummy)

Onset Mean (SD)
1.000 (0.000)

Min
1.000

Max
1.000

Obs
97

GDP/capita (1,000s)

6.899 (1.081)

4.774

8.870

93

PCE

0.147 (0.132)

0.006

0.745

90

PCE Squared

0.039 (0.077)

0.000

0.555

90

Peace Years

15.593 (14.143)

1.000

57.000

97

Former French African Colony

0.041 (0.200)

0.000

1.000

97

Social Fractionalization

0.253 (0.198)

0.000

0.651

95

Young Men (Prop of Total Pop)

0.132 (0.013)

0.099

0.161

92

lnPopulation

16.521 (1.362)

13.963

20.785

95

Mountainous Terrain

20.204 (21.183)

0.000

74.500

94

Infant Mortality

94.555 (42.248)

11.750

186.800

81

MSES

0.245 (0.231)

0.003

1.603

93

Full Democracy

0.000 (0.000)

0.000

0.000

82

Partial Democracy

0.085 (0.281)

0.000

1.000

82

Partial Democracy w/ Factionalism

0.159 (0.367)

0.000

1.000

82

Partial Autocracy

0.122 (0.329)

0.000

1.000

82

Full Autocracy

0.488 (0.503)

0.000

1.000

82

Transition

0.146 (0.356)

0.000

1.000

82

Political Discrimination (0-4)

3.325 (1.250)

0.000

4.000

83

Economic Discrimination (0-4)

2.904 (1.358)

0.000

4.000

83

GDP Growth (Lag)

0.002 (0.074)

-0.315

0.287

90

N

97
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Table C2: Summary Statistics for “Other” Years – Updated Data
Variable

Min

Max

Observations

Conflict Onset (Dummy)

Onset Years
Mean (SD)
0.000 (0.000)

0.000

0.000

1355

GDP/capita (1,000s)

8.126 (1.565)

4.933

11.723

1242

PCE

0.175 (0.241)

0.002

4.973

1167

PCE Squared

0.088 (0.762)

0.000

24.725

1167

Peace Years

27.238 (17.262)

1.000

63.000

1355

Former French African Colony

0.089 (0.285)

0.000

1.000

1355

Social Fractionalization

0.171 (0.168)

0.000

0.651

1291

Young Men (Prop of Total Pop)

0.129 (0.020)

0.081

0.278

1249

lnPopulation

15.701 (1.708)

9.659

21.002

1283

Mountainous Terrain

16.515 (20.101)

0.000

94.300

1288

Infant Mortality

58.682 (49.203)

2.180

234.400

1155

MSES

0.332 (0.227)

0.001

2.225

1245

Full Democracy

0.188 (0.391)

0.000

1.000

1242

Partial Democracy

0.113 (0.316)

0.000

1.000

1242

Partial Democracy w/ Fact

0.076 (0.266)

0.000

1.000

1242

Partial Autocracy

0.085 (0.280)

0.000

1.000

1242

Full Autocracy

0.406 (0.491)

0.000

1.000

1242

Transition

0.132 (0.339)

0.000

1.000

1242

Political Discrimination (0-4)

2.915 (1.274)

0.000

4.000

784

Economic Discrimination (0-4)

2.566 (1.319)

0.000

4.000

786

GDP Growth (Lag)

0.022 (0.041)

-0.279

0.360

1234

N

1355

176

APPENDIX D
Regime Type Tests
Table D1: Logit Model of Onset - Partial Democracies with Factionalism as Reference
(Full Democracies Removed from the Sample)

Year

Model 1
PCE/Growth Obs
0.005 (0.045)

Model 1
Ref = Full Autocracy
-0.007 (0.042)

Model 2
Ref = Factionalised Democ
-0.007 (0.042)

Full Autocracy

1.551 (0.427)***

Reference

-0.554 (0.343)

Part Autocracy

1.311 (0.547)**

0.181 (0.373)

-0.372 (0.444)

Part Democ Fact

1.916 (0.491)***

0.554 (0.343)

Reference

Part Democ

--

-0.444 (0.436)

-0.998 (0.491)**

Full Democ

--

--

--

Part/Full Democ

ref

--

--

Transitional

1.361 (0.485)***

-0.072 (0.346)

-0.626 (0.421)

Const

-3.949 (0.481)***

-2.501 (0.261)***

-1.947 (0.394)***

1140

1091

1091

N
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Table D2: Cross Tabulation of Political Discrimination and Factionalized Democracies
in the Full Sample of Countries
No Discrimination
Neglect/Remedial Policies
Neglect/No Remedial Policies
Exclusion/Neutral Policy
Exclusion/Repressive Policy
Total N
2
= 2.01, p = 0.734

Not Factionalized
7.6%
8.4%
11.3%
25.9%
46.8%
750

Factionalized
4.7%
5.9%
12.9%
29.4%
47.1%
85

Total
7.3%
8.1%
11.5%
26.2%
46.8%
835

Table D3: Cross Tabulation of Political Discrimination and Factionalized Democracies
among Factionalized Countries and Autocracies Only
No Discrimination
Neglect/Remedial Policies
Neglect/No Remedial Policies
Exclusion/Neutral Policy
Exclusion/Repressive Policy
Total N
2
= 4.472, p = 0.346

Autocracies
8.4%
3.7%
10.0%
23.6%
54.4%
539
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Fact. Democ.
4.7%
5.9%
12.9%
29.4%
47.1%
85

Total
7.9%
4.0%
10.4%
24.4%
53.4%
624

